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PRETENDED UNITY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, vertheidigt von Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., 2 Bände, Münster, 1860.

Dr. Th. A. Rixner's Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, III. Band, Sulzbach, 1850.

Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie von Dr. Albert Stöckl, Zweite Auflage, Mainz, 1875.

AT the end of a former article in which idealism with its various phases was explained we promised to examine the foundations of this system, and of others, either flowing from it immediately, or that in any other way owe to it their origin, in order to see if they are really reducible to that unity which is given out as *prima facie* evidence of their truth. The present article will examine and dispose of that claim.

In the criticism of idealism let us follow the three respects mentioned in the beginning, under which, according to the saying of the idealists themselves, philosophy ought to be one. Systematic philosophy should first draw all conclusions from one supreme and immediately certain principle, by strict deduction, without admitting or requiring any presupposition. Now, the truth of reason is said to be the main presupposition which has always been implied by ancient, and was replaced with strict demonstration by modern philosophy. Chiefly Des Cartes and Kant pretend to have reached this result, one by proving the other by criticising the truth of reason.

Des Cartes, beginning with universal doubt, admitted only our own existence to be immediately certain, and proceeded from this

one fact to demonstrate God's existence and infinite perfection, and thence the truth of our cognoscitive powers. But if he, at the very outset of his reasoning, denies the immediate certainty of the first principles,¹ and doubts even the truth of reason, how can we be certain of our own existence? If, as to all other things, even as to the existence of our body, however so necessarily admitted, we may be deceived by an evil spirit, or misled by the human mind itself, why could error not be enforced on us as to the existence and the nature of our thoughts and our reason? Moreover, if even the principle of contradiction does not hold good, what firmness can the conviction that we exist have? Can he affirm it undeniably certain, if it can together agree with the objective order and not agree, and if the object appearing itself can together be and not be? As long as he supposes the first principles still doubtful he cannot claim for the cognizance of our existence any insight into truth or objective evidence; he must consider it as a mere subjective bent of our mind. The same is to be said of the general criterion that all is certain that we clearly and distinctly perceive; the first principles not yet being certain, it cannot have but mere subjective certainty, not connected at all with the objective order of things. Then, starting from our existence, and led only by the standard of clear perception, Des Cartes has to go through a long series of conclusions, nearly through the whole of natural theology, before he arrives at the truth of our cognoscitive powers, founded on the fact that they are a participation of God's infinite perfections. I shall not even mention that in the course of his demonstration he bases his deductions on the theory of innate ideas and the ontological proof for the existence of God, which certainly do not extort our assent by their clearness, since they are rejected by the majority of philosophers for very good reasons. But what validity can he claim for his argumentation? Conclusions rest not only on material principles, the premises, but also on formal ones, the laws of consequence; the former being frequently, the latter always, those of contradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. But

¹ Des Cartes sometimes says that we are not to doubt the first principles of reasoning, but only the conclusions drawn from them. In his work, however, *De Principiis Philosophiæ*, Part I. n. 5, he plainly asserts the contrary. He says: "Dubitabimus etiam de iis principiis, quæ hactenus putavimus esse per se certa. Cum autem advertimus, nos esse res cogitantes, prima quædam notio est, quæ ex nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque enim cum quis dicit: ego sum sive existo—existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, ut patet ex eo, quod si eam ex syllogismo deduceret, novisse prius debuisset istam majorem: illud omne, quod cogitat, est sive existit; atqui profecto ipsam potius discit ex eo, quod apud se experiatur, fieri non posse ut cogitet, nisi existat."

The truth of reason being still doubtful, also its first principles must be doubted and cannot yet be admitted as certainly true,

for Des Cartes they are still doubtful. As often, then, as he appeals to them he supposes what he intends to prove. His method is still more perplexed by the necessity either to admit or to doubt the truth of reason in the course of his deductions. If he admits reason to be true he supposes his own conclusion. If he still doubts it all his reasoning is doubtful, too; for how can reason, which, by its own nature, may be deceitful, be trusted and relied on surely? Wherever he turns himself he cannot evade this dilemma. But let us even suppose he could, what would he attain? Not science, but faith. As in his system the firm conviction of our first cognition arises not from an objective motive but from a merely subjective bent of the mind, so, the truth of our cognoscitive powers does not rest on objective evidence or intrinsic reasons, but on the impossibility that God can be deceived in his cognitions or deceive in his manifestations. But this is the motive of faith and not of science. For this reason he and his followers have justly been accused of dogmatism in philosophy.

It might, however, be answered that we present Des Cartes's case too weakly. Let us, then, make any allowance he may ask. He sometimes says that we ought not to doubt of the first principles, but only of the conclusions drawn from them. This saying of his is based on the theory of doubt which he later adopted, in order to extricate himself from difficulties. He divided our certainty from the actual cognition of all the reasons which evidence a proposition, and, on the contrary, our doubts from the impossibility to have always present all the premises from which a conclusion is drawn. The remedy now to attain certainty also in the latter case he imagined to have found in the remembrance of God's truth. Let us, as I said, grant every word of this theory. But then arises the question how we acquire the certain knowledge of the first principles. It may be said that they are implied in the cognition of the first concrete or individual fact known to us. Des Cartes took for such our own existence. Let us not question whether he is right or wrong in doing so. We are, indeed, not conscious of those distinct acts by which we understand, first, the abstract principle that what thinks must exist, then are cognizant of our thoughts, and at last infer that we exist. We are certain of our existence by one act of judgment. But how can the first principle be implied in it? This may happen in two different ways: either the principle is inferred from the individual fact as its reason, or the individual fact is known in the light of the first principle. The latter means that by one act we judge, immediately and with certitude, of an individual object in which the principle is made concrete, so however that what enlightens and moves our mind is, not the concrete form of the object as such, but the principle invested in it.

Des Cartes seems to think such principle is inferred from the individual fact; for he says that one knows the principle, "what thinks must exist," from the experience he has that he cannot think without existing. But such an inference would be quite unlawful, because we would thus simply and immediately make a general rule of one single case. If, on the contrary, we know the individual fact in the light of the general principle, then the latter furnishes the reason or the motive for which we pass a certain judgment on the former. So, in reality, our judging proceeds. We do not, for instance, infer the principle of contradiction from the experience that we cannot together exist and not exist; for, by the by, this is not even an object of experience; but rather we understand it directly and immediately, whether it be proposed to us in an abstract or in a concrete form. Yea, if we analyze any certain cognition and resolve it into its last motive, we give as the reason of our certitude the general principle of contradiction. It is this that furnishes firmness to our conviction and makes doubt impossible; whilst, on the contrary, it not yet being admitted, the assent to any judgment of a particular fact could be withheld for a good reason. What we have said of the principle of contradiction may be applied also to those of identity, of sufficient reason, and to all the others. Now this being so, evidently not our existence or any other individual fact, but the first principles are the first truths known to us, the foundation of certainty, and the starting-point of all our reasoning. Des Cartes's doctrine on self is thus completely overthrown.

But even the remedy with which, his theory of doubt supposed, he supplied us for the attainment of certainty in our reasonings, is quite insufficient. As he thinks, a judgment is certain only then, when we actually understand all the principles on which it rests; but not when we know them habitually, though with the remembrance of their former actual cognition. But if a proposition might be false, when we clearly and distinctly remember to have understood its reasons, it may also be false when we actually penetrate them. To gainsay this, it would be necessary to deny the truth of memory. This, however, Des Cartes does not do. Moreover, if, as he says, no judgment is certain, unless we actually see through all its reasons, also the truth of God is not certain, and consequently no motive of certainty; for at no time and in no reasoning have we actually present in our minds all the syllogisms by which Des Cartes, starting from our existence, proves God's existence, infinite perfection, and truth. Even generally in all our deductions, when we arrive at the conclusion, we have no longer an actual understanding, but only a remembrance of the premises. We must, therefore, either grant the truth of the memory and sufficiency of reasons, which we do not see through actually, but

remember to have understood formerly, or we must give up all certainty. The solution, then, which Des Cartes tried to give of the objections urged against his system furnishes a new support to skepticism. To give the result of his theory in few words, he begins with universal doubt, and never succeeds in overcoming it and restoring certainty.

Kant, still more anxious to lay a solid foundation of philosophy without presuppositions, commenced with criticising reason. As to the result of his speculation he differs from Des Cartes. The French philosopher tried at least to prove the truth of reason; but the German Aristotle, as Kant was sometimes called, ends by maintaining its falsity. He, therefore, is liable to much greater objections. First of all, if he claims objective validity for his critical researches, he already supposes or admits reason to be true; for he undoubtedly makes them by reason, and will not say that deceitful reason surely attains or manifests truth. But his criticism merely results in proving that we cannot know anything as it is in itself; that all our conceptions of time, space, existence, reality, and so on, and all our reasonings about the final cause are mere illusions. He, consequently, has either to renounce the objective validity of his criticism, or to acknowledge that by his tenets he together denies and asserts the truth of reason. But had he even proved its falsity without contradictions, thus he would have obtained no enviable result. He would start with cognoscitive powers proved by himself to be utterly deceitful and necessarily leading to error. Philosophy thus indeed would not be based on a solid foundation, but completely destroyed. What he adds about the practical reason, in order to save some truths, entangles him no less. The practical knowledge of which he speaks is based on no objective evidence and on no influence from any object, but, like the theoretical, on a mere subjective necessity of the mind. Now if this pure reason cannot attain truth, because it is as to its form independent of any outward object, why should the practical, being in just the same condition, do better? What undermines the truth of one overturns also that of the other.

Kant's new method of philosophy is as solid and radical as that of a physiologist who begins his researches with pulling out his eyes, in order to examine them under the microscope and to correct his observations from the faults discovered in them. It is worthy of notice by what reasoning he came to admit inborn forms of the mind. First, as space and time are apprehended by all our sensible perceptions, he thought that they must be forms of our organs. Had he said that only material objects, which as such exist in time and space, make an impression on our material senses and determine them to action, he would have both accounted for the form

and saved all trouble about our sensual cognitions. Then, because possibility, necessity, universality, and other categories can, as such, neither exist in contingent, individual, and changeable beings, nor act on our senses, he concluded that all these predicaments must be derived from the mind alone, and by no means from the objects. Consequently he denied also the objective truth of our conclusions, because our reasoning is founded on the relations of things, and relations are pure forms of the mind. Others had been aware of the difficulty of accounting for our universal conceptions long before Kant. From their existence they had concluded that there must be in man, besides the sensual, also an immaterial power of perception, by which he, abstracting from individual notes, obtains the universal, and penetrating the phenomena arrives at the essence, necessity, possibility, substance, and cause. Thus they had fully explained our universal and abstract cognitions, not injuring the truth of the mind, but disclosing its higher spiritual power. Kant would, on the contrary, acknowledge but a material or sensual perception in man. This reason alone compelled him to declare all our intellectual notions and reasonings to be illusions. However much he seems to extol human reason, he takes materialism as the basis of his system. We ought, then, not to be astonished if the modern materialists have recourse to Kantism.

The idealists, after Kant, based the unity and solidity of their systems, not on criticism, but on a new method and on quite new principles of reasoning. The ancient philosophers, following the analytical method, had proceeded from the effect to the cause, from the contingent to the absolute; the modern tried to proceed by the synthetical method, from the cause to the effect, from the absolute to the contingent. True, they considered the absolute from different points of view. Fichte calls it the absolute ego: that is, nothing but pure being; Schelling, the absolute identity of subject and object, first indifferent in itself and to be predicated of all things; Hegel, the universal, identical with thought. But, after all, the idea of the absolute is, as to the substance, the same in all their systems. Now, two questions must be discussed: first, whether they can reach the absolute without any presupposition? secondly, whether they can attain such an idea of the absolute as may be the distinctive principle of all philosophical conclusions? for this was laid down as the first condition of unity.

As to the first question, it is clear the absolute must be known either by immediate intuition or by inference; else it would be necessary to resort to a supposition. If it is known by inference, it is not the first principle. They must consequently say that they know it by immediate intuition; and so, indeed, they say. But now since this intuition is generally rejected by other philosophers,

because as our own consciousness attests, our cognition begins with sensual objects and proceeds from the contingent to the absolute, may the idealists not object against it that their first principle is based on an act of cognition, doubtful not only as to its truth, but even as to its existence? How will they justify their proceeding without implying a presupposition? They distinguish in man a twofold intuition: that of common understanding and that of higher reason. Common understanding, they grant, cannot attain the absolute immediately; nay, it detects in it only contradictions. Reason alone can, as they say, arise to the height of the absolute, and penetrating its depth see it to be both thinking and being, both spirit and nature. This answer, however, intricates the difficulty still more. Why should we, again, like Kant, think one power, the human mind, common understanding, to be false and unfit for truth, and take the other, high reason, for infallibly true and endowed with the immediate insight into the infinite? Why was, during many centuries, only the deceitful common understanding active, and why did higher reason not awake before our days, and is found even now not in mankind in general, but in a few idealists? Ought we not ask for some reason for so strange a distinction of our intellectual powers and so marvellous an event in history? Ought we to grant all such assertions on account of their immediate evidence? We may confidently say, no philosophical system has ever commenced with a presupposition that is so startling and does such wrong to all mankind. The idealists themselves would overcome this repugnance by the fair hopes they gave of the great results to be obtained from their system. The philosophy of the absolute they promised would give so satisfactory a solution of the most difficult questions, and afford so full and so deep an understanding of all truth, so complete a reduction of all things to perfect unity, that mankind could not but find therein a proof of the immediate intuition of reason they had asserted. If, indeed, so perfect a science were obtained by their method, we ought not to quarrel with them about one or the other postulate, and might take the result as a warrant for the truth of their principles. But where is that satisfactory solution of all philosophical questions, that full insight into all truth given by idealism? Was it Fichte who gave it? He was severely attacked by Schelling. His system had to be changed, but even so was soon rejected. Did Schelling accomplish this task? He himself had to own that he was generally misunderstood, and his hearers and scholars, though they wondered at his poetical flights, had to complain of the confusion and the many contradictions of his doctrine. His system needed to be reduced to order by some one else. Has Hegel reached that pretended height of perfection? Even Hegel-

ism soon got out of fashion. Before Schelling's death modern philosophy was tired of all these systems, and tended toward atheism, materialism, and nihilism on a much shorter way. Arthur Schopenhauer, a follower of Kant and a materialist himself, avowed that the modern sophists, among whom he reckons chiefly Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, by their obscure silly talk, empty of sense but full of pretensions and contradictions, have brought disgrace on German philosophy abroad and at home. Even the three great geniuses and founders of idealism themselves were not contented with their philosophical theories. They had to change them continually and could never come to a satisfactory end. They were, moreover, idealists only in their lecture halls and at their writing-tables. In their practical life they could not be induced to follow their philosophical views. Their affairs of the greatest importance were decided according to the common understanding, not according to the pretended immediate intuition of higher reason. At last, though they were closely connected and kindred as to the main ideas of their systems, they nevertheless accused one another of sophistry, deceit, nonsense, and stupidity.¹ Idealism thus having rather disgusted mankind than given the satisfaction alleged as a proof for the immediate intuition of reason, rests on a mere supposition, not only not probable, but utterly repugnant to experience and monstrous in its very conception.

Let us now answer the question whether the idealists can attain such an idea of the absolute as may be the first deductive principle of all conclusions. From the systems expounded we know that they call the absolute, universal; indeterminate, indifferent, first void of reality, and then to be realized by determinations. But such is the abstract not the absolute being. This will be evident from a short comparison. The abstract being which our mind obtains by prescinding from all particular or individual notes of an object is, just on account of this abstraction, indeterminate, and, on account of its indetermination, universal, that is, predicable of all things; it is indifferent in itself, because it is neither this nor that, but can be contracted to everything by determinations added. Though it can be said of all things that exist, it, nevertheless, cannot exist as such but only under determinations, since whatsoever exists is individual and determinate, and though it is so universal that it can and must be predicated of all things existing and possible, it does not imply a high but rather the lowest degree of entity, for it has no other note than simply that of being, which if

¹ With what contempt Schelling and Hegel spoke of each other we may see from their own letters, *vide* Johannes Jansen, *Zeit und Lebensbilder*, Freiburg. Herder, 1875, pp. 80-93.

we should abstract too, we should arrive at nothing.¹ The absolute being, on the contrary, is individual, since whatsoever exists is such, and, consequently, universal (not as to its predicability, but as to its causality); it is not indeterminate, but, rather, necessarily determined in every respect; not void of reality, but the fulness of all perfections; not unable to exist, as such, but bearing the sufficient reason of existence in itself, and, therefore, self-existing. From this we evidently see that the attributes which the idealists give to their first principle are directly repugnant to the absolute, and agree only with the abstract being. They consequently, only by a strange confusion of two widely different conceptions, pretended to have attained the absolute by immediate intuition; for they did not reach the absolute but the abstract; not the fulness of perfection, but the most indeterminate entity. Therein lies the paramount falsehood of their theory of the first principle, the source of a great many other errors and mistakes. Some of them I shall point out. First, such a confusion being made, the idealists ascribe to the abstract being self-existence and infinity. Now, not only are such attributes repugnant to the abstract being, but from them also false and contradictory principles are deduced as a basis of further speculation. Then, by the same confusion, they make the being from which they would start quite unfit to be the principle of all deductions. Any principle must contain what is to be deduced from it, else deduction would be absurd in its very conception. But mere being, indifferent, and void of any determination, does not contain any determinate truths. It is true there are some general laws and principles, founded on the single conception of being, but they are as abstract and indeterminate as being itself. Like this, they are applicable to everything possible and existing, but do not involve any concrete element, and serve, on this account, rather indirect demonstration, by which the contradictory of a proposition is shown to be absurd, than direct deduction, by which a new truth, quite unknown before, is disclosed. It is also true, abstract being can become everything; but the determinations by which it is contracted are not developed or conceived from it, since it does not contain them, but are taken from determinate beings presented to our mind. To make, therefore, the indeterminate being the general principle of all deductions is the most startling contradiction ever set forth; for, by supposing it to be indeterminate it is made void, and by assuming it as the principle of all deductions it is declared to be full of all conceivable determinations.

This consideration will supply us also with the answer to the question whether idealism connects all things as they are, in them-

¹ St. Thomas, *Summa c. gent.* cp. 26 : *Summa Theol.* p. I, q. 3, art. 4, ad I.

selves, in perfect unity, by deriving them from and reducing them to one supreme ontological principle. This has been said to be the second respect under which philosophy ought to be one. Ancient philosophy, it was objected, introduced a fatal dualism everywhere. It distinguished in the body matter and form, in man soul and body, and put between the world and its cause an infinite distance. Idealism, on the contrary, is thought to have discovered that all things grow from the absolute as its organs or determinations, and, though distinct and even opposite to one another, return not only to perfect harmony but even to absolute identity. Has idealism, indeed, obtained this result?

As the idealists maintain being and thinking to be identical, the development of thought is, in their systems, the same as that of nature or reality. Accordingly, as all philosophical conclusions are ultimately derived from the conception of being as the supreme logical principle, so all the reality of the world springs forth from being as its first ontological source or origin, thought being either the activity by which reality is produced, or the form under which it is put into existence, or the principle from which it is developed. This supposed, it is first clear that the evolution of the world from the absolute is liable to the very same objections as the logical development of science. They both have, in common, not only the same first principle, but also the same confusion of the absolute and the abstract. From indeterminate being, therefore, as no determinate knowledge, so no concrete and determinate reality can spring forth. The same reason shows the impossibility of both the one and the other. Any deduction, whether logical or physical, supposes that the thing to be deduced is contained in the principle from which it proceeds, else we should have a product without a sufficient reason or cause. But indeterminate being is void of any determination, and by its very conception excludes any determinate reality. The development of the universe from it is, for this reason, a contradiction in itself, a monstrous absurdity. The idealists, however, try to illustrate its possibility by the growth of organic beings. But there is an immense difference between these two evolutions. Organic beings grow from a seed already determined to a certain species, if the latter is influenced from several outward agents, and receives from without the food to be transformed into organs. One of these conditions not being fulfilled, no plant or animal whatsoever will be developed. But the evolution of indeterminate being, as taught by the idealists, neither begins with a determinate germ nor admits an outward cause which may act on it or furnish the matter to be assimilated, since without the universal, as they say, nothing can exist. From the very comparison alleged we must rather infer the absolute impossibility of the evolution in

question. Another illustration has been taken from mental development. This, however, leads to the same conclusion. Can we imagine that one secluded from the outside world, blind to the beauties of nature, in no contact with other beings, yea, not even developed as to his intellectual faculties themselves, will, little by little, enlarge the narrow compass of his knowledge, and enrich himself with all accomplishments of art and science? Must we not, on the contrary, judge that during this life he will be doomed to darkness and utter ignorance? Just so we must think, also, of the indeterminate or abstract being. It wants all elements necessary to self-development. There is in it no sufficient reason for evolution; neither an impulse from without nor a determination from within as effective causes, neither matter nor form as constituent parts. Its self-development is as inconceivable as an effect without a cause, or a compound without components.

Many other absurdities must follow from such suppositions. First, the idealists admit, like other philosophers, that the absolute is infinite, eternal, necessary, self-existent, independent, in short, endowed with consummate perfection. Now; as they confound the absolute with the abstract, they are compelled to predicate all these attributes also of indeterminate being. They add, however, that this is possessed of infinite perfection, not at once and from eternity, but successively and by evolution. Its infinity is a tendency to an endless struggle for perfection, a cause of continual progress. Thus they thought both to justify the confusion they made of the absolute and the indeterminate, and to give a correct and adequate idea of infinite perfection. Progress, they said, is a perfection in itself; consequently, the absolute must be viewed as progressing, it seems, full of life and energy, whilst if endowed with immutability, as described by ancient philosophy, it must be conceived as dead and motionless. However striking and new this idea seemed to be, it, nevertheless, implies a monstrous contradiction. The infinity of the absolute cannot consist in progress. The being which exists by itself determines by its own essence its actual perfections as well as its existence, for, without the former the latter cannot be thought of at all. But, perfections which a being has by its own essence can neither be changed nor destroyed in it, because they depend on the same essence both as to their substance as to their degree. Were they ever changed in any way, the essence itself would cease to be. But then the latter would not be absolute, as it was supposed, but contingent, and would, if self-existing, arise from non-existence into existence by its own activity exerted before existing. The absurdity of this nobody will deny; but one might say that an alteration of perfections or determinations supposes the essence of the absolute to be only modified, and not cease to be.

This, however, is an error. Any essence is, as such, unchangeable, and any increase or diminution of its reality destroys it and constitutes another one. Moreover, the sufficient reason for a perfection is either contained in the essence or not. If it is contained it can never fail in a being of that essence. If not contained in the essence, and, nevertheless, once to be obtained, the perfection must either be laid in it from without, which is repugnant to the absolute being determining itself by its own essence, or must arise in it from nothing, which is the same as being put into existence without a sufficient reason. Nor can such a perfection of the absolute be effected by its own operation, because this neither can bring forth more than what is contained in the essence by which it is constituted. It is therefore evident that the absolute being is unchangeable, both as to its existence and to its perfections, and that with absolute necessity it is such as it is, and can neither decrease nor increase, neither acquire nor lose anything. But what degree of perfection does it thus possess? The fulness of all perfection: for, as it possesses those perfections which it actually has, so it excludes those which it has not by virtue of its essence, and, consequently, with absolute necessity. Now, it does not exclude any perfection by virtue of its essence, but rather admits them all; for the union of all perfections which we positively conceive to be possible cannot be realized in a contingent being, and hence must be realizable in the absolute. We then conclude that the latter really possesses all perfections from eternity and forever without any wane.

Now we may easily judge, whether progress is possible in the absolute or infinite being. Evolution is not a simple, but a mixed perfection. It involves finiteness; for it necessarily supposes a being which possesses first a lower and then acquires a higher degree of perfection; which by virtue of its essence is not endowed with the fulness of perfections, but tends towards higher accomplishments; which is not stationary on account of its being determined in every respect, but always moves on, because never completely actuated. There is, consequently, between essential infinity and growth in perfection, between absolute necessity and evolution, an irreconcilable contradiction.

Pantheism is another absurdity of idealism. The idealists maintain that there is nothing without the absolute, that it is all, and that it gets infinite and enriched with all reality by the development into our individual egos or into nature and spirit. They plainly avow, that God himself is the process of evolutions and becomes first the world, then man, at last spirit. Again, according to their views, the world is either the appearance of the absolute, or the opposite into which the latter turns itself, and by which it is determined and realized. There is no doubt, God is, as they say, the

universe, and the universe is God. But as they on one side avow all moments and stages of evolution in the universe to be imperfect, changeable, transient, finite, distinct from one another, produced; so they must admit on the other that God, whom they term self-existing and absolute, is infinite, absolutely necessary and unchangeable as to his perfections, eternal, unproduced, simple, and free from any composition. Accordingly, in their system God is together finite and infinite, together unproduced and produced, together absolutely necessary and contingent, together unchangeable and subject to continual changes, together entirely simple and compound of many parts, together most perfect in every regard and imperfect as to the elements of which he consists, together existing from eternity and arising in time into complete existence and reality. Can there be contradictions more evident and striking?

What we have said so far might induce any one to reject the unity devised by idealism. What is unity worth if founded on contradictions and falsehood? We shall, however, show directly and from their own tenets, that they have not built up, but destroyed unity. By unity things are perfected and accomplished. If, therefore, it is proved that idealism tends toward nihilism or denies the reality of things, its destruction of unity will be evident. But idealism results necessarily in nihilism. We might first say that all the contradictions already disclosed must end by negation and destruction. Notes contradicting one another cannot constitute being, but nothing; for, if the very elements of which being consists, destroy one another by contradiction, nothing can result from their combination. Now as all the perfections of God are contradicted by the imperfections of the world, which he is said to be, his necessity by its contingency and so on, the foundation of all reality is annihilated. Moreover, being which has no sufficient reason, is to be conceived as nothing. But indeterminate being has in itself neither the sufficient reason for its own existence nor that for evolution; consequently, the universe said to be developed from it is mere nothingness. Still more evidently, nihilism follows from the nature of evolution taught by the idealists. According to Fichte, the absolute is determined by the limitation which the hindrance or the non-ego produces in it. But this limitation is negation. Therefore, not only the matter or the hindrance is nothing, as Fichte, in order to avoid dualism, is compelled to grant, but also the determination of the absolute or the abstract. Schelling, in the first and third period of his speculation, says that each particular being or each degree of evolution consists of two opposite elements: one positive, the other negative, and that by being reduced to indifference they constitute absolute identity. But the result of a struggle between positive and negative elements is de-

struction, just as by the collision of two bodies, equally strong, motion is stopped and rest ensues. In his second period, when imitating Platonism, he plainly avows both that the sensible world has no reality in itself, being nothing but an unreal appearance, and that the absolute develops itself by such unreal images. In Hegel's system the universal turns itself in each stage of evolution into its opposite, that is, into nothing, which, however, it withdraws and combines again with itself. By this combination of nothing with itself he thinks the universal becomes determined and filled with reality. It is, for this reason, an outspoken axiom of his speculation, that the absolute is the identity of contradictions, and that by them it becomes real. But how can being grow in reality by turning itself into nothing, and by uniting nothing to itself? Who can imagine existence in what consists of being and not being, of entity and its negation? The result of such a combination cannot be thought to be anything else than nothing or annihilation. It is not to be overlooked for what purpose the idealists resorted to such a theory. Having put the absolute in opposition to its appearance or to its reality, they, in order to overcome dualism again and return to absolute identity, let the two opposite elements destroy each other. Dualism then has indeed ceased to be, but things have returned not to the same entity, but to the same nothingness. The Indian pantheism comes to just the same result; it, too, plainly terms the return to the divinity annihilation.

We have not drawn consequences from the tenets of the idealists of which they did not think themselves, and which, if aware of them, they would have abhorred. Nihilism is so closely connected with pantheistic idealism that the latter without the former can scarcely be conceived. Nihilism was, moreover, in reality the last issue of Hegel's teachings, and has been warmly embraced by his followers as the consequence of his tenets. But also Hegel himself professed it, when as the main proposition to be expounded and proved by philosophy he laid down the following: "All is one and all is nothing," or, "God is all and God is nothing." Could nihilism be taught more openly and be stated as the result of idealism more plainly? Now I think, nothing is more shocking than the very idea of a system which is avowedly based on contradiction, which implies both pantheism and nihilism, which combines things in unity by reducing them to nothingness, which pretends to derive all beings from one principle that is void and barren, by an evolution that is destructive, which avouches the absolute to contain everything by identity, and declares it to be nothing. Such contradictions being stated, everybody must see, I will not say the falsity, but the extreme absurdity and foolishness of idealism; so much the more as the idealists, notwithstanding its repugnance to

sound reason, boast of having found the most complete system of science, and of having by far surpassed all former centuries in wisdom.

On Des Cartes's and Kant's systems it is not necessary to dwell; for they did not and could not pretend to have reduced things known to their objective unity. Kant denies the capacity of our mind to show anything as it is in itself, and consequently also the possibility to attain the objective order. Des Cartes made not only no progress towards unity, but even widened the dualism for which scholastic philosophy was blamed.

Having spoken of the oneness of the logical and the ontological principle, we may now pass over to the union of them both, which is the third condition of perfect unity. In this respect, too, the idealists glory in having made quite new and wonderful discoveries. By establishing the identity of thinking and being, they pretend not only to have accounted satisfactorily for the transition from the subject to the object, but also to have reached the highest degree of unity possible. Indeed we cannot conceive unity more complete than identity. But identity would, according to idealism, exist between the logical principle and its deductions, between the ontological and its evolutions, and between the logical and ontological principles themselves. The question is, however, whether such identity of thinking and being is real.

Let us first hear the reason alleged by the idealists for its truth. Because the abstract or indeterminate being is indifferently predicated of all things, of the mind thinking as well as of the object thought of, Schelling thinks it contains subject and object, both reduced to identity. This reasoning is evidently a sophism. Indeterminate being is predicated of all things indifferently, not because it contains all their determinations, but because it abstracts from them. Now subject and object, the ideal and the real, if thought of as such, already imply some determinations. Therefore, Schelling's argumentation is the following: "Because being excludes all determinations, and is thus predicated of all things, therefore it includes the determinations of both the subject and the object." Really a very solid foundation of idealism! Fichte reasons with the same fallacy. "If the mind," says he, "affirms a proposition absolutely true, it must itself put into reality both the subject and the predicate and the connection between them; for, if it were in judging dependent on an outward object, its assertion would not be absolute, but hypothetical." The mind, therefore, he imagines, is both the subject and the predicate, both that which thinks and that which is thought. True, whenever we form a judgment, its subject and predicate and the connection between them is within us through the activity of our mind, as far as this represents them; for cogni-

tion is vital representation. But representation is not necessarily identical with the thing represented; they may be and are indeed often distinct from each other, just as the portrait differs from the person portrayed, and real differs from pictured gold. We can, therefore, pronounce an absolutely true sentence without putting into reality its subject and predicate and their connection; we need only bring forth a representation of them in our mind. Fichte's saying would have some truth if an absolute sentence meant a representation formed without any dependence or presupposition. But this is false; for such a proposition does not mean a representation which exists with absolute necessity and without dependence, but an object which is necessary in itself and independent of our thought. One might, nevertheless, answer, quite in accordance with Fichte's views, that the mind cannot represent an object without containing its very entity. But we may ask in return: Can a photograph not represent a man without containing his very substance or nature, that is, without being a man, too? Is it, in order to produce a resemblance, not enough that the object to be photographed makes an impression on a susceptible plate through the rays of light? In the same way, the mind is sufficiently enabled to represent any outward object, as soon as this directly or indirectly determines our cognoscitive powers. Fichte's reasoning, then, rests on the confusion of the object and its representation.

This reminds us of Schelling's Platonism, which was intended to evidence the identity of thinking and being by a quite new theory. "The absolute," said he, "forms by intuition an idea or a likeness of itself, which likeness, inasmuch as it is produced, is dependent, and inasmuch as it a resemblance, is absolute, independent, and endowed with the power to reproduce its own image. Considering itself as absolute, it falls off from God, and, thus losing its entity and its productive power, brings forth unreal representations of its own nothingness, the sensible world." Let us test the validity of this proof. First of all, it is by no means necessary that the likeness constituting cognition should equal, as to entity, either the object which is known by it, or the intellect which has produced it. That there must not be equality between the object and its likeness as to entity, that one thing can be represented by another of a quite different nature, we know from daily experience. Great statesmen and poets are represented in marble; plants and animals in gold, silver, or iron; fluid by solid bodies. If we reflect on ourselves, and find our thoughts to be transient affections, and our soul the permanent substance in which they inhere and from which they arise, we are certainly conscious of a very great difference between our ideas and our soul as to their entity. To speak, therefore, in general, it is untrue that a living being and its ideal resemblance have necessarily the

same absolute entity and the same productive power. As to divine cognition it is true the divine essence and the idea, which it forms of itself, have absolutely the same entity on account of the absolute simplicity of the Divine Being. But if it is impossible to make an absolute distinction between God and the idea he has of himself, it is also absurd to put an opposition between them, or to say, as Schelling does, that the idea, if considered as absolute, falls off from God and comes to nought. To use the same argument against him in a somewhat different form, we may ask him, whether he admits or not a distinction between the absolute and its idea as to entity. If he admits no distinction, no opposition between them and no falling off from God is possible. If he admits a distinction, he intricates himself in other contradictions; for, if he supposes the idea to be inherent in the absolute, he must say that the latter is compound and lacks the simplicity of the infinite being; if he, on the contrary, thinks it exists without the absolute, this cannot be rendered cognizant or intrinsically enriched by its entity. Again, we must suppose the idea either to be equal or not to be equal to the absolute in perfection. If he considers it to be equal, it is also unproduced; for there is no equality, but an immense difference between being produced and unproduced. But if the idea is, as to its entity, unproduced, it must be identical with the absolute and indistinct from it; because a plurality of absolute beings is absurd. Moreover, it could also not be conceived how unproduced being could fall off from the absolute by considering itself as such. If, on the contrary, he says that the idea is unequal to the absolute in perfection, it has its own entity, inasmuch as it is distinct from any other being, even from the absolute, but remains essentially dependent on the latter. Schelling seems to think that what is distinct from another being is also independent of it. But distinction is one, and independence is another thing. A slave, even, inasmuch as he is such, is certainly distinct from his master, and nevertheless quite dependent on him. The idea, therefore, cannot, in this supposition, consider itself as independent and absolute. Did it judge so of itself, it would produce not its likeness, but its unlikeness, which would neither be cognition nor constitute the ideal development of the absolute. Many other questions, not less perplexing, might be put to Schelling. If the likeness of the absolute participates as such of its productive power and its absoluteness, how can it, by forming a conception of its own entity, bring forth an image of its own nothingness? Again, things have productive power not only by nothingness, but by their intrinsic perfection, and are actually productive, not when they bring forth something unreal or nothing, but when they put some real entity into existence. How, then, shall we understand Schelling, when he says, that the idea, inasmuch

as it is absolute, and has productive power by itself, is nothing and produces only unreal images? Schelling's Platonic system is a labyrinth of contradictions.

We have still to hear Hegel's proof for the identity of being and thinking. It may be rendered in the following syllogism: The universal alone is being; but the universal undergoes a process of evolution which is possible only in thought or conception; therefore, being and thinking are the same. Let us test one premise after the other. The universal alone is being. Universality as such arises from indetermination. The universal predicability of a note increases inasmuch as determinations are abstracted from it, and decreases inasmuch as they are left in it. Hegel must, consequently, say that determinations are non-entities, and says, indeed, that the particular or individual is nothing. But how can the indeterminate being which means nothing but mere entity get determined by a negation added to it? Or, to illustrate the matter by an example, how shall we conceive that, if we contract the universal being to a particular by adding the note "rational;" the former alone implies entity, and the latter means nothing but a negation of being? Whether Hegel, by the immediate intuition of his reason, can see this, we do not know; but certainly the common-sense of mankind cannot perceive anything else in such assertions but contradictions. As long, therefore, as we cannot root out the understanding we have at present from the bottom of our nature, we cannot admit Hegel's first principle that the universal alone is being. A clue, however, to unriddle Hegel's propositions, may be found in the confusion of the absolute and the abstract. The absolute is by itself and illimited, and is, for this reason, also called pure being, or simply, the being; any other thing is limited, implies imperfections, and differs from the absolute by negation. Now compounding the absolute and the indeterminate, the pure and the abstract being, he maintained, first, that the universal alone is being, and secondly, that it is contracted or determined by negation. Fichte and Schelling use quite the same language, evidently for the same reason. But the confusion made being unlawful, also the consequence, drawn from it, is false. Though the infinite is alone *the being*, the finite does not, therefore, cease to be *a being* involving real entity, with dependence, however, on the absolute and with negation of some higher perfection; it cannot, consequently, be considered as nothing. Again the limited being must be conceived as determined not by the perfection which it excludes, but the reality which it actually possesses; for, indeed, one is this and no other being, this and no other person, not because he is nobody, but because he is somebody. Determination, then, results, not from negation, but from perfection.

Hegel's first premise, therefore, is false, and rests on confusion of conceptions.

As to the second premises, by which he intended to prove the identity of thinking and being, we grant that the object is universal as it is in our thought, not as it is in itself. But we deny the reason alleged by him, to wit, that the process of evolution which the universal has to undergo cannot be found but in thought. The self-development of the indeterminate is, as we have shown, absurd and impossible. The true reason why the universal exists only in conception is the fact that, on one hand, whatsoever exists is determinate, and, therefore individual, and that, on the other, the mind can abstract the individual notes or determinations and thus attain an indeterminate and universal object. The consequence drawn by Hegel from such premises is necessarily absurd. A remark, however, on his reasoning might still be added. As he maintains that being in itself cannot exist but in the mind, or, as an intellectual abstraction, he does not, as it was pretended, establish the reality of things, but returns to skepticism, according to which the outward object is nothing else than an appearance to the mind, or an effect, or form of its operation. Yea, one might justly doubt the existence of the mind itself, for this also is either universal or individual. If it is individual it does not exist, or it is false that nothing but the universal is being. If it is universal, then Hegel should have explained why the universal in the mind alone and not outside it can exist, for this not being proved, the identity of thinking and being does not follow. There he evidently confounded the thought with its object. By abstraction a universal object is attained, but the mind, or the thought itself, which attains it, is, as to its entity, determinate and individual, and can just as little be universal as a head, or hand, or mountain. Every step of idealism rests on confusion and tends toward destruction.

But, now, we might be asked for what reason have we said that cognition is representation. Is not this a mere supposition, too, which the idealists may reject as well as we rejected theirs? It will, therefore, be necessary to search into the nature of thought. This research we shall base on the judgment of consciousness, which, I suppose, the idealists will not refuse, they, themselves, giving it out as the highest evolution of our mind, and, even, as absolute philosophy. Indeed, if we could not know our own thoughts we ought to despair of our capacity to attain any truth. What, then, does our consciousness pronounce on the connection between the mind and its object? First, it distinguishes a twofold series of objects; one of them it really places within ourselves, as, for instance, our own existence, our ideas, and affections; but the other it places without us and declares them to be distinct from us,

as, for instance, other intelligent beings, the mountains, the sea, the stars. But even the inward objects it distinguishes from thought itself, and considers them always as prior to it. Now this distinction of objects within and without ourselves appears to us so clear that under no circumstances can it be seriously denied; it is forced on us with so stringent a necessity that nobody, not even the most outspoken idealist, can part with it; it is so general that no man having the use of reason is found to be without it, and so fundamental in our life that on it nearly all our actions, even those of the highest importance, are based. If we dare gainsay such a judgment of our consciousness, we have to fall back to skepticism. If, on the contrary, we admit its truth, then the identity of thinking and being must be denied, and thought must be conceived to be representation; for, if things are without us and if, nevertheless, our mind apprehends their notes and qualities, they must needs be present in us, not by their reality but by their likeness.

Another consideration will throw still more light over this matter. According to idealism thought is either the cause or the form of being, and consequently prior to it. But, if thought is representation, it is evidently posterior to being, which is its object. Now it is not difficult at all to see for which side consciousness will decide. If being resulted from cognition we should be independent of the object, or, rather, this would be dependent on us. But we experience just the contrary. We cannot form truth as we like, but must admit it as it is in itself. We cannot think that two and two are five, or that poverty is wealth, or that virtue is vice. If we should so judge, we should evidently depart from truth. We feel truth will not yield to us; we must conform to it. We are, as to true cognition, quite dependent and put under a stern necessity. Nor is this subjective, but rather it is evidently objective, for we perceive things to have certain attributes and to form certain truths, before our cognition, without our conception, before we existed, and also if we should exist no longer. Moreover, if that necessity were subjective we should be enabled, by ourselves, and even forced against our will, to bring forth certain appearances or certain cognitions. But we are conscious that frequently we are neither forced to perform certain acts of cognition, but, rather, can prevent them, as we like, nor enabled to attain other ones, by ourselves, without the influence of outward objects. Shutting our eyes and our ears we shall not see the mountains and cities about us, or hear the words addressed to us; but being on the high sea we cannot perceive mountains or hear the noise of the cities. Why, then, should this be so, if the world were only the product of our cognoscitive powers, or our cognition itself, to which we are determined by nature? Again, if the firmament, the stars and their laws of motion,

the earth and its beauty and order, is simply the work of our mind, we ought to be conscious of having produced them, as we are aware of the labor we spend on a book we write or on a machine we construct. Or should we believe that we cannot perform some trifling work without consciousness, and yet have brought the whole world into existence without our knowing it? The process of our cognition is not accounted for by the theories of the idealists. But it finds its full explanation in the single principle that thought is representation, and therefore posterior to its object. Representation does not feign but imitates, does not produce but presupposes the object to be exhibited. On this account our cognoscitive powers are dependent on it, and cannot act without being either directly or indirectly determined by its influence. Therein lies the reason why we can prevent cognition by withdrawing our senses from all contact with outward things and obtain it by exposing them to their influence; and again, why we have not certain cognitions if certain objects cannot reach us. By a similar reasoning Kant's inborn form might be refuted. The necessity under which we are to perceive things in time and space, or to pass certain judgments on them, cannot be but objective, for frequently our perceptions or our judgments on the very same thing change, not because our faculties or organs have been changed, but because the outside thing has undergone an alteration either in itself or in its relations. Else Kant would be obliged to saddle all the changes which we perceive in the outside world on our organs and our cognoscitive powers; which is certainly repugnant to our consciousness as well as to critical researches. Then, of the several things without us we have different perceptions as to time and space, and form different judgments as to their reality, existence, necessity, and so on. Whence, we ask, does this difference arise? From the influence which the object exerts on us; for our senses and our mind remaining, in themselves, the same, are forced to vary in their cognition, just as the objects vary which are brought into contact with us.

We may, then, sum up the result of our reasoning in the following statement: The identity of thinking and being is not proved by reason, but upheld only by sophisms; consciousness, the truth of which cannot be denied, enforces on us the firmest conviction that there is a wide distinction between the thought and the object; experience attests in many daily instances that things within us are not dependent on us, but rather that our mind depends in its acts on their influence.

The theoretical tenets of idealism thus being refuted, its practical doctrine is evidently deprived of its foundation. The moral system of the idealists is founded on the absoluteness of reason, on the evolution of all from one indeterminate being, on the identity

of being and thinking. But all this is utterly false and absurd. The foundations being overturned, the tenets based on them can subsist no longer. This remark alone would suffice to refute their moral doctrine. But we may, directly from the contradictions contained in its first principles, and from consequences drawn from its tenets, show that idealism, instead of bringing about the unity of ethics, destroys all morality. For this purpose I shall first prove that it denies either the moral law or the freedom of man, which, both, are essentially necessary for morality. The moral law can be imposed on us only by a power or authority that is over us, and, consequently, distinct from us. But Kant, and the idealists after him, deny positively that, as to morality, man ought to be subject to an outward lawgiver. It is, therefore, evident that they also deny the existence of the moral law. But our first premise, saying that the moral law can be imposed on us only by a higher power, is gainsaid by the idealists, and must, for this reason, be proved. The moral law is a restriction of our free will. According to our nature, we can tend towards every object containing what good soever, and of all the good proposed to us choose what we like. Law restrains our will from a certain class of objects, and binds us to a certain order of goods; it lays on us a kind of necessity, so, however, that we are not forced to obey it, but have the possibility to do what it forbids and to omit what it commands. Now from what can such a restriction of the ample range of our free will arise, and how can we conceive a necessity laid on us without injuring our freedom? The restriction cannot originate with ourselves, neither with the dictates of reason nor with our free acts. Reason, left to itself, may declare some of the several goods which allure us to be more or less agreeing with our nature, for what is good in one may be harmful in another respect. But, though finding an object less suitable for us, it cannot deprive it of all its goodness, and, for this very reason, not lay a necessity on the will to abstain from it. Neither can the will by its own act bind itself; for, from what it has freely and by itself resolved on, it may also by itself again desist; it has as much power to desist from as to resolve on a purpose. To illustrate the matter by an example: an absolute monarch is, as to his person, not bound by his laws; he can follow or not follow, issue or repeal them, as he likes; whatever he does is right and lawful. Now idealism, above all, maintains the sovereignty and independence of the will; it cannot, consequently, be understood how it should lay a binding necessity on itself. This is more evident if we still further consider the nature of man's free will. The human will leads toward good, not toward one or the other good, but toward all good, toward the fulness of good, so that not yet having reached this it cannot rest, but is driven by an

inward impulse to further pursuit, and having reached it, it necessarily finds therein rest and complete happiness. Thus far our will is not free, but necessitated intrinsically or by its own nature.

If, however, any particular object does not appear with strictly compelling evidence to contain the fulness of all good, or to be quite necessary for the attainment of the latter, other sufficient means being supplied, there is no reason why the will should be under the necessity to strive after it; on the contrary, we concede it to be free, that is, to have the power to act or not to act. Such indifference as to a particular good in regard to the attainment of the supreme good is the real root of freedom. This supposed, we may now answer the question how human will may be bound or restrained with necessity, and nevertheless remain free. Two conditions are required; first, a particular good must be in a necessary connection with the supreme good, being either the object in which this is found, or a means or condition, without which this cannot be embraced; and, secondly, this connection must be disclosed to us with certainty, but not with compelling evidence. If there is such an object, then, indeed, the will is under a kind of necessity, and is nevertheless not forced to obey it, neither by an outward power nor by its own nature. Another way of binding the will with necessity and leaving it nevertheless free we cannot imagine. But now who can bring a particular object or act into a necessary connection with the supreme good? Certainly He alone who has power over all things, that is, He who can freely dispose of the supreme good itself and set down the conditions under which it may be attained. Such power we evidently do not possess; we feel and experience, on the contrary, that neither is the highest good found within our limited nature nor in any other object than the infinite being, nor do the conditions and means necessary to attain it depend on our own will. Therein, as even Kant agreed, we are entirely dependent, on an outward power, which must be the infinite being; because this alone can both dispose of itself and set down the conditions under which it ought to be embraced. The chain of this reasoning must convince us that moral law originates only with God. But Kant denied the very first principle from which our conclusion is drawn. "Moral actions," says he, "ought not to be performed through the motive of good, but through that of duty or necessity." This assertion supposes a complete ignorance of the nature of the will. The will is not and cannot be moved or allured by anything else but by good; such is its very nature as our own consciousness witnesses in every one of our actions. Duty itself does not move the will but by the good it implies or to which it leads; its pure necessity binding our freedom rather shocks than attracts us. No higher being, then, laying a law on our free will and thus restrict-

ing or binding it with necessity, there is neither a distinction between moral good and evil nor order in our actions; whatsoever in this supposition the will desires or does is allowed and good, yea the better, the more it promotes the independence and freedom of self.

If, nevertheless, the idealists insist upon a moral necessity which does not originate with an outward power, but arises from human nature itself, they destroy freedom; because they must resort to intrinsic dispositions of the will, which so regulate its actions as Kant's inborn forms determine the mind in its perceptions, judgments, and reasonings. But then the will is just as much necessitated by its very nature to a certain way of acting as the mind is forced by its forms to a certain way of thinking. This Kant and the idealists grant in plain terms. To retain a kind of freedom nevertheless, they place its essence in the absence of outward compulsion. But what becomes of morality if inward freedom is denied? It is no longer that self-determination according to reasons, perceived by an immaterial power of the mind; that noble tendency towards good, yea toward the infinite good, which attracts us by the splendor of its perfections; that love of right and justice which leads us without compelling us, and which we cherish in our hearts of ourselves, not being determined to it by nature. Morality then is a blind necessity inborn in us, a bent of our nature forcing us to a certain course of action, as gravity causes the stone to fall, or the instinct impels the birds to build their nests. Man and brute then differ only in the object toward which they tend, but as to the nature of their tendency they are perfectly equal; and morality is attributed to one for no better reason than to the other. Such a moral deeply lowers the dignity of man, and contradicts both the consciousness of all mankind, each individual of which knows itself to be free from inward necessity and the practice of all human societies, which regulate the actions of their members by laws, rewards, and punishments, not indeed because they think them to be necessarily determined by nature, but because they perceive them to have their actions in their power so as to be able to choose between them.

Other reasons might be alleged as a proof that idealism destroys morality, but for the sake of brevity I shall only hint at them. The moral law puts an intrinsic distinction between good and evil, and commands the one to be done, the other to be avoided. This idea of morality is common to all men, and, therefore, we all conceive him who is perfect to be free from sin and to be adorned with virtue. But idealism makes sin necessary, and puts it in God himself as a moment necessary for the attainment of infinite perfection. Vice is thus rendered divine just as well as virtue, which is at least

nothing but the combination of good and evil. Again, mankind has always considered God as the source of morality, He being the centre and foundation of all order, the main object of our love, the first principle from which all things flow, and to which all should return by their subjection. But Kant says that it is immoral to do anything out of love or obedience towards him, or to refer our actions to another aim than ourselves. The idealists confounding God with the world degrade him to man's wickedness and lift up man, not to subordination unto, but to equality or identity with God. What has been said of the morality of each individual may also be applied to all human society. There is no outward law which can bind man's free will, no supreme lawgiver as the source of inviolable right, no rule of true and inward honesty. Society is to be governed by outward compulsion. Whatsoever is thus extorted is right, whatsoever cannot be so reached is done justly and lawfully. The morality of public life thus becomes the policy of the iron hand and the sword, the tyranny of the stronger over the weaker. What every honest and noble-minded man considers most unjust, iniquitous, and base, is, according to idealism, highly just, praiseworthy, and divine. Certainly it was no exaggeration to say that the ethics of the idealists is the destruction of all morality.

To recapitulate our criticism of the several systems spoken of, we may now make the following brief statement. Des Cartes and Kant, in order to part with the presupposition which they thought ancient philosophy had made, have completely destroyed science, the former by falling into skepticism, the latter by denying the truth of reason. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in order to reduce philosophy to complete unity, commenced with a presupposition absurd in itself, set up one principle of logical deduction, which, resting on the confusion of the absolute and the indeterminate, is void of any determinate truth, but teeming with contradictions, and established another also of ontological evolution, which, being stripped of any determination and bringing forth only conflicting elements, results in universal destruction or nihilism; then combined them both to a kind of unity, which is not only not proved but repugnant to the experience and the consciousness of mankind; and ended at last with a moral system, which is the abolition of morality.

Would to God that in our day, as the false principles of idealism can be denied no longer, and the abstruseness of its tenets and its method is rather laughed at than admired, so too the prejudices which it has produced against scholastic philosophy may pass away; may its baneful consequences, already so apparent both in

science and in public life, convince mankind of the necessity to return to a sounder system!

In conclusion I should like to say still a few words on subjective tendency, which, though it has proved so fatal in idealism, is nevertheless sometimes looked upon as a great progress of our time, and as the principal means to reduce ancient philosophy to more complete unity. Subjective tendency, under what form soever it may be adopted, destroys both the unity and the truth of science.

Self may be considered either as the criterion, the last motive of certainty, or as the source, that is the deductive principle of all cognition. In both suppositions truth perishes. True cognition represents, and this manifests the object as it is in itself; certain cognition is the firm conviction that the object is in itself as it is apprehended by the mind. Now, as cognition, like any other thing, must have its sufficient reason, there must be a cause which first determines the mind to a representation agreeing with a certain object, and secondly produces in us the conviction of an agreement existing between the object and its representation. This cannot be but in the object. If the mind could form ideas merely by itself, why should it be necessary that there be a thing without us answering the representation within us? Why should then our thoughts rather be likenesses of real objects than mere fictions like the dreams of fancy? As the object would not be contained at all in the mind, the latter would produce the appearance according to its own peculiarity, and stamp on it only the form of its own subjective framework. But such appearance must either entirely disagree with the thing outside, especially if this is quite different from the nature of the mind, or, being in no connection with it at all, agrees with it only by chance. Were cognition nothing else, we should be compelled to espouse skepticism like Kant. Was he not forced to take the result of our mental operations for mere illusions, just because he imagined the forms of our perceptions, judgments, and reasonings to arise from the mind alone and not from the object? Cognition necessarily implies and represents the object only then when the latter determines our faculty to produce its likeness. We come to the same conclusion if we consider the nature of our faculties. Any cognoscitive power of ours, because in itself indifferent and determined to no act in particular, is but a remote and incomplete capacity of knowledge. Another element must, therefore, still be joined to it, which makes it complete and proximate by determining it to the representation of a particular object. What may this be? What can take off from it that indifference and incline it to that individual likeness of an outside thing? What else than the object itself by its direct or indirect

influence? No other course can do it, because no other can be thought to contain such an effect.

True cognition, then, originates with the object; this must determine our faculties, being present in them either by its own entity, or by its effects, or by its resemblance, or by its archetype. The cognoscitive power is but the material, the object the formal principle of our acts of cognition. Even God himself, therefore, knows all things from eternity, because His essence is their cause and their archetype, and so contains them all either eminently or virtually. It is thus that he is determined to infinite, illimited knowledge.

The criterion of certainty must likewise be objective, and not subjective. As cognition is true or agreeing with a certain object, not on account of its mere existence in the mind, or the qualities and peculiarities it has within us and from us, but on account of its being determined by the object, we cannot find the last reason of our certitude in ourselves. If we would do so, we should rely on a motive not connected with truth. We must derive certainty from the formal principle of our cognition, from an object determining our mind. But how shall we base on this the firm conviction, that our cognizance agrees with a certain thing outside? The appearance, being that which is known of an object, implies and indirectly manifests also our own act of cognition. This supposed, we may also say that we are certain as soon as we perceive the object to be necessarily so as it appears. That necessity of the object we understand in the following way. The object is in itself, in the respect under which it determines us, and consequently appears to us, just as it is and cannot be otherwise; not because it cannot be changed, if it is contingent, but because, if it has a determinate perfection, it cannot be likewise deprived of it. Moreover, if it has certain determinations, there must be also sufficient reasons within or without it which constitute or produce them. Now as cognition consists in the conformity of the subject with the object, and as the latter determines our faculties to conformity with itself by its influence, it makes known to us the reasons why it is such in itself and cannot be otherwise. We consequently see through the appearance itself the necessity of the object to be such as it appears, and also the reasons why it is so. This shining forth of the necessity of the object into our mind makes up evidence and founds alone solid and infallible certitude.

It might, however, be said that, nevertheless, ourself being a microcosm, or at least reflecting all the perfections and phenomena of the outside world, determines us to all cognition whatsoever, and is thus the deductive principle of all our knowledge. In this supposition we would directly and immediately know only ourselves, our soul, and our body; but outward objects, on the contrary, only

mediately and by reasoning. But this is utterly false, for we directly perceive the outside world itself, and not a mere likeness of it produced on our senses. Moreover, it is an undoubtable fact, attested by our consciousness and by daily experience, first, that we cannot know the substance of our soul immediately as it is in itself, but only as far as it manifests itself in our thoughts and our affections; secondly, that the series of our ideas begins with the outward objects which make an impression on our senses; thirdly, that we know the things and phenomena without us much better and more distinctly than those within us. All this points to the outward world as the main and the first source of our knowledge.

The destruction of truth by subjective tendency may be also illustrated by the divergence of men's minds which it necessarily produces. True cognition, being the representation of an object as it is in itself, must be the same in all minds; for the ideas or judgments, which two or more intellects form of the same object under the same respect, are either agreeing with the latter or not. If they are not agreeing, they are not true; if they are agreeing, they agree also with one another, and are, consequently, reduced to specific unity, according to the principle of identity. Two terms agreeing with one and the same third term agree with each other. Now, if self were the source of true cognition, the latter would vary just as much as the former. But self varies in each individual; and so indeed does cognition, whenever we are not compelled by evidence, or whenever our individual peculiarity exerts an influence on our judgments. It is an old and very true Latin proverb: "*Quot capita, tot sententiæ.*" Now it would be necessary either to give all the different and contradicting opinions of men the same claim on truth, or none at all; because they all arise equally from self. To give them no claim on truth would be inconsistent with the supposition that makes self the source of true cognition, and would moreover lead to skepticism by overturning the principle, that two contradictory judgments cannot be together false. If we would give them all the same claim on truth, then contradictory opinions would be together and equally true. Polytheism would be as true as Monotheism, and Theism as true as Atheism; and, in matters of moral, injustice would be as good as justice, if he who practices it thinks it to be so. But this is evidently false. Two contradictory propositions cannot be together true. Should this fundamental principle of logic be overthrown, certainty could subsist no longer. Moreover, if disagreeing opinions were together true, we should gainsay the axiom already proved and granted, that two cognitions agreeing with the same object must also agree with each other.

For this reason, it cannot be denied, that if self be established as

the source of all cognition, both truth and unity of science are necessarily destroyed.

True science reduced to perfect unity we cannot attain but in God. He being the last cause of all, in Him all our reasoning must end; He, possessing infinite perfection together with absolute unity and simplicity, can alone fill our minds, and by the likeness of Himself which he produces in us, reduce them all to complete agreement.

VOCATIONS TO THE PRIESTHOOD.

THERE is no subject more important than the securing of a well-trained clergy, and none demands greater thought and care on the part of superiors. The salvation of immortal souls depends, in a large measure, on the piety and zeal, health, strength, and learning of those whose vocation it is to labor in the mystical vineyard of Christ.

It is, therefore, with feelings very much akin to awe that we, on request of those whose wishes deserve respect, enter upon this subject, which ought to be treated by better and more competent hands than ours, and which should be discussed in an open and generous manner suited to the needs of our country. Lessons, moreover, should also be drawn from past experience for the furthering of the increasing work in our extensive and surely well-disposed field of missionary labor. We take it, indeed, for granted that our first duty is to preserve intact those who already possess "the faith once delivered to the saints" (St. Jude, 3d v.); but we may also add that, among our dissenting brethen, many bitter prejudices of past years have been, comparatively speaking at least, broken down, and that the "harvest is fully ripe" (St. John iv. 35) for the earnest labors of the energetic and untiring reaper.

The grace of a vocation to this highest office among men comes necessarily from "the Giver of every good and perfect gift, the Father of light" (St. James i. 17). It requires no special definition, since the word *vocation* makes itself clearly understood by virtue of its signification. St. Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, whilst speaking of the priesthood of Christ, says: "Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is *called* by God, as Aaron was" (Heb. v. 4). And our Lord and Saviour says most distinctly to His disciples: "You have not *chosen* me, but I have *chosen* you" (St. John xv. 16). Again, speaking of a vocation to the faith, He says: "No man can come to me except the Father,

who hath sent me, draw him" (St. John vi. 44). And he repeats the same teaching in the sixty-sixth verse: "Unless it be given him by my Father."

But when he speaks most directly of vocation, being about to send forth His disciples, He says: "The harvest, indeed, is great, but the laborers are few. Pray ye, therefore, the Lord of the harvest, that He send laborers into His harvest" (St. Luke x. 2). And he adds, in the sixteenth verse, the source or fountain of *vocation*, and the authority thereof, saying: "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me. And he that despiseth me despiseth Him that sent me." Add to these words what is found in St. John xx. 21: "As the Father hath sent me, I also send you;" and we are prepared for the very finishing stroke of an authoritative call, vocation, or mission, which is clearly set forth as though by letters patent in His last words on earth directed to His disciples, whom He had educated and instructed in His own seminary, saying: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (St. Matthew xxviii. 18, 19, 20).

This call or vocation is, therefore, not human, but divine. It has its source not from men, nor from among men, but solely from Him who alone is the possessor of the right to teach mankind. Now, since the work is continuous, and must proceed to the end of time by divine command, it follows, doubtlessly; that the grace of vocation to fulfil it is given now just as freely as our needs require, or as at any former time. Certainly there are times when greater demands may ask imperiously for a larger supply; but even the discovery of new regions found adequate aid, whilst the constant growth of our country has developed vocations not inferior to those of former times. Our clergy are, in the main, just as self-sacrificing as at any former period, and we know of many whose whole lives are literally given for their flocks. Examples need not be adduced. "*Si quæris monumentum, circumspece.*"

Yet there is, of course, a human side even to the picture of a divine vocation. Undoubtedly the children of Zebedee, John and James, left a strange void in the old man's heart when "they forsook all and followed Christ" (St. Matthew iv. 22). The same must frequently happen when young men leave their home and friends to obey the impulse of the Holy Ghost, urging them to enter upon a life which is not alluring to flesh and blood. In case of a true vocation nothing will prevent the following out the higher call; and, indeed, difficulties thrown in the way, whether from internal or external sources, are rather a proof of the divine nature

of the call. A true vocation will stand testing. Nor are we to expect perfection all at once even in those who have a divine call. We can hardly fail to remember the various instances of mere human nature which present themselves in the history of our Lord's disciples. It required a long novitiate for those who were under the direct guidance of Christ. Divine grace perfects human nature, but does not make it forfeit liberty. Hence long preparation is even required, nay, demanded for those who seem likely to be useful in the service of Christ. We must try the spirit of each individual to see "whether it be of God" (1 Epistle St. John iv. 1).

Rules for knowing vocations have been put into great, we might almost say, thorough system, and religious societies have for centuries been engaged in the noble work of preparing faithful men to forward the work of Christ's mission on earth. It is true that extraordinary calls are not (for they never were) very frequent. In all the pages of Holy Writ we read of but a few expressly called by God for a special purpose, and consequently endowed with every requisite grace, as Moses, Aaron, Samuel, and he who was "the greatest born of women" (St. Matthew xi. 11), the forerunner of our Lord. These were, with the heavenly inspired prophets of the ancient law, exceptions to the general rule, for we find mention made at a very early date of "the schools of the prophets" (4 Kings, ii. 3, 5, et passim). Hence we may expect to follow the beaten or ordinary path as a rule for our guidance, and this has always consisted in making a right use of common-sense as a foundation upon which a solid edifice of piety may be built. Such basis has never been wanting in those exalted men whom God has from time to time raised up for special purposes of His own. Reason and revelation, wisdom and piety go hand in hand.

The ordinary vocation to the ecclesiastical state may generally and readily be known when young people, or even those of riper years, show a real desire for their own advancement in all that is good and devout, when they add thereto an inclination for serious studies, and direct them in such manner as to be subservient to the great end of creation. When they have not only a desire for their own advancement in virtue, but also a zeal for the salvation of others; when they show an aptitude for the ceremonies of the Church, and a degree of fondness for all that pertains to the decency of divine worship: these and similar signs may be further investigated in St. Alphonsus's work, *Homo Apost.* iii. v., Append. iii. c. ii. 45; and we may fairly aid in this matter by making use of suggestions tending to keep the minds of candidates more and more steadily engaged on spiritual things. Such dispositions can be very much fostered by pious parents, and especially by mothers, who generally know more of the inner qualities of their children than fathers,

who, in our days at least, are not brought into such frequent contact with their offspring. Thus we owe many of our greatest saints to the timely advice and fervent example of good mothers, and we know that many vocations are both preserved and advanced by graces obtained through the prayers of a pious mother's pure heart. On the other hand, we hold that parents will be held strictly responsible for vocations hindered, or even lost, because they neglect to instil into the minds of their children the untold beauty of co-operating with Christ in the salvation of souls.

Now, as our Lord is "the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world" (St. John i.), and as all His lights and graces are given in perfect harmony with the plan laid down for the salvation of mankind, we may be absolutely sure that He portions out, or imparts, His supernatural grace and light at all times to an adequate number to fill the priesthood of His Church; for this is one of the most important factors in His plan, since "faith cometh by hearing" (Romans x. 17); but how can they hear to whom no duly authorized messenger is sent? The world cannot know the truth but by the Church, to which the teaching authority in all its fulness has been given: "Go teach all nations all things whatsoever I have commanded; and behold I am with you always, even to the end of the world" (St. Matthew xxviii. 18, 19, 20).

It is true that our Lord chose out His especial Apostles from among men already mature. Yet these also required to be drilled, as it were, under His own eyes, in order to become true witnesses of His stupendous miracles. At subsequent periods, and as a general rule, it was necessary to take the young and prepare them assiduously for the task. This takes the place of the extraordinary vocation of the Apostles. We deem it of the utmost importance to insist that youth is the season when such a bent may be given to the mind towards what is high and ennobling, that no future trials will be able to change it. In this wicked world we must anticipate the possibility of having the evil seed of vice sown in the garden of the heart, and it is our duty to prepare the youthful mind by precautionary measures. Parents would assuredly be faithless to their trust did they forget the strict duty of efforming the minds of their offspring both by human learning and by Christian precepts. Thus their character will be based on fixed principles of action. This is no tampering with the freedom of choice in a profession or vocation, nor is it an undue influence exercised by parents over those under their charge. Children are generally not averse to follow the avocation, or worldly trade, or profession of their parents, yet even these leave them entirely free in their choice.

The next step is usually in the schoolroom, where the further development of character is effected. Here youth are under the

care of those who make it their solemn duty to elicit that quickness of comprehension and ready grasp of subjects placed before them, which tend to enable them to grapple with the harder questions of practical life. Much will, therefore, depend on the teacher, holding almost a parent's sacred position, to give a serious bent to the well-disposed pupil's mind.

Now, since God is not expected to act outside of His ordinary method, we may be said to proceed with tolerable certainty and prudence in forming an estimate of character, when we base it on the deliberate judgment of able and conscientious teachers. This is not, indeed, the work of a few desultory meetings. The true teacher becomes very thoroughly versed in the mental and moral condition of his pupils, and the horoscope made from such experience is reliable. When, in addition to such testimony, we have the approval of grave and unselfish clergymen, there is little fear of the result. At least we shall possess an approximate likelihood of a vocation.

Nevertheless there will be numerous and serious difficulties still to be overcome. In this country we can hardly be said to compose a homogeneous body. It is certainly true that the question of nationality has no entrance here, since of all things the Church has least of this spirit. She has shown it no quarter from her very inception. She is Catholic, consequently intended for all races of men, and all time. In her divine mission for the salvation of the world she knows no distinction, and the testimony of St. Paul is conclusive on the subject: "God has made of one all the races of men" (Acts xvii. 26). Yet we see cropping out, from time to time, certain *natural* feelings in reference to vocations. Evidently some thought that the Greek origin of St. Timothy should prevent his vocation, although he had been chosen by St. Paul to do the work of an Apostle. Of course it will not be denied that those who are of the same language, habits, customs, and manners are usually most useful and acceptable. So far as we are concerned this matter need not be even mooted. It will in due course of time settle itself. As we assimilate in this vast country more and more daily, but a few years will be required to pass from the swaddling-clothes of childhood to the perfection of manhood. This can be attained by a close imitation of the excellent lives of those apostolic men who left all for Christ, and gave themselves to the missions in the midst of trials which we should often recall. Their memory must remain as an incentive to virtue. The names of the laborers should be held in perpetual benediction by every grateful heart. We would be demanding an impossibility, however, were we to ask that such transient arrangement should continue. It was a special blessing for our needy and forlorn condition, and an unspeakable

grace for those who dedicated themselves to our difficult missions in earlier days.

For the future, therefore, we must in a very great measure, if not entirely, depend upon ourselves to keep up these plantations for the "sons of the prophets." And we must meet the difficulties arising in reference to our clergy. As the ranks are yearly thinned by death, or incapacity from old age, sickness, etc., there must be provision made, and we need only look at the mortuary record of each year to assure ourselves of the increasing demand for laborers in the vineyard.

As a practical people we all know that the heavy item of cost for the education of the clergy must fall ultimately on the laity. None feel this more sensibly than our poor people, who are not only taxed to keep up the expensive system of "public schools," but also are super-taxed for the parochial or parish schools, whence the material is drawn, in most cases, to form our probable ecclesiastics. Now, from the beginning of his studies, the bright young student, whose poverty is, perhaps, his chief fault, has to be sustained by charity. In all other avocations, or conditions of life, each candidate is supposed to have gone through what is deemed, or at least called, a satisfactory course of studies in some reputable college. Afterwards he must pay for instruction in law or medicine, as indeed in almost all other permanent professions of the higher sort. In the seminary alone, during from four to six years of philosophy and theology, with the other analogous studies, the student for the ministry is a heavy (unless in a few rare instances) tax on the people, who have to secure the raw material, are burdened in transforming it, and finally levied upon to support and protect it. They do not complain, but they have a right to know on whom their money is spent, and that the really *called* have been chosen.

Just here a remark seems fitting. When those to whom God has given the grace of vocation shall have been so cared for, and shall have corresponded with lights obtained in their career, so that they have already entered the clerical ranks, a right sense of their own obligation, and a manly gratitude, will impel them to repay out of their own means the expenses of their education. This plan has been adopted in some of our dioceses, and will tend to make the seminaries self-supporting. Another excellent plan would be that each priest should educate a young cleric, and thereby diminish the constant claim made upon the small wages of the poor who work for daily bread. As to those who, sailing under false colors, have pretended a vocation in order to obtain an education free of expense (the case has occurred), we can only say that such unscrupulous persons are little likely to make restitution for ill-gotten goods, however much in conscience they are bound, both because

of their own deception and the positive hindrance of others who would have been useful in the diocese.

That was a very flimsy sort of pretext for a vocation to the priesthood put forward by the guileless young man who said: "I never was fond of work." Yet there are those who would have graced a plough and a yoke of oxen, and who actually are a disgrace to their profession by their ignorance and vices, who have managed to put themselves forward as guides of the people. "They ran, but I have not sent them, saith the Lord" (Jer. xxiii. 21). They secured some bishop who was forgetful of St. Paul's advice, nay, command, to St. Timothy, 1 Epis. v. ch. 22: "Impose not hands lightly (thoughtlessly) on any man," and was unfortunate enough "to lay hands—careless hands—on skulls that could not teach, and would not learn."

Now it is certain that the duty, in the last analysis, devolves on the bishop to look out for candidates who may be imbued with the qualities pre-eminently required in the priesthood. It is his chief work, since he has the power of transforming them into "the ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. iv. 1). Having found suitable candidates he must see to their training, either personally (which is usually impossible) or by those in whose judgment he may reasonably rely. No undoubted certainty is or can be attained, and since even when the number was only twelve one of them was found utterly recreant, we should not be astonished that numbers being increased many fail to persevere. The fewer mere worldly motives enter, on the part of candidates, the greater will be the probability that the vocation is divine, and such a vocation will endure trials and contradictions. Mistakes in the choice will also be fewer just in such proportion as the precautionary measures of sound common-sense are observed, and as the bishop is faithful in asking God's wisdom to enlighten him, and His grace to guide him in the selection.

The plan proposed in a pastoral by the late Archbishop Spalding for the increasing of the number of candidates, seems to us very clear and concise. It consists of the following suggestions. Let every priest in charge of a congregation or mission, keep his eye on promising lads, even from their tender years. Frequently give explanations, both to parents and children, on the dignity and honor of the office, the necessity of keeping up the ranks of those who forsake all to follow Christ, the certainty of salvation for those who faithfully receive and treasure up the divine call or vocation to labor for Him, the promise that "those who teach many unto justice shall shine like stars forever in the kingdom of heaven" (Daniel xii. 3). These and similar suggestions should frequently be made in pastoral and catechetical instructions. Even

the wealthy are moved by such appeals, and may participate in the blessing of a divine vocation, since riches and possessions by no means exclude their owners, but only an overweening attachment to them, as we see in the case of the young man whose dispositions were excellent even to such a degree that Jesus loved him, but the same youth, when it came to the test, was too much enamoured of his possessions "to sell all he had, and give to the poor, and come to follow Christ" (St. Matthew xix. 20-22). Nor, indeed, are the highest classes excluded, as we see from brilliant examples among the clergy who rose to saintliness of life by making themselves like to Christ in humility. "Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi" (St. Matthew xx. 16) applies to every rank and condition.

If young candidates be thus chosen they should be separated at an early age from secular life, and be placed under the charge of men who have been religiously trained in community. Should any of the candidates be deficient in the necessary qualities of head and heart, or either, he is to be returned to his home without delay. In case a mistake had been made, or an injustice done by too great severity in observing this inexorable rule, the subsequent good conduct of the student would prove him worthy of a new trial.

We would wish to make our views most emphatic in reference to those under whose charge these youths are to be placed. They ought to be, when possible, either men under strict discipline, as those of a religious order, or community approved for that purpose, or, at least, living under rule. They should be men of *wisdom, prudence, and experience*, who have themselves been educated under special auspices for the guiding of young men in the clerical life. They hold a most necessary place in the work of training youth for future usefulness. They should know the needs of our country, and have some practical knowledge of the missions, their wants and difficulties. This was the manner in which our Lord, as the great prefect of studies, introduced His own disciples into the apostolic seminary, teaching them after His own example, "first to do, and afterwards to teach" (Acts i. 1). We can have no higher model. The more closely our guides for the young ecclesiastic imitate Christ, the more surely will the clergy be imbued with the spirit of their vocation, a sense of the dignity of their solemn office, and a horror of ever departing from the same, even in thought, or swerving from the discharge of duties, however onerous these may be. The spirit of such a seminary life will pervade each student, and like the leaven of the woman mentioned in the Gospel, "leavening the whole lump" (Matthew

xiii. 33), will cause mind, soul, and strength of all to be pervaded with heavenly motives of action.

The priest who lives in the world as a secular has many very different and almost contradictory duties to perform. Not only the spiritual guidance of his flock, his own advancement in study, and in all virtues, but also the material work of building up churches, schools, and the surroundings of a parish, fall upon him, a task for which his previous education in no way fits him. In such multiplied work the chief wonder is that many more do not fail. Few, comparatively speaking, who have been zealous and sincere have come to grief. The priest is also in our country isolated, in many cases far from any other clergymen. Now, unless he be endowed with the "spirit from on high," and view all things in the light of eternity, and with reference to the salvation of souls, his own and those of his flock, he is little likely to persevere. He is a man like others, and if piety and zeal, a love of study and inclination thereto, do not form a part of his very frame and power of thinking, and unless these be, at least, virtually never absent from his mind, he will surely fail, for he is not imbued with the spirit of his Lord. If mere material prosperity, the building of large edifices (well thatched with mortgages to be borne and paid for by posterity), if temporal matters take the upper hand, we may fairly conclude that the pastor is merged and destroyed by the mere business man, "*implicans sese negotiis sæcularibus*" (2 Epist. Tim. ii. 4),—which is not the vocation of the priest. For his work is exactly that for which the Son of God came into the world, and nothing could be further removed from secular employment. If the priest be "*alter Christus*" as St. John Chrysostom says, if the work be divine, if it consist in the application of the benefits of the atoning blood through the Sacraments by his hands, how can any other thought intrude upon, much less take the place of the work of salvation whereto he is called? Should the mere animal life of eating and drinking hold the chief place in his mind, he will not withstand the many occasions of fall daily and hourly presenting themselves. We know this from past experience, and can with ease and certainty point out the cause of lapse in each special case. Hence, the minds of youth must be formed in and inclined towards piety in the sense of the Apostle (1 Timothy iv. 8): "*Quæ ad omnia utilis est.*"

In the next place, it is simply a truism that unless the mind be cultivated when young, it can with great difficulty be brought in after years to severe studies. The name of priest in former times was, as it always should be, a synonym for learning, even among outsiders. Now, if this is to continue, greater care must be exercised in choosing out those who are to be admitted to the

sacred ranks of the priesthood, where learning should have honorable home. It might do little good, or possibly be productive of much evil, were we to speak of the utter superficiality of many of the younger members of the clergy. It is thoroughly true that they have an immense field of hard study before them which requires constant application, and they are no sooner ordained than they are obliged to take upon themselves, in many cases, all the onerous duties of attending, perhaps, several missions; but there can be no excuse for the prevalent neglect of study, which is at once occasion and cause of numerous evils.

We are prepared to assert that whatever there be of scholarship in Latin and Greek culture, may be found in our colleges and seminaries, but we could wish that the latter study were more rigidly insisted upon, as well as mathematics and science. This can hardly in every instance be urged and, in point of fact, has not been absolutely demanded. Cases may occur in which the candidate, although lacking a full classical training, will be a very efficient and devout clergyman; but for us, at least, the time has arrived when it should be required of each student to be able to meet the keen adversaries of our faith with their own weapons. The age demands that we should keep pace with whatever is good in progress, and this has always been the mind of the Church, of which our holy father Leo XIII. is the exponent. When his firm teaching shall have thoroughly imbued all superiors we shall by no means be the losers in comparison with those who have gone before us; nor shall we suffer, as we do now frequently, because some ignorant men, to whom no institution ever accorded a diploma, make a false pretence of learning to the detriment of the good name and fair character of the sacerdotal office.

It should, therefore, be the bounden duty of the bishop and his advisers, to choose out select youths, not many in number, but excellent in quality and disposition, and place them under guidance suitable for developing their vocation. This is the mind of the Council of Trent, that only a few, comparatively (according to the wants of each diocese), are to be taken. These should be thoroughly educated, examined, and sifted, until it be evident, humanly speaking, that the right choice has been made.

SOCIALISM AT THE PRESENT DAY.

German Socialism in America. North American Review, for April and May, 1879.

De l'Etat Actuel de la Science Sociale. Claudio Jannet ; Correspondant ; 10 et 25 Sept., 1878.

Les Naturalistes Philosophes. Professeur A. Proost. Revue des Questions Scientifiques, Janvier et Juillet, 1879.

AFTER the extravagant attempt of the St. Simonians in France had failed, and the phalansterian system of Charles Fourier had been proved impracticable in France, England, and the United States, social science, as it is called, fell back into the simple political economy of Adam Smith, but was tainted more or less with socialism, and even with communism. This must be treated of somewhat in detail.

The French economists of the last century were at this time altogether forgotten, and no one thought of bringing again into notice the theories of Turgot, Quesnay, and Mirabeau the elder who called himself *l'ami des hommes*. But new speculators soon arose, particularly in England and Germany, who turned their attention to the well-known doctrines of the English philosophers of the previous century, who had flourished about the same time as the French. Adam Smith's followers set aside all consideration of the moral law and never attempted to influence the politics of the nation. They limited their theories to the production and distribution of material wealth. Morality did not appear to them to be a factor in the social system, as they conceived it; and, in fact, of all social questions they meddled only with those of labor and money. They never even dreamt of discussing those of the family, marriage, religion, or anything connected with politics and government. They seemed consequently to leave intact all the bases on which human society rests, and thus seemingly were not anti-Christian. Their social science was, therefore, very incomplete, yet not strictly of a disorganizing nature, neither religiously nor politically. The only great moral defect in their views, consequent upon their doctrinal indifference, consisted in setting aside all considerations of individual welfare, and never asking themselves the question, how the condition of the masses, the toilers, the producers, would be improved by their speculations?

Those first English economists thought, therefore, much less of the comfort and happiness of human beings than of wealth itself as an abstraction. They could not embrace humanity, with its won-

derful social activity, all ordained for a great end, and this the last and supreme end of human life, and consequently connected with a hereafter. As on one side, owing to their materialistic philosophy, they did not take account of man's immortality, so, likewise, on the other, they were so full of the importance of their theories that they regarded the era which had preceded the introduction of their system as darkness itself. Thus it seemed to them idle to examine if man had, before their time, any conception of social ideas. They were, in fact, men of only one idea—wealth and how to procure and increase it. Their rules seemed to them perfectly, infallibly certain with regard to that supreme end; but they were only the iron rules of supply and demand, of capital and labor, of distribution and circulation. What did it signify if, meanwhile, a great part of mankind was made or left even more wretched than it had ever been before, provided wealth were on the whole increased?

As was just said, this supposed a complete ignoring of human history. It was idle, in their opinion, to interrogate the past, and inquire if nations had not previously reached a high degree of prosperity and happiness without regard to their rules. It did not even strike them that it would be proper to ask themselves what would become of society in case their projects succeeded, and their views were generally admitted among mankind. Undoubtedly it would become—as they thought—the golden age! What a splendid spectacle would be offered to the philosopher if the whole world were converted into a huge commercial firm, and every capitalist became enormously rich! When this took place it would be worth while to write and read history; as things were it was needless trouble.

Still, long before the era of Christianity even, some philosophers had gone deeply into the study of human nature, to deduce from it firm and unchangeable principles of social science. Aristotle in particular had spoken on the subject with all the authority of reason. But the religion of Christ, more effectually than any philosophy, had established on firmest basis the principles of social life among men, and thereby placed the European family at the head of the human race. All this was entirely ignored by the English economists.

Nevertheless, they could not long remain in this ignorance, which, at first, distinguished their theories from all others. Voices had been lately heard which could not be forever hushed. They had come, it is true, from unhallowed lips, which spoke irreverently of almost everything sacred. Still, they had, at least, proclaimed that wealth is only a means, not an end; that it must be used ra-

tionally to be of any value; and that even the lowest classes of society must have a share of it. This was, after all, in substance the principle advocated by the Fathers of the Church and the mediæval schoolmen, re-echoed by Bossuet when he said that "*La vraie fin de la politique est de rendre la vie commode et les peuples heureux.*" This was the occasion for introducing new principles into the old political economy, and for dividing this school into several very distinct branches.

The first of these branches truly worthy of being examined is composed of those who have been called the Manchester men. The ideas of Mr. Cobden, the head of the party, will suffice to explain their programme. Free trade, the spread of liberal ideas over the whole world, and the promotion of universal peace among nations were the chief planks of Mr. Cobden's platform. In his opinion previous axioms of political economy must be brought to agree with these three saving measures. But, by the necessity of the case, Adam Smith's axioms could not but be greatly modified by the new principles of the Manchester school. It would be, in fact, a complete revolution; for Cobden's three great measures were all derived from the apparent desire to improve the condition of the people, whilst Adam Smith had never troubled himself on that point. Nay, to adopt this new view every detail of the old scheme would have to be changed, for its great radical defect was that everything, according to it, must be organized in favor of capital and against labor, while under the new theory it was the interests of the laborer, or *prolétaire*, that were to be consulted. Mr. Cobden had been born poor, and of an extremely poor family, it seems. He could not but take up with warmth, on all occasions, the cause of the suffering classes, particularly of the operatives in factories. He had deeply studied previous theories of political economists in England, and whilst remaining faithful to them as far as it was possible under the circumstances, he was bound to give them a new turn. The branch of which he became the founder could not remain indifferent to the welfare of individuals, as was the case before among all the old English economists. Much less could it rest satisfied with the accumulation of wealth in general; the intention now was to make it profitable, particularly to the poor, and to open new channels for its distribution.

But the chief trait of difference between the new and the old, was that political agitation was henceforth to be the means of spreading the new ideas. Free trade, liberal views, and universal peace could not at that time be advocated in England without violent political commotion. It is well known that free trade itself met at first with a fierce opposition at the hands of Sir Robert Peel, and that the whole of England was shaken to its centre by the

simple discussion of its merits. Former political economists never imagined that social theories, as they understood them, would become the cause of any disturbance in politics; and now a great nation had been at once plunged almost into civil war by the simple demand for a free admittance of breadstuffs. An important step had thus been unwittingly made in the direction of socialism, which was to introduce into Europe the pregnant germ of most ominous strife.

The people's welfare being now brought into discussion, it soon appeared that the Manchester doctrine could never become a universal panacea. Mr. Cobden, as well as Adam Smith, could not conceive of the necessity of morality as a basis to social science. He had no greater knowledge than his predecessors of the history of social ideas in previous ages, and could not think of examining how nations had formerly become prosperous and happy. He labored like his predecessors under the delusion that human bliss could only be promoted by giving to all a share of sensual enjoyment. The moral, social, and religious nature of man was for him an unknown thing. How could he, or Mr. Bright, his great co-worker, succeed in solving such a problem as is comprised under the magic words, *human happiness*? The well-meant agitation into which he threw himself, could not by any possibility be productive of any important results. It is not surprising, therefore, that his party is now in a complete state of disorganization. His three pet measures are fairly on the way of being abandoned even in England. Free trade is again a problem subject to discussion, after having once won a complete victory. The old doctrine of protection to industry and commerce is reviving, under the influence of the surprising success of the United States in forestalling Great Britain in many markets of the world. Liberal ideas are evidently frightened at the aspect of gaunt socialism which is now everywhere bold and audacious. As to universal peace, the words even cannot now be uttered without a smile.

But if there is little hope of saving mankind, and improving the condition of the poor by the theories of the Manchester school, it must be said, nevertheless, that by calling public attention more than any other school of English sociologists had ever done to the needs of the lower classes, they have, without wishing it perhaps, placed a number of political economists in England and France on the way to a true solution of the problem. Henceforth the influence of national life and of the family as a unit, the idea of right, the principle of social benevolence, cannot be discarded from the conditions of the problem; and a number of powerful writers (though they may be called the successors of Adam Smith) are in the way of entirely reforming the science, and bringing it into

much closer conformity with Christian views than was ever the case before. Mr. Lowe, of England, and Mr. Dameth, of Geneva, particularly by their strong advocacy of the unchangeable laws of human society, are evidently coming to a common understanding with the French school of M. Le Play. This last gentleman, in his *Ouvriers Européens*, published as early as 1855, openly proposed to reorganize industry on the feudal model, and undertook to prove that the European nations among whom this old industrial system had not yet entirely disappeared are the most happy and prosperous in our day. History is thus restored to us as containing lessons invaluable to the student of political economy; and from history it becomes evident that economical laws are but the expression of the divine plan which presided at man's creation. Several writers of eminence have lately furnished a demonstration of it not only from mediæval times, but likewise from the history of Greece, the ancient Hindoo laws, those of Chaldea and Palestine, and from numerous inscriptions lately discovered in Assyria, Persia, the whole Orient in fact. M. de Quatrefages, finally, has demonstrated in his most important work, *l'Espèce Humaine*, that the moral, social, and religious character of man, has been the same at all times, whatever may have been said to the contrary by such scientists as Sir John Lubbock and Herbert Spencer.

These happy consequences may be more or less attributed to the Cobden movement, and it was proper in the foregoing remarks to say a word of it here. But it is not less just to mention that by introducing political agitation into sociology, the Manchester men have prepared the way for *socialism* itself without even suspecting it. Their example could not but be followed by the ardent theorists who began at that time to speculate on what they called social science; and it is in Germany under the powerful influence of Prince Bismarck that we find them first actively at work to discover the true laws of industry, economy, human society, and to engage in violent political polemics to further the prevalence of their views. Thus, in all German universities, economical speculations have been made subservient to political parties, and in the idea of the great Chancellor, they were to be a part of statesmanship. He, however, soon saw his error, and tried to retrieve it. This much, by way of introduction to our consideration of modern socialism.

Two new principles were from the very beginning adopted by these theorists, as the firm basis of social science, from which many pregnant consequences would follow. The first is that man's evolution is not confined to his physical organization, but extends likewise to his moral nature; and that social laws must partake of the necessary and rigid fatality which, according to them, governs the

world. The moral nature of man, however, though ruled by fatality, must constantly change, since evolution is ever shifting. This second principle, derived from the first, asserts that the State alone is competent (in a world constantly on the move) to organize human society, and to prescribe the minutest as well as the most important details of social life. Here you have a broad hint of a new *Babeufism*, to anglicize a French word.

The first of these two supposed axioms originated in England, but was immediately adopted by the new German school. Mr. Herbert Spencer was the first to elaborate this theory, and he has done it with wonderful acumen and plausibility. As his views have made a deep impression on many, it is proper to examine them somewhat attentively. He was evidently led to adopt the views he has put forth by the theories of modern astronomers of the formation of the world. From the *Mécanique céleste* of Laplace, particularly, it is now generally believed that without embracing the whole creation, and limiting the inquiry to our solar system (composed of the sun and of all the planets and satellites which revolve around it), the whole harmonious group was primitively evolved from the rotation of the central body, by which rings of solar matter were formed by centrifugal force; and, being successively detached from the sun, they became planets, with or without satellites.

Mr. Spencer introduced into these speculations the words *integration* and *differentiation*; and he said that out of the primitive integration of the sun, the differentiation of the planets was reproduced, owing to the condensation of elements which were previously diffuse, and apparently homogeneous, but which became condensed and heterogeneous, so as to introduce variety into the world. This change from homogeneousness to the contrary is not altogether logical.

This very ingenious theory was transferred by Mr. Spencer to man himself, first in his physical nature and then in the moral and social order; and finally he applied it to nations in their social characteristics. For, as he remarked, all organisms proceed from a cell, since all organisms begin in the simple cell. Through the process of differentiation, the primitive homogeneous cell gave rise to the immense number of plants and animals which we see. Their various species were formed by natural selection, a principle of which Mr. Spencer is the true inventor, Mr. Darwin having merely adopted and elaborated it. This is not the place to show again the want of logic here. Physiologists have proved, I think, that unless the cells differ there can be no process of differentiation. It is true that where this theory is limited to the physical nature of organic beings, it requires a great deal of science to prove its un-

reliableness. But as we have just seen, this would not satisfy Mr. Spencer. From the physical he passed to the moral and social orders, and though he displayed extraordinary ingenuity in showing (or pretending to show) that man, at first *inconscious*, because homogeneous with mere matter, gradually reached consciousness by differentiation, which first produced instinct, we suppose; then arrived at emotion and sensation; and finally reached morality and sociability—though he brought to his help all his knowledge of the natural history of organic beings, he nevertheless only accomplished a task which logic itself repudiates, and which no sensible man can accept without stronger proofs.

It would require too much space and time to give a succinct account of the specious and plausible way by which Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles*, and in his *Principles of Sociology*, proves to his own satisfaction not only that the material world has been evolved without a designer, but that man in his physical, moral, and social nature is simply the result of rigid material laws, allowing him to remain perfectly independent from, and unaccountable to, any superior power. The only thing important here to learn is that in the new social science evolution explains everything, and is supposed to form a basis for further speculations. To include the new doctrine in a nutshell, it is sufficient to say that evolution as a law is supposed to draw more complex organisms from the simpler ones. Besides, according to them, the study of history proves that the social aggregates no more escape from this law's action than do the organic aggregates. And the proof they give of it is that "constitutions of states are not made; they grow and are gradually transformed." So it is likewise of languages, arts, sciences, religions, and theologies. All these things are the products of development, and "pass through insensible phases like the body and soul of an infant." The proof is evidently weak, and the parity scarcely allowable.

Nevertheless, the German sociologists eagerly embraced this Spencerian doctrine, as to the principle itself; but they were far from unanimous in accepting the proofs given of it by the English philosopher. In fact they soon began to offer as many explanations as there were heads among them, none being satisfied with what another had said.

Hartmann was among the first to disagree, and the cause of it is truly instructive to the impartial looker-on. Mr. Spencer is, as we all know, the great advocate of progress. In his opinion if nature presents anomalies, incongruities, nay, evident disorders apparently inexplicable, it is only for the reason that the end of evolution has not yet been reached. As soon as this blessed moment arrives the whole universe will furnish a spectacle of the most per-

fect harmony and bliss. Hartmann thinks precisely the contrary. Professor A. Proost, of Louvain, has given in the July number for this year of the *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, an abstract of his (Hartmann's) main ideas on the subject, a short paragraph of which I translate from the French :

"The German author has not discovered in nature this progressive evolution of Mr. Spencer, which explains all the sufferings of sensitive beings. In his eyes the world is the product of a blind and barbarous power, which, though itself inconscient, seems to employ all the resources of a wicked cunning in order to render its own work imperfect. From that inconscient being has come out at last an animal—man—who believes himself free, because he supposes that his impressions correspond with the reality of things. . . . Man believes that he possesses knowledge and will ; but he is in fact the sport of ignorance and fatality, owing to the obscure consciousness of his acts. This has been the cause of all the evils he suffers from ; because, owing to that presumption, he has thought that he could invent laws, religions, etc. . . . Our pretended knowledge, according to Hartmann, is only a huge illusion ; and all his philosophy ends in despair. He thinks that when the inconscient evolution of the human mind shall have put an end to its illusions by developing conscience, man will close by suicide the fatal evolution of his species."

Let it be incidentally mentioned here that Mr. Hartmann has lately published a book on the *Self-dissolution of Christianity and the Religion of the Future*. The future creed will be Monotheistic Pantheism, and man will be God. We leave to the author the task of reconciling his new ideas with previous ones.

This disagreement of evolutionists did not stop at Hartmann *versus* Spencer. Soon Ernst Hæckel, a most ardent promoter of the belief in the transformation of species, and consequently of literal evolution, appeared to have deliberately undertaken the task of universal demolishing of all the systems of his co-laborers. He seems to have nobody on his side ; and thus like Ismael "his hand is against all men, and all men's hands against him." Professor Huxley, of England, however, agrees generally with him ; but both having lately fallen into several blunders connected with their evolutionary system, the celebrated *History of Natural Creation* by the German sociologist does not seem to be on the way of benefiting overmuch the new social system adopted in Germany. Hæckel, however, is a link in the chain of these fanciful writers, and his name could not be omitted.

Karl Voght is another, and he professes to be a most consistent evolutionist, though in his *Origin of Man* he fiercely takes to task Hæckel, one of his most ardent co-workers, and proves the entire unreliability of his opinions. The arguments and counter-arguments of all these gentlemen embrace the whole doctrine of evolution so dear to them, and evidently prove how far it is from being demonstrated, as many simpletons of our day would fain believe. But the point which must be insisted on here is the pretended sup-

port that those theories give to new social theories, and the character of rank socialism with which they inoculate it.

Man's sociability is all the time considered by them as an essential item in the whole evolutionary process. The object being to frame for man a system in which God and religion shall have no part whatever, it is most important to them that social laws should be entirely derived from fatalistic and material principles. On this account the German socialists are unanimous in advocating evolution in society, to the total exclusion of free will and moral accountability, and consequently to the open denial of eternal and unchangeable social laws, imposed on man by his Creator, and intimately moulded in his nature, to secure human happiness in this world and in the next. These principles in a previous number we called *Christian socialism*; it is our intention to return to this presently.

The new school is driven by natural logical necessity to the position just stated, and to adopt a very different code of laws; and, in order to set aside accountability, free will must be denied, and man left the victim of a blind, fatal power. The doctrine of a strict evolution comes in here admirably to complete this theory. But, the result, when we come to examine it closely, is far from pleasant. Man, according to this theory, has no moral accountability, it is true; no judge to whom he must answer for his actions; but then he is a slave. Human society constructed on this basis must rest on despotism of some sort; and thus even the first view we gain of this social philosophy is by no means pleasant. When we look farther the hideous character of the monster becomes still more clearly apparent.

The second principle, on which all German sociologists now agree, when properly examined is even less attractive. This is State omnipotence, which already for several years has been universally advocated in all German universities. It is interesting to know how this strange freak of the new science became so prevalent in an age of liberalism; and this was probably the genesis of it. It is only a conjecture, but a very reasonable one in our opinion.

Though in the new theorist's idea the social laws are those of a fixed necessity or fate, absolute in their origin and development, they must be constantly changing, because evolution, essentially and in itself, is ever moving and shifting. Besides, the application of those laws must be multiform, owing to the actually divided state of society which has not yet reached the last goal of unity. Each nation, each people has its own history and aims; and when the socialists enter upon these historic considerations they are compelled to deny that there is a general social science, because they refuse to admit that the laws which govern society are the expression of the will

of God, and have been communicated to man by the voice of conscience. Everything, therefore, must still be chaotic, fragmentary, until the day of the universal republic comes to make all humanity a whole. In their opinion, consequently, there must be at the present time only a national economy particular to each people, and particular likewise to each epoch of its history. The idea which each of them conceives of the incongruity of things in general with the interests of his particular nation, is what they call their *ethical* science. For they spurn as childish the immutable formulas of the Decalogue; and ethics or morality, as everything else, must have, according to their theories, only a human origin.

If this be once admitted, it is manifest that the State alone can be the organ of the nation as to its ideas, interests, and welfare. It cannot be left with each individual, because to do that would be anarchy. It cannot go higher than the State, because there is no power superior to it. And the State has to consult only the utility of the moment, since there are no social laws immutable in their essence and founded on human nature. This presents a new view of the monster called Socialism; and this feature is more hideous even than the previous one, because the State is not an abstraction as are the imagined laws of the theory of evolution, but an actual, living, and powerful institution, which in some places is an emperor or king, in others a president or a body of oligarchs, in others still a mere party which has obtained the majority by fair means or foul, intending to derive all the advantages it can from its good luck.

This State omnipotence was openly promulgated in a Congress at Eisenach, Germany, in 1872, when the Association now called the *Verein für Social Politik* was founded. The doctrine, however, had previously been admitted by the great mass of German socialists. Their object was to frame a social organization, such as they had devised among themselves, but which was to be accepted by the State and carried out by its power. This they intend to substitute for the natural organization of society resulting from the free activity of individuals and families, and they include within it a circle of precepts and prohibitions promulgated by the law of God. The reader will readily determine whether this new system could possibly be an improvement upon the old one. Of this new organization Mr. Claudis Jannet says in the *Correspondant*, for September 10th, 1878:

“Nearly all the professors in German universities belong at this moment to this school. Mr. Engel and Wagner teach this doctrine at Berlin, Mr. Nassa at Bonn, Mr. Shinöler at Strasburg, and Mr. Scheele at Berne. Among its adherents are found men of great weight in the German Empire, such as Girst and Henry von Sybel; and likewise Mr. Schœffle, formerly Minister of Commerce at Vienna.”

This was true in 1878. The theory probably has been considerably modified since that time, owing to the change of policy adopted by Prince Bismarck toward socialism. We are not informed, however, as to those modifications. Has the German Chancellor turned his back on socialism altogether, or only on the extremists who united in what has been called the International Association? We are inclined to think the latter most probable, as the system, when it was confined to Germany, admirably chimed with his own notions of statecraft. But even had the German Chancellor ordered the university professors to be henceforth silent on their socialism and State omnipotence, he cannot prevent them from thinking, and perhaps writing and publishing their ideas under a false name. We must show why they should do so in spite of Prince Bismarck.

This doctrine of State omnipotence was in fact a godsend to many economists in Germany and elsewhere, even in the United States. The writer thought proper to say a word about this in a late paper in which he quoted the commendatory expressions of a Catholic magazine of this country on this very subject of State power. This is properly the place to speak of it at greater length.

One of the greatest difficulties inherent in all systems of political economy consists in determining the *production* on a general plan, in strict conformity with the *consumer's* needs; and this the State alone seems to be able to do. Every one is aware that too often *the market is glutted*, and workingmen have to remain idle until the goods manufactured in too great quantity have been disposed of, and the stores are on the way of becoming empty. A systematic arrangement by which all such cases would be foreseen and provided against would undoubtedly be of great advantage, and allow the workers to continue their employment, and at least to earn bread for themselves, their wives, and children. It is impossible for manufacturers to calculate exactly how far they can go in production. Even could they do this, their supposed immediate interest would often induce many of them to shut their eyes to the future, and look only at the actual demand.

The State seems, therefore, a preferable *producer*, though until this time it had been regarded only as a *consumer*. It is well known that manufacturers always have ardently longed for large demands from the government, and the *lobbyist's* avidity at Washington and the State capitals is not unknown to politicians. A new scheme was set on foot to dispense with lobbyists altogether by dispensing with the manufacturers themselves, and the best way, evidently, was that the State itself should become universal manufacturer. It was contended, too, that the best goods at the lowest price would come out of the State workshops, because the government would not look to profit but only keep itself from loss. In all these sys-

tems the State, the government, is supposed to be immaculate, as also the individual is assumed, on one side, not to have been born in sin, and, on the other, to be fatally controlled by his natural aspirations.

For the reasons just assigned in favor of State universal supervision, many persons, not only in Europe, but even in this country, are not opposed to it, nay, sincerely wish that the plan would be adopted, at least in the main; and they find a further support for their opinions in the extraordinary difference of circumstances in this age from any previous one. Every enterprise, they say, is now conducted on an immense scale, which a single individual, however skilful, can scarcely grasp. There is a constant tendency to develop every branch of business to immense dimensions, and as nationalities are daily growing larger by the annexation of small states, so likewise monstrous commercial firms are swallowing up inferior concerns, which do not seem to have any longer a right to exist.

The evident ultimate result is that the State itself should replace everything of an individual nature. They even pretend to have experience on their side, and they aver confidently, and with seeming truth, that since the government succeeds so well in the carriage of letters and the transmission of money by post-office orders, it might as well sell us our shoes, and garments, and drygoods, and provisions. For these reasons, and others perhaps, the German professors continue firm in their opinion in spite of a change of views on the part of Prince Bismarck.

The answer to all these arguments is, nevertheless, plain, and must satisfy all who reflect on the essential characteristics of a nation, great or small. The government cannot be everything and the citizens nothing. If property is to remain undisturbed, every one is entitled to employ his money as he wishes, and the various natural aptitudes with which men are generally endowed require that all the channels of industry, commerce, agriculture, science, and art should remain open to them, provided they obey the laws of God and of man. Should the project of State omnipotence, entertained by many economists of this day, chiefly in Germany, be adopted, the first consequence to follow would be that property also must be included in the scheme, and this is probably what many socialists ardently desire. Then Babeuf's great principle would become at once a social axiom: *the State would be sole owner of the territory*. And not only this would take place as regards real estate; personal property would soon have to be handed over likewise to the universal purveyor of all material goods. This last measure would be inevitable, and only the blind can fail to see that this would be the rankest socialism that can be imagined. Citizens, in this case, would become mere slaves and tools, as we have shown

in a previous paper. Can any one suppose that any nation could long continue to subsist under those circumstances? Is it not counter to the essential idea of a nation? Is not the proposal an outrage, and socialism a hideous monster?

Moreover this theory of State omnipotence, in order to be logically consistent and beneficial to all, assumes that human governments are always immaculate, infallibly prudent, and absolutely just institutions, working disinterestedly for the common good, entirely incorruptible in fact, and thus must really aim at replacing God's government in the world. To indulge in these theories is, however, little less than insanity or cruel mockery when one reflects on the stupendous disclosures of crimes and impious plans and conspiracies which have lately astonished mankind, though it can readily be believed that the worst and most odious of them have never come to light. It would require more than the simplicity of a child not to see, at once, that the new state of things, with all the imaginable social science possible, would run directly into the most insupportable tyranny on the part of the State, exciting universal indignation, and ending in the most terrible insurrections on the part of trodden-down proletarians. It is not necessary to dwell further upon these points. What we have said suffices to prove the scheme impracticable.

When the attempt was made in Germany to prepare the way for the advent of this blissful project in favor of the lower classes, it is probable that Prince Bismarck paid little attention to these points. He was shrewd enough not to be caught by brilliant utopias. But he only saw before him a number of wise professors, who openly advocated State interference in political economy; and, instead of silencing them, he warmly encouraged them in the dissemination of their doctrines. The chief measures contended for by these theorists had evidently for their object to place in the hands of the rulers of the State the right of equalizing production and consumption; that is, the right of looking into all the private concerns of commercial firms, banking institutions, and manufacturing companies, previous to assuming, not only their general supervision, but at last the totality of their functions, if the State so desired. The astute Chancellor looked to the increase of his personal power rather than at the future difficulties which it would be easy enough for him, as he supposed, subsequently to master. Schemes, besides, were already being formed to render everything smooth and practicable. Mr. Shœffle proposed the establishment of *State tribunals of labor*; Mr. Shauberg, of Freyburg, was in favor of creating a body of *arbeits-œmpters* (baillifs de l'industrie), who would be high functionaries of the empire, and, of course, chosen from the professors of political economy.

But these dreams were soon on the point of vanishing into air by the sudden discovery that all this was a childish playing into the hands of the International Association. We do not know whether they have yet been altogether discarded, or some modifications of them have been thought sufficient.

A formidable name, *The Internationalc*, has just been mentioned. Our intention is not to enter here into a detailed account of this mysterious society, of which everybody speaks, and which, in fact, scarcely anybody knows. So far, the secret of its occult transactions has been well kept, though its ultimate object is sufficiently evident. It has already been said that German sociologists in general do not admit a universal social science, equally extending to all the nations of the universe, but only a partial one for each nation. This school of economists has, of late, spread extensively through Germany. It is called the Historical School, because they rely, in part, on history, and they can, as they imagine, read in the annals of each nation heterogeneous aims, since each nation has peculiar features of its own, on which alone they look. They close, in fact, their eyes to the universal principles of right which are undoubtedly common to men of all races, and which constitute the true basis of social science. In their view mankind is an aggregate of many fragments, disconnected from each other in great degree, each of them having an evolution of its own. Over these fragments the State must be paramount for the reasons previously assigned.

This suited Prince Bismarck admirably until he became aware that there were spirits in the world bolder than his own State professors, men who did not recoil from the consequences of larger views, and for whom there was a universal social science of a new kind. These men admitted a strict evolution for the whole of mankind, and consequently strict social principles, embracing the whole world. Combine all the States together, they said, and you have humanity. Only these universal social principles and aims must not be looked for in the pretended prescriptions of right proclaimed by what is called conscience's voice, but in the independent aspirations of each man toward material enjoyment, irrespective of any hereafter. Humanity must, therefore, form a universal republic, and the various nations are only its component parts. The whole huge machine would work admirably well, owing to *co-operation*, and this became the pregnant word of the day. Everything, to succeed well, must be co-operative—production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. This would instantly do away with the necessity of *wages*. This odious word must disappear together with that of *capital*. There must remain nothing but co-operative labor, and instead of wages each one will receive his *share*.

The reader will perceive that this is Babeuf's doctrine again, but extended this time to the whole world. France alone was not destined to partake of these inestimable blessings. All nations were indiscriminately called to the feast. But, evidently, Germany was bent on receiving the first and largest share.

It is not the writer's intention to enter here into all the details of the scheme, so far as the public is allowed to know them. But it can easily be understood that if despotism was the last goal of the State socialism advocated by Prince Bismarck's professors, the most crushing destruction of all initiative, free action, and individual interest would be absolutely necessary for the safe and sure working of the gigantic international monster. If this plot's realization were possible,—thank God, it cannot be,—and if it became a fact, the world would not become a huge commercial house, as Adam Smith, and after him the Manchester men, intended. It would become a prison compared with which all our penitentiaries would be pleasant retreats. This would infallibly be the result of the theories broached by Karl Marx and Lassalle in Germany.

That the project is not a mere supposition and the International Society a dream is proved beyond all question by many facts and publications now well known, but particularly by the frank avowal of the German socialists themselves in their attempt at organization in the United States, in 1877, the year of the great labor strikes. The following paragraphs are a part of the "National platform and principles of the Socialistic Labor Party," as adopted at the national congress of the workingmen, held at Newark, New Jersey, at the end of December of that year. We copy it from the *North American Review*, for April, 1879:

"Labor being the source of all wealth and civilization, and useful labor being possible only by and through the associated efforts of the people, the results of labor should, therefore, in all justice belong to society. The system under which society is now organized is imperfect, and hostile to the general welfare, since through it the directors of labor, necessarily a small minority, are enabled in the competitive struggle to practically monopolize all the means of labor, all opportunities to produce for and supply the wants of the people, and the masses are therefore maintained in poverty and dependence.

"The industrial emancipation of labor, which must be achieved by the working classes themselves, independent of all political parties but their own, is consequently the great end to which every political movement should be subordinate as a means.

"Since the ruling political parties have always sought only the direct interest of the dominant or wealthy classes, have endeavored to uphold their industrial supremacy, and to perpetuate the present condition of society, it is now the duty of the working people to organize themselves into one great labor party, using political power to achieve industrial independence. The material condition of the working people in all civilized countries being identical and resulting from the same cause, the struggle for industrial emancipation is international, and must naturally be co-operative and mutual; therefore, the organization of national and international trade and labor unions upon a socialistic basis is an absolute necessity. For these reasons the So-

cialistic Labor Party has been founded. We demand that the resources of life, the means of production, public transportation and communication, land, machinery, railroads, telegraph lines, canals, etc., become, as fast as practicable, the common property of the whole people, through the government; to abolish the wage system, and substitute in its place co-operative production, with a just distribution of its rewards.

"The Socialistic Labor Party presents the following demands as measures to ameliorate the condition of the working people, through the government, under our present competitive system, and to *gradually accomplish the entire removal of the same.*"

The words italicized by us were italicized in the programme, and the *demands* which follow directly after, being only of a temporary nature (*until the present competitive system should be gradually and entirely abolished*), they do not give any information as to the ultimate objects of the movement. The pregnant paragraphs, however, which immediately precede those demands, are sufficient to indicate them, and the reader has seen their international character.

In these well-defined purposes there is a suggestion calculated to deceive the unwary. It is said that the great object of the new labor party is to abolish the wages system, and to substitute in its stead co-operative production, *with a just distribution of its rewards*, and this is to be done *through the government*. To make it more attractive it is assumed throughout the whole scheme that capital, such as it has been always understood, will cease to exist. All personal property, of every kind, will be common to all. But, since no one individual can any longer be permitted to dispose of any part of it, it must be vested in the whole organization, and to make the delusion stronger and more plausible it is pretended that this will be brought about through the government.

Could the managers of the Labor Party suppose that the government of the United States, such as it has always been from the first establishment of the Constitution, would favor the project, adopt the measures of this party, and turn socialist on such an immense scale? They would have been perfect simpletons had they so believed. But they were not simpletons. Did they not openly say that the first measure to be adopted was to form a party *of their own*? This they did emphatically say at that very congress in Newark. It was evidently intended that this new party should sweep all other parties out of existence, and finally absorb into its own hands the *government* of this country.

And what would be the inevitable result of this blessed movement, if successful? Simply to leave the destiny of this great country under the sole control of the leaders of the Labor Party. According to their intention, there soon would be no government, in the ordinary sense of the word, on the surface of the earth; neither absolute monarchies, empires, nor kingdoms; nor any other

representative body politic. All these institutions were to be replaced by a universal republic, about whose organization they scarcely condescend to utter a word. There would be a head, certainly, and this could not be a mere abstraction. It must consequently be a man, or a certain number of men, following rules of their own, entirely concealed from the multitude. Nothing is ever said by them of universal suffrage, nor of elections under any form. People have an indistinct fear that the whole system resolves itself into the *ipse dixit* of a single man, appointed in a mysterious way to rule the whole concern. But whatever may be the mode of instituting the ruling power, that power must be supreme, irresponsible, and final in its decisions. Nothing else could maintain the existence of such a government, even for a single day.

The just distribution of rewards, as the platform cunningly expresses it, will be entirely in the hands of the supreme power, through its blind agents. It remains to be seen if the *rewards* would be more equitably distributed than were the wages which workmen, under the existing system of society, have received. Is it not to be feared that from the tyranny of capital the world will have passed to the far worse tyranny of a committee of scoundrels? This surely would lead to the most frightful anarchy, because the *masses* would soon open their eyes, and, by bold and universal insurrection, at once break off the intolerable yoke.

What has just been said is not based on mere conjecture. From the passage which has been quoted, and from several others contained in the same paper of the *North American Review*, it is only too evident that the project is in motion, and that there are, at this moment, men who intend to bring it to a successful issue, even in this country, in connection with all the other, European, branches of the sect. The well-informed contributor to the periodical alluded to, seems even to fear that it will eventually be carried out in the United States, and he is not alone in his opinion. He says that "Mr. Seward once declared that of all the elements which entered into our national composition the German was the element which he feared most. The discontented and revolutionary spirit which characterizes the German mind, coupled with the little learning which every citizen of the Fatherland brings with him, and the clannishness of his race, seemed to Mr. Seward a danger menacing to the existing order of things."

Many other conservative men in this country share in this opinion. It has always seemed to us that the extreme socialists, whether of Germany or elsewhere, will find more obstacles to their plots in the United States than in any European country. Still it is the plain duty of all honest citizens to oppose the monstrous project with all their might, and every one is aware that Catholics

will never listen, except with intense indignation, to any proposal leading to such monstrous conclusions.

But if there was a sad reality in this gigantic and wicked enterprise a year ago, it was then only *conjectured* that the socialists were bent on carrying out their plans with the pistol and the dagger previous to a wholesale inception of civil war. To-day it is no longer a conjecture, it is a fact.

It is well known that many other secret societies, particularly in Italy and France, have formerly used the same odious weapons either against the rulers of the State or against those whom they regarded as apostates from their ranks. Assassination was openly advocated by secret plotters against the established order of things. This was also considered by many as a *plank* in the socialistic *platform*, to use a well-known American phrase. There were, however, no positive proofs of it.

But, "not many months ago," again says the *North American Review*, "Europe was panic-stricken by four successive attempts in one year upon the lives of three monarchs." Should we enumerate similar attempts upon the lives, not of monarchs, but of generals, magistrates, police officers, etc., a long list would undoubtedly be the result. It is, therefore, a fact that there actually are men in Europe using the revolver and the dagger against the lives of officials obnoxious to them. The question is, who are those men? Public opinion points its finger directly at the socialists, and the conjecture is forthwith so far probable, that no other supposition can explain the fact, and the ominous word *socialists* is the only answer that can be given to the question.

There is, however, further proof, and this time it is a public avowal. The passage is remarkable, and is contained in the same *Review* already quoted. A *Russian nihilist* was allowed to publish an article in it last July, in which, among many other interesting items of information, two positive facts are acknowledged, or, rather, boastfully proclaimed, which must be considered as settling the question. The first fact is that Russian nihilism is nothing else than Russian socialism, or "the reorganization of Russian society according to the doctrines of modern socialism." The writer must certainly be what he says he is, and he seems perfectly well acquainted with the whole history and the real projects of the sect, without exaggeration or overstatement.

The second fact is the open adoption by this party of the doctrine of assassination as a means of success. His words deserve to be quoted:

"When not only the public speech is stifled, but the innermost thoughts of the citizen are searched and pried into by a barbarous inquisition, then the time has come for the dagger and the pistol to speak. Violence becomes a necessity, a duty, and revenge

becomes retribution. To use Milton's words, 'it is but reason that he who trod down all law should not be vouchsafed the benefit of the law.' It would be idle to discuss here the theory of political assassination; it is to the best of my belief an element of public life which stands out of the reach of any scientific theory. It is a simple fact which under certain conditions must make its appearance with the elementary force of a law of nature. As any man has an unalienable right of shooting a robber who attacks him, so has the citizen an equally unalienable right of destroying the infamous tools of a system which shamelessly tramples on humanity and justice. The question of right and wrong in this matter reaches beyond all the ordinary standards of morality, and depends mainly on the manner in which the people itself looks upon the deeds of violence. . . . These deeds are no longer murders, but acts of national justice."

The editor of the *Review*, from which we quote, in declaring as usual that "he accepts no responsibility for the opinions of his contributors," adds with great justice:

"Since Colonel Sexby perished in prison for disseminating in England the treatise in which Colonel Titus undertook to show that killing would be no murder in the case of Protector Cromwell, no such deliberate plea for assassination, as a political weapon, has been put forth in Europe as is embodied in the programme of the Russian nihilists. Recent events have but too clearly shown that it is their intention to carry this dreadful doctrine into effect whenever and wherever it may seem to them necessary so to do. It is of the highest interest, therefore, to know on what grounds and by what reasoning it is that men not belonging to the criminal classes of society in Russia, have brought themselves to reject one of the most sacred and fundamental principles of our Christian civilization."

We will merely add that *recent events* also have proved that this is not the doctrine of Russian nihilists only, but also of German and other socialists. The measures taken against them in Russia, Germany, Austria, and even Italy, oblige them at present to keep themselves quiet. How long this will continue, and whether political repression will effectively destroy this satanic monstrosity is a consideration of great moment; and a few words on the subject will not be out of place.

That the conspiracy has taken deep root in Europe, and has even invaded this country cannot be denied; and it would be most imprudent on the part of those who are conservative to close their eyes to it, and to act as if it did not exist, merely because its ulterior aims and true character are systematically concealed. Suppose that these socialistic projects, as they have been described, existed alone of their kind, and found all other social elements in open antagonism to them, it would even then be an extremely serious matter, requiring the union of all other classes of society in support of existing governments to successfully cope with it. Still it might be hoped that strong measures of repression highly approved by the great majority of citizens, would in course of time put an end to it, or that as an epidemic, according to M. Thiers's expression, the frightful evil would die out of itself. But unfortunately the virus of these doctrines has deeply penetrated into a body politic weakened and tainted by many diseases, altogether

akin to the one which alone has attracted attention and created terror. Nearly all the other modern systems of political economy have sown the seeds of the disorder, and continue to be the fond objects of many delusive dreamers. In all of them religion is set aside, morality is considered of no account, material or rather sensual enjoyment is the only thing looked for and aimed at. The Christian principles which have given such strength to human society are openly discarded; and the only object of desire offered to the aspirations of men is an illimitable increase of whatever may please the senses and stimulate the lower appetites. Can the deleterious doctrines of socialism under these circumstances, and in this way, be successfully opposed, and in the end destroyed? We think not. It will undoubtedly continue to spread among the lowest ranks of society, among a large class of proletarians deprived of all religious and moral sense. It will continue to employ all the means adopted by secret associations with which the European mind has for a long time been familiarized. At the first favorable opportunity it will burst out afresh like a smouldering fire when it once finds vent. Its pent up fury will be all the greater because of its former confinement, and the world will shudder over the ruin and destruction it will produce. Then men will at last understand their folly in excluding God and His religion from society, and in trusting to their own wisdom for the construction of a new social edifice after having battered down the solid walls of that previously existing.

The growth of the evil until now has been attributed to two baneful principles, from which its excesses have sprung. These are: 1st, the doctrine of material evolution extended to social science, in order to develop it independently of God's will and action; and, 2d, State omnipotence, which replaces in modern theories the power of God Himself. Are not these notions at the root of all political and social axioms by which alone men now consent to be governed? Do not men now openly and scornfully deny God's government in all human affairs? Do they not pretend that evolution has been demonstrated to the full extent attributed by Herbert Spencer to that theory? Do they not imagine that it is a great boon conferred on man in this age to be freed from the fear of God? Let them understand that in spurning His yoke they put on their necks a heavier one of another master. Their dearly-bought independence leaves them more slaves than ever, and with no lightening of their thralldom by the hope of a hereafter. They pretend to be wise in preferring present enjoyment to any future and eternal prospect of happiness. They will find that the earthly paradise which their imagination pictures to itself is far worse than the sacred inclosure of God's city,—the Christian Church,—which looks to them like a prison.

That there is no exaggeration here a single reflection will prove. All must admit that the sum total of all modern philosophy is to do away with the miraculous, the supernatural, that is, with God's government among men. The mildest systems of political economy always assume it even when they do not openly set it forth. All political principles by which men now are ruled are impregnated with a like doctrine. Hence the State must be above the Church, must be paramount, in fact omnipotent. In human society the family, the tribe, the nation, must be free from all spiritual control, unless they foolishly impose it upon themselves. The human law does not acknowledge anything above itself. This being so, can it be expected that socialism in its various forms will die out? We say that it is destined to conquer, because everything conspires in its favor. The principles of socialism are now those of ordinary human society; it is impossible that all its consequences, even the worst, should not follow. Some of these have been already enumerated and we have proved them to be actual facts. Is it an earthly paradise that socialism promises to man? We leave it to the reader's imagination to answer.

Before concluding, a hasty sketch of the true social ideal consecrated by Christianity must be drawn by way of contrast to the previous picture. This we have promised more than once, and have called it Christian socialism. It is time now to develop some of the expressions and hints scattered here and there through these pages, and which of themselves are not sufficient to a full understanding of the subject. In calling it Christian socialism it must not be forgotten that most of its peculiarities were the guiding rules of men even before Christianity. Aristotle embodied its chief principles in his ethics. Some modern economists who now advocate the Christian ideal, were brought to it by the consideration of the rational views of ancient pagan philosophers. But this is not the place to make a distinction between whatever part of it is founded on mere reason, and what is based on revealed truth. By explaining the Christian side alone, whatever is at the same time founded on reason is brought forward with still more power; and this must suffice here.

In entering on this subject a preliminary remark must be made of no small importance, when we speak of the contrast between the old and the new; that is, between what was thought to be the basis of human society in Christian times, particularly in mediæval, and the view now taken of it by modern economists. With great justice the theory—the old—embraced within it whatever can be known of *man's nature* as a social being; of the *family* as the first social unit; of *morality* as the great substratum of social laws; of *religion* as their firmest support; of the *State* as the regulator of the

peace and prosperity of citizens; finally, of belief in a *hereafter* as the sanction of the whole system. But it is known that what is now called political economy makes no mention of any of these important truths, whether known through philosophy, or revealed. It treats of human society without even referring to what is essentially and inseparably connected with it. After having read all the books of recent scientists you can scarcely have any idea of what human society is. It is probably on this account that the name given by the *founders of the science* to their pet theories is political economy, not social economy. There is, it is true, nothing avowedly political in those theories, since they make not the slightest reference to politics or government. But as they entirely ignore whatever constitutes true sociology (to use a modern expression), their originators and advocates probably feel that it would be preposterous on their part to call their theories *social* economy. Hence, in their eyes it is only *political* economy.

We, Christians, are accustomed to be logical in our expressions. Consequently when we speak of *social* matters, the dullest reader at once perceives that there is really a question of human society. Let us, therefore, enter at once on the subject.

I. In all modern economical systems man's social nature is scarcely alluded to, and among the extreme and most radical of the supporters of these systems—among the strict evolutionists—their theories are avowedly grounded, not on firm, stable, and eternal principles, but on shifting eventualities. For, according to them, there is nothing else in nature. This has been sufficiently proved already. It must, however, be repeated here that, in their opinion, man is a perfectly harmonious being, without any admixture of evil in his moral composition. All evil consists, according to them, in outward circumstances, which press hard upon man, and have to be redressed by political economy.

In Christian socialism two very different principles are laid down at the very beginning with respect to human nature, both susceptible of the most tangible proof, and furnishing firm ground on which to build the whole edifice. The first is that there are exact, eternal, and unchangeable social principles, deeply impressed on the very soul of man, and which are known to all nations, even the most rude and barbarous. This the Fathers of the Church from the beginning, and the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages, have clearly demonstrated, and human reason ought certainly to be convinced of it after the repeated proofs they have brought forward. To the English reader the discussion of this question in Mr. Lecky's *History of European Morals* cannot but prove interesting. It is entirely conclusive, though the celebrated author merely repeats what had been written long before.

The second Christian principle with regard to man's nature, as easily demonstrable as the first, is that we are born sinners; that original sin is a fact; and that the social evils which afflict mankind are the result of a first transgression, communicated to the whole human race. The sufferings consequent upon it must be taken by man as an expiation, though he is permitted to mitigate them by all lawful means left in his power.

The existence of original sin is undoubtedly a fundamental fact of the Christian religion. It forms its historical foreground. Christ said that he came not to call the just but sinners. Every one who admits that our religion is divine must, at the same time, recognize the fatal power of Adam's first sin, since redemption would not have been needed had it not been for the fall. But, independently of revelation, our own experience and consciousness gives us, at least, a strong presumption of this. To pretend that there is no evil inclination in man's will, argues a total deprivation of the moral sense; and, in order to be compelled to acknowledge our original sinfulness, it is only necessary to look at the inborn depravity of our hearts. All this is elementary in moral science, but the principle once admitted is pregnant with ominous consequences for true sociology. First, *l'homme de la nature*, as imagined by J. J. Rousseau, perfect in himself, because not yet corrupted by civil society, is worse than a delusion; it is a fatal error, which more or less vitiates all economic systems. Wherever the paradox is not adopted to its full extent and with all its consequences, the sinfulness of man is always presupposed, and means are often suggested by economists for the *equalization of nature* in man, by which modifications would be produced tending to perfectibility and to raising man to a higher moral level. Mr. Accolas proposes for this, common meals for children, a public and obligatory education, etc. It is always the Spartan system, and comes back to Rousseau. When, on the contrary, you admit that man is a fallen being, and that his lapse is interior and moral, means or remedies of a very different nature are plainly required, and to them we will soon refer.

Secondly, when original sin is once admitted as an actual fact, the cure of the evils to which human society is liable cannot be limited to any exterior circumstances, such as the inequality of conditions. But since the great cause of those evils is interior in man and touches his very moral constitution, it is there that the corrective is to be applied. The consequence is that it is from morality, namely, from the observance of the Decalogue, that the true social reform must be expected. This will require, by-and-by, a special development.

II. No social system can be broached without laying great stress on the *family* as the first and most important social unit. The econ-

omists, and particularly the socialists, never treat *ex professo* of this important subject. They often, it is true, speak of the education of children—Mr. Accolas has just enlightened us on this subject—and on the rights of woman, and her adaptation to all civil and social purposes. Some sects among them speak of marriage; all of them rave on population, the intercourse of the sexes, etc. But to lay down firm principles on the three relations of father, mother, and child; to attentively consider whether reason can contradict the injunctions of divine revelation, can defy the precepts of the Divine law; to seriously reflect on the immense importance that particular families have had, in all ages, on various states and nations (as M. Le Play has done in France in his *Monographies de Familles*); all this and many other considerations are regarded by them as of no account in what they call political economy. It may be said generally that the human family is desecrated, yea, dishonored, in all these modern systems. They wish to improve on Christianity, of which, however, they never speak; and most of their theories, if successfully realized, would go to the instant weakening, first, and then to the total breaking asunder of all social ties. What would have become before this of the human family in case the ravings of the philosophers of this and the previous century had become facts, actualized in any nation whatever?

Though most of these utopias have been rejected as impracticable by the good sense yet left among men, is it not lamentable to see the wretched state, physical and moral, of a large number of human families in all our great manufacturing centres? Except when and where the Catholic Church intervenes the moral decline among operatives soon becomes unmistakable, and the road to degradation is plain before them. It has required strong parliamentary measures of repression in England to correct disgraceful evils of this kind, brought on by prevalent theories of political economy.

The Church, on the other side, has always been most attentive to keep unimpaired the dignity and sacredness of the home circle; and the principles laid down in revelation and enforced by Catholic rulers have invariably proved to be the only ones adapted to the preservation of the foundation of well-being among men. Read what the Schoolmen have said of the human family ages ago, and what Catholic theologians down to this day have repeated on the same subject, and tell us whether you can find elsewhere anything comparable to it for promoting the great object in view, viz., the foundation of virtue and happiness. It is chiefly on this account that in mediæval times, yes, in the much-abused *dark ages*, the public welfare was so well attended to by Christian rulers. This is now admitted by all well-informed men. And the great cause of

it was that the dignity of the human family, on the pattern of that of Nazareth, was sacredly preserved under the Church's wings.

Fortunately this is not unknown now to many men who at first did not believe it, but have been brought by a sense of truth to openly acknowledge it. M. Le Play is one of them. He began as a simple economist and was far from being a Christian. But his studies, carried on with fairness and in good faith, soon brought him to the threshold of the Church, and he developed in his *Monographs* (an essential part of his *Ouvriers Européens*) a splendid panorama of what have been, at all times and in all countries, the great social units, called families, in the Christian commonwealth. Pity it is we cannot enter into more details, and must pass on to our next point.

III. Morality has been called the universal substratum of social laws, and it is important to show the fatal error of economists and socialists in entirely discarding it. In the first place, it must be remarked that it is only from Turgot's time in France and Adam Smith's in England that morality has begun to be considered of no importance in sociology. The founders of political economy thought that even the natural principles of ethics would not be strict enough for laying the foundation of their *strict* system. They, of course, could not think of the morality of the Gospels, which they knew was *strict* enough; but as they were aware that many strange and almost unaccountable notions of ethics had been entertained by various nations, which could not suit them, they took the bold step of forming a *gospel of their own*, where no mention should be made of any moral obligation. They consequently turned their backs on all thinkers and writers of previous ages who had been unanimous in proclaiming the identity between the social and the moral laws. They thought that by keeping silent on these *moral laws* they could proclaim with more effect the stringency of their own *social axioms*, and to this day the socialists, their successors, have continued in the same path. For them, consequently, the Decalogue has never been written with any serious purpose. Its prescriptions are only childish enactments which can have no weight in the eyes of a philosopher.

But in the second place the Decalogue is fortunately inscribed in the human heart, and on this account the human heart never ceases to protest against the pretended ignoring of it by these new teachers. They must know that the numerous flaws of their systems are visible at least to eyes that have once looked on the majestic Mosaic tables; and no one can pretend that man has not seen those tables, since they form a part of his being, and are *written*, as St. Paul says, in his heart by the testimony of his conscience.

This folly of economists and socialists shows the inanity of their

thoughts, since they imagine they can dissociate what is strictly identical. But it is an herculean task which they will never be able to accomplish. Until the end of time mankind will declare that social laws must be moral laws, or no one will ever be bound to keep them. In vain the new teachers, therefore, do their best to invent a perfect system; it will remain in the end a dead letter in spite of all the perfection they can give it.

IV. Religion, as has been said, is the firmest support of social laws. This is a mere corollary of the previous paragraph. Morality is in the keeping of religion alone. No other institution has the right to prescribe it in all its fulness. Natural morality in ancient times was to a certain extent within the scope of the State's attributes, or of an authorized teaching body. Since Christ came the State undoubtedly should see that its legal enactments are conformable with Christian social ethics, and it can forbid whatever is contrary to them. But for an ultimate decision, in case of doubt, reference must be had to Christ's representative, namely, the Church, which alone has received the power of teaching what is truth and virtue. This must be admitted by all Catholics; and those who are not, must see at least that it is the safest way that can be conceived in all human affairs. Every one can perceive how firmly human society is established when this is the case; and how, on the contrary, everything in social institutions is problematical and precarious when this is denied. There is no need of proving in detail how pernicious is the socialistic idea that the exclusion of religion from society must be carried so far as to deny God's presence and power, either at the origin of it or throughout the course of its history. If this denial could once come to be universal there would soon be an end of man himself. God's intervention would not be necessary, man would be his own destroyer.

V. The State, which has been called the regulator of the peace and happiness of citizens, is the next subject of consideration. The reader is aware that mere economists never took any account of it. They were mainly concerned with the industrial questions of supply and demand, production and consumption, circulation and distribution of wealth. On this account their speculations scarcely deserve the name of social science. The modern socialists go much further, and discuss many topics of real sociology in a way peculiar to themselves, as has been already explained. Their doctrine of State omnipotence, as has been shown, instead of excluding the State from their system, makes the State the keystone of the whole edifice, at the expense of all individual activity.

The true social science of the old Schoolmen and of Catholic theologians in general considered the State as the head of the social body; but its attributes, according to them, were very different

from the monstrous power granted to it by modern theorists. The State, particularly when *Christendom* existed in its full vigor, favored the existence of numerous corporations, either of churchmen, or of noblemen, or of burghers, artisans, and agriculturists, whose liberties, as they were called, gave birth to a solid and complete hierarchy of rank and functions. This was chiefly visible in industrial pursuits, which, however, presented features very different from those of recent times. Owing to the division of Europe into many small states, and to a certain difficulty of communication between them,—a difficulty which has been often exaggerated,—each district furnished itself with the necessities or conveniences of life. Very few commodities had to be imported from other districts. There was consequently no difficulty in regulating the production and distribution of goods. On this account we hear of no strikes during those times. There was no forced cessation of labor; and the joyful keeping of Christian festivals gave to the artisan, merchant, and agriculturist all the time required for necessary rest and the sufficient improvement of his mind.

It would, no doubt, be difficult if not impossible to reproduce in our day so happy a state of society. There were, however, shadows in the picture, resulting chiefly from the feudal system then prevalent, which no one would wish to see revived. But could not the State in the present age enter into the spirit of those times, allow the reconstruction of many corporations similar to those of the ages referred to, and favor private industry without allowing the monstrous monopolies which are now so fatal to all ordinary commercial and manufacturing concerns? The Church would, no doubt, heartily co-operate with the State in spreading comfort among all classes, preventing the absorption of wealth by a few concerns, and cutting off the root of pauperism by favoring the simple artisan, and extending a fostering care over humble and honest homes. The only thing required for it would be a peculiar legislation modelled after the old Catholic one. It is all comprised in the pregnant phrase of Bossuet already quoted: *La fin de la politique est de rendre la vie commode et les peuples heureux.*

Let the State at the same time encourage the Church in her efforts to relieve human misery. She knows how to do it, because she has received the mission to do it from her Divine Founder. The reign of true charity is the kingdom of Christ, whose universal spread has been intrusted to the Church. During her whole history she has proved her willingness and ability so to do. Let a false shame be thrown overboard and a reconciliation take place, which would redound to the good of humanity. This would be far better for the State itself than the omnipotence proposed to it by new dreamers. The few pages just indited at the end of this

paper prove abundantly that these infatuated men know nothing of human society, and cannot speak intelligently of social laws. It has been proved at the same time that there is a Christian socialism which alone deserves the name. The only defect of the demonstration is that it could not be sufficiently developed, and with regret we now stop.

VI. A word must be added on a last consideration. There cannot be a true human society without *belief in a hereafter*; because man's life does not end in this world, which is only a preparation for a better and eternal one. Let sophists close their eyes to this truth if they choose. Mankind cannot do so, because its aspirations towards heaven are irrepressible. Those who have lost hope in it cannot truly enjoy present blessings, should they even have a large share of them. Those who are happy enough to keep that sweet hope in their inmost heart are measurably contented in this world, even in the midst of privations. The hereafter is the place where every injustice will be repaired and every evil compensated. For this reason it is that human society in this life cannot be perfect, because it is merely a probation. All our sanguine philosophers who promise to change earth into heaven, foolishly work against the designs of God, who does not wish it to be so. He reserves for us far better things than this world can ever secure. The Christian should never forget that piety alone is useful for all things: *Pietas ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitæ que nunc est et futuræ.*

THE NECESSITY FOR INFALLIBILITY.

THE subject of infallibility is one of commanding interest. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the intelligent theological mind to set it aside. The consequences resulting from it are so serious and far-reaching as to command the attention of all. If true, no one can afford to treat it with indifference, and if not true, all should know it to be so. It is the duty, therefore, of all earnestly to test it in every form in which this may be legitimately done, and not to endeavor to confuse and thus hide its true claims from the conscience. Though there has been, as we have reason to know, a good deal of earnest reflection by many Protestants upon this subject, the public treatment of the question by them has not been such as to do them full justice. Only here and there has it been allowed to make its appearance in their more elaborate publications, and even then, owing to some sort of indistinct or undefinable dread, it has always been more or less slighted or superficially run through, so as to create the impression that it is not worthy of a full, radical, and thorough examination. The question, however, is manifestly not thus to be quieted or put out of the way. It has called forth a response from the common reason of men, which commands respectful consideration, and the theological mind generally is beginning to realize that if it is to be satisfactorily refuted, it must be done by legitimate means, which will require all, and likely a good deal more than all, the most earnest resources of Protestant thought.

It is said that Nero, in order to conceal his cruelty from his own conscience, as well as from the eyes of the world, clothed many of his victims with the skins of wild animals, and then cast them into the amphitheatre to be torn to pieces by ferocious beasts. They were human beings, nevertheless. So there are many who oppose infallibility, and denounce it as an absurd pretension, not because of its own true nature, but because of the imaginary and tawdry garments with which they have clothed it. They are fighting, for the most part, the consequences of their own misconception; just as the lions in the amphitheatre thought, no doubt, if they thought at all, that they were devouring beasts, not men; and many of this class, after the true idea was allowed to take the place of the false one, have fully recognized, along with the greatest intellectual lights of the world, its profound rationality, and have come to be not only sincere believers in it, but also its most strenuous advocates.

Let us briefly allude to, and, if possible, correct some of these misconceptions.

Infallibility, for instance, is not inspiration, with which it is often carelessly confounded, namely, that peculiar supernatural gift of

prophets and apostles, by which a divine relation was given to the world. It pretends to no power or authority to give a new revelation, nor yet to add one jot or tittle to the old. Nor is it a personal gift, whereby a man is made to be unerring individually in all his mental or moral judgments. Moreover, it is not impeccability; for, however infallible in his proper function, it is freely admitted that the Supreme Pontiff may nevertheless sin, and sin so deeply as to be lost forever. His sin is always greater than that of others, because of the exalted position which he occupies. Infallibility, briefly, is a supernatural gift secured by the Divine Spirit to him who occupies the office of Vicegerent of Christ on earth, so that when, in this office, and teaching the whole Church, in matters of faith and morals, and when, if he were in error, the whole Church, of which he is the head on earth, would be in error also, he is so guided and guarded, by the promised light and grace of the Holy Ghost, that he cannot but teach the truth in the most absolute accordance with revelation.

As regards the nature of this great endowment the subject of this article requires no further remark at this point.

Now, where is the absurdity of this dogma? Is it an impossible bestowment, and in this view absurd? Then, what becomes of the claims which similarly frail human beings, such as prophets and apostles, made to inspiration—a still more transcendent gift—upon the truth of which depends the validity of revelation? Those claims must, on this ground, also be absurd; for so far as they personally were concerned, it cannot be asserted that they were materially different from the generality of men; they experienced the same human frailties and were conditioned by the same finite limitations. But absurdity is not predicated in respect to their claim upon this or any other ground. Therefore, the objection in this application is, as it must be, without foundation. If God was able, or if it was consistent with His manner of working, to give inspiration to feeble men, men of like passions as ourselves, and through them, thus endowed and conditioned, to communicate an absolutely infallible revelation, can any one on the ground of reason say, that it is absurd to believe that He is also able to give, with this revelation, the inferior grace which will qualify a man, placed at the head of the Church, to preserve the truth thus revealed from all fatal error? Surely this cannot be. To speak of the impossibility, and in this view the absurdity, of frail erring men sharing with God, and by His act, in the grace of infallibility, is, therefore, in the way of fact, to undermine the whole groundwork of inspiration itself; for, if anything is clear, it is the fact that the first is presupposed by the last; that the two are, like body and soul, inwardly bound together; that the union is so vital, that the first cannot be impossible if the

second is not, and that the one cannot be absurd unless the other is so likewise.

These reflections prepare the way for a clear and in some sense full apprehension of the necessity for infallibility, in regard to which we now proceed to speak more definitely and in detail.

As already intimated, it seems clear that the nature of revelation itself requires infallibility. This, so far as it can be sustained, is a direct, divine requisition. Inspiration in giving, and infallibility in guarding revelation, are co-ordinate, at least as to their ultimate aim, and therefore must be, in their respective functions, of equal necessity. The last but secures the proper results of the first, and is, in fact, the only condition on which the first can be of any real account as respects its own purpose and mission.

Revelation is acknowledged to be supernatural, both as to its substance and form, *i. e.*, that its truth and its inspiration are wholly above and beyond the natural order. Although much of it is concerned with natural or historical facts, which might be known in an ordinary way, yet the whole, being the work of the inspired mind and connected with a spiritual and supermundane end, is a purely divine product. This is revelation in itself,—an objective fact, as really so as the sun, which gives natural light to the world,—absolutely unerring and supernatural. Here we stand upon common grounds with all believers in the fact of a revelation.

But now, whilst this objective supernatural revelation is one thing, conceded to be unerringly true by all so-called orthodox Christian minds, our fallible apprehension of it is, as must also be conceded, quite another and a different thing.

It is well, at this stage of our general discussion, to mark somewhat in detail a few of the sharp points of difference which here arise.

1. Revelation, as an objective fact, immediately from the pen of inspiration, is, as to its truth, absolutely certain. It must be so, otherwise it would not be inspired. As, however, it is understood, or subjectively apprehended by fallible minds in their ordinary state, it is just as absolutely uncertain; and this also must be so, otherwise those minds would not be fallible.

2. Revelation, as objective or in itself, teaches the same truth through all ages and to all minds. It cannot vary or change, or, as regards its doctrine, adapt itself to different conditions, being one thing for one and a different thing for another. As understood, however, by different minds, on the principle of fallibility, it teaches radically different things.

3. Revelation, as objective or in itself considered, carries the whole complicated system of divine truth in a way that is perfectly harmonious throughout. There is not, as there cannot be, the

presence of a single jar. As apprehended by the fallible individual reason, it results in contradictions of the most palpable nature from beginning to end.

4. Revelation, as objective, is the bearer to our natural, and now world of sin and moral darkness, of pure supernatural truth, which, as such, is in no sense attainable by the reason, nor by any process which the reason might institute. As apprehended by finite, darkened, fallible minds, it is truth on a level with the limited human understanding, that is, truth in the order of nature.

Now there is certainly no form of reasoning known to the human mind which can make it appear that these two things, with differences so strongly marked, are one and the same thing. This would be to destroy reason itself and convert the whole region of knowledge into a fancy or an idle dream. As it cannot be shown that light is darkness, so neither can it be proven that these two things are the same thing. Rather, like light and darkness, they are opposites, and, as such, can never be reconciled.

Take now these two strongly-marked and divergent facts, and suppose infallibility, or an infallible interpreter, does not exist, which of the two would remain, and be the practical guide and controlling power for men? Very manifestly, the latter—that is, the uncertain, contradictory, natural opinions of men respecting revelation, which constitute just no revelation at all, instead of the absolutely sure and perfect Word of God itself! Here, as all may see, is a direct substitution of the word of man for the Word of God. What, then, in these circumstances, *is* the perfect objective revelation of God, without the power somewhere to understand it in its own perfect character? Clearly, in spite of all the vain boasts of the Protestant world, it is, as it must be, a pure abstraction.

The absence of this power of infallibility to understand revelation would not, it is true, utterly destroy revelation as such. It would still exist, just as the sun would, were there no eyes to see its light; and it would still be, in itself, absolutely unerring. But, plainly, so far as we are concerned, it would be as though it were not. For us and for the world generally, concretely and practically, it could not be. In other words, it would be shorn, *ex necessitate*, of every element that constitutes it a supernatural revelation, and would be reduced to the character of a mere ordinary, common book, from which each one may, *ad libitum*, gather what notions best suit his tastes, though he would be, at the same time, at absolute war with every other one, who professes, in like manner, to take his opinions from the same source. To speak of this book, thus eviscerated, in which human opinion has taken the place of divine inspiration, as being the revelation of God, is simply to be foolish and impious; and it certainly is not harsh to say, that no

one in proper harmony with his own reason can seriously maintain such a proposition.

In such form, being a mere abstraction, or relegated practically to the clouds, the Revelation of God, however perfect, both as to form and contents, could of course never actualize its own purpose, namely, serve as an infallible guide, or lead men into infallible truth; and not being able to do this, we cannot rationally believe that it would ever have been given. Why should it, in such case, be inspired at all? Surely it did not require inspiration to produce such results. There is nothing in variable and contradictory opinions which, as effects, can connect them with inspiration as their cause.

What then is the general conclusion which reason, to speak of nothing higher, compels the mind to draw from these premises? Nothing less, surely, than this: If Revelation is to be a fact for our world—if it is to be for us the actual revelation of God, whose teachings are, and in their own nature must be, certain, harmonious, invariable, and supernatural, in which there can be no error, no changing opinion, no contradiction, then, by some means or other, we must be made to understand it in its own certain, harmonious, and absolute character. Otherwise, whatever it may be in itself, it is, and can be, no inspired revelation for us. Thus the inherent logic of reason, which speaks to the consciousness of every man who recollects himself as being accountable to God, will force the conviction, when prejudice is banished and nature is calm, that to know revelation in this the only way it can be known, we need a power to interpret it which shall have equal authority with revelation itself. This conclusion cannot be avoided.

It is a great mistake, which many make, to suppose that all that is necessary in order to possess the Bible, is to purchase it, and, like an honest man, pay for it. They seem to forget that infidels of the most advanced type possess it—precisely in the same way, and are frequently able much more adroitly to manage, in the service of infidelity, their quotations from it. Such possession may indeed give him a legal right to the paper and ink which enter into it, as into any other mere personal chattel. But the Bible itself, in its own proper nature, namely, its truth, is not thus a matter of merchandise or legal ownership. To possess it in this its only true sense is to seize its meaning, to know its sense, and to know this infallibly, for this sense or meaning is infallible. How may this be done without infallibility?

The necessity for infallibility in this view is, therefore, clearly equal to the value of revelation itself; for without the first it is not possible to possess the last. He who has the truth of revelation, in its own infallible form (and it has no other truth), has revela-

tion, and he who has not the truth under this form has not revelation, and would not have, though printed Bibles were stacked around him to the height of the Himalayas.

Give up, then, this infallible interpreter, and you have remaining a fallible interpretation, a varying opinion, an absolute uncertainty, that is, no revelation at all, and thus nothing, to be the guide for all men in respect to their eternal destinies. What rational mind can calmly yield to such a result?

But we may view the same general truth in another light, namely, in its relation to faith, both in itself and in its unity. It is acknowledged on all hands that faith is an essential grace. Here again we start on common ground. The necessity for infallibility arising from this source is no less apparent and imperative than that which we have just seen growing from the nature of revelation. We all admit the Christian faith to be a divine gift. As such, like the eye, it must have an object. What would the eye be without an object adapted to it? So what would faith be without, in the same manner, an object which in its nature might correspond with it? What is the object for faith other than the truth of revelation? The living person of Christ, as the *λογος*, or the Revealer, is not distinct and separate from this general revelation. This truth of revelation is inspired truth, and therefore, as to its form, is certain and unerring. It is this truth, in this form, that constitutes the object for faith, as a divine gift. Divine truth, substantively, cannot be separated from its form, as given and fixed by inspiration. Divorce here means general shipwreck.

Here, then, are two divine or supernatural things, namely, the spiritual organ of vision (the gift of faith), seeing, and the object (the inspired truth of revelation) seen.

Now, if the truth of revelation is one, or single, as we have already seen it must, to be inspired, then it follows that this faith must also be one or single; that is, it must apprehend its object in the form in which it is given by inspiration, which, by the necessity of the case, must always be one and single. There is no way in which we may escape this conclusion. Therefore, unless revelation changes, or unless there are many and different revelations instead of one, and this one unchangeable, there must be one faith only, even as there is but one baptism and one God.

It follows from the foregoing, that faith is not and cannot be a mere opinion. Opinion takes many forms—is never fully settled. By its own nature it is something individual, and follows all the kaleidoscopic changes to which the individual is liable. In its best estate, and sustained by the highest degree of human intelligence, it involves uncertainty, and therefore, at least, the possibility of error; for if it were or could be certain, it would, *ipso facto*, not

be opinion. Now the uncertain or doubtful is not an object of faith, for it is the nature of faith to exclude doubt. Faith, as distinguished from opinion, is, in its own nature certain, just as much so as its object is, and hence is divine or supernatural; or, to change the order, it is divine or supernatural, and *hence* certain, and was given for the purpose of enabling man to rise above all mere sense, and opinion, and ratiocination—the whole sphere of mere mundane existence—into the supernatural order, and thus take into his moral being what he never could by reason, namely, the certain, infallible, and perfect sense of revelation, just as revelation gives it.

Now if revelation could teach, in regard to the same subject-matter, many and different doctrines to many and different minds, or if it could proclaim one doctrine to one age and a different one to another, it would manifestly not be the same revelation for each; and in these circumstances, instead of there being but one faith, there would be many and different faiths. Indeed, there would be, by the necessity of the case, as many revelations as there would be men, and as many faiths as there would be revelations. And, besides all this, they would all be in fatal conflict and contradiction. God would thus be at war with Himself. Could any rational mind regard this as the work of an infinitely wise Being? Such revelations would carry their refutation upon their own face so clearly that the most illiterate even would at once see and spurn them.

Faith, then, by its very nature, is a unit. It could not exist in any other form; for the moment it takes any other attitude or nature, or becomes many and contradictory, it ceases to be properly related to its certain object, and is mere opinion.

But what, now, is the condition on which this essential unity of faith depends? There can be immediately but one, and that plainly is the power to apprehend revelation—the object of faith—in its own infallible character. In this character, as we have seen, revelation does not and cannot teach in regard to the same subject-matter, many different and contradictory doctrines, but must always announce, as it does in fact, one and the same doctrine. That which the Apostles taught and was believed in the beginning, is that which is taught and believed now. It is the same in every age, in every clime, and to all minds; and the original commission under which this teaching is continued from age to age is also the same. Hence the nature, and hence also the ground of the unity of faith—“the faith once delivered to the Saints.”

Here again, it is very clear to perception that the power capable of so apprehending revelation as to give to faith its own sure object, namely, unerring and absolutely certain truth, and in this way preserve its unity, which is essential to its being, can be noth-

ing short of infallibility. Whatever, therefore, may be the value of the unity of faith, nay, whatever may be the importance of faith itself, as a condition of personal participation in the grace of redemption, must form the measure of the necessity which exists for infallibility, since neither faith nor its unity can, in the way of fact, exist without it. Could any necessity well be more absolute? and could any touch our nature at a more vital point?

The same argument might be deduced from the nature of the Church. There is, as is theoretically acknowledged by all properly enlightened minds, but one Church. It is also clear that this Church is visible and invisible, or that these two sides inhere in its nature. As such it is an objective, organic, and historical fact in the world, compared by the Apostle to a human body—it being the “body of Christ.” It cannot, therefore, be divided. By its own nature it is a unit, and division would be destruction. This unity is invisible of course, but it is visible also; for where is the proof of the first if the last does not exist? and, moreover, how can an organism be a unit internally and not a unit externally? But we have not the space further to develop this point, and can only say that this unity of the Church, in fact, in faith, in government, and in work, is possible only on the ground of an infallible head, very clearly secured to it originally in the person of Peter and his successors to the end of time. To speak of invisible unity, as Protestants are in the habit of doing, in spite of the fact that each denomination is independent of all the rest, and in spite of the continued and bitter warfare between them in regard to the most vital doctrines of Christianity, is manifestly a pure delusion, and hardly worthy of earnest discussion. Where earnestness ceases, argument is wasted.

There is yet, however, one other consideration showing the same necessity, to which we would direct earnest attention. This is the nature of Church authority. Here again we start on common ground, at least so far as the more advanced Protestant thought extends.

There is authority in the family and authority in the State, and neither the family nor the State could exist, as all readily acknowledge, without it, except in ruins; certainly could not accomplish their own respective ends in the economy of society in its absence. The same is, of course, true in respect to the Church as the collective body of believers or the Ecclesia. Indeed, the principle of authority, even to a greater extent than is true in relation to the family and the State, is a vital part of its being. This authority, however, thus asserted, both as to the being and the mission of the Church, is peculiar altogether to itself. There is no class into which it may be arranged, and with which it would in all respects be

similar or alike. It stands alone, and all that can be properly said of it is, that it is like itself. As authority simply it is, of course, the same as that in the family and the State; that is to say, it is *real* authority. But as to its nature it differs widely from both, and mainly in the fact that it refers to the conscience and matters of faith. This renders it entirely unique. The conscience, dependent, as it is, upon a morally darkened intellect and perverted will, is not, as all are ready to admit, an infallible or safe guide, and therefore needs a controlling force beyond itself. Of course this force is moral, and not physical. The authority of the family is internal as well as external, *i. e.*, it takes hold of the child mentally and physically, but is conditioned and limited at every point. The authority of the State, on the other hand, is wholly external, it having no right to command any but outward obedience, allowing full freedom to faith and the conscience.

Acts, however, arising in the conscientious conviction of being right, may be, and often are, palpably wrong. A sadly striking instance of this is seen in the melancholy conduct of Freeman, the Pocasset murderer of his child. Civil government has the right, and is, moreover, obligated, to suppress and punish such acts, if intelligently committed, however sincere the conscience from which they arise, because it is bound to protect society and punish crime. The mere fact that men are conscientiously sincere, will not, if the act is wrong and injurious, stay the restraining or punitive hand of civil authority. Brutus, when plunging the dagger into the heart of Cæsar, and Jacques Clement, when he assassinated Henry III., acted, no doubt, under a very great excitement of mind, which led them to view their attempts as deeds of heroism; and yet, if they had both been brought before the tribunal of justice, no one would have thought them entitled to impunity—the one on account of his love of country, and the other on account of his zeal for religion.

But now, just as civil law has an acknowledged right to suppress and punish wrong and injurious acts (not thoughts, feelings, or purposes) arising in conscience, so moral law, with even greater right, and quite as strenuously, condemns the wicked feelings which are the immediate antecedents of these acts. There must therefore be a power entering into the person, capable of regulating and controlling the conscience itself, irrespective of outward acts. If this is not so, then the most vital and responsible part of our being is left altogether without government, and this cannot be supposed. The authority, thus entering man's moral being, is not that of the State, but that of the Church. Its field of action is the interior of our being, just as that of civil government is the exterior; the first

having regard governmentally to our moral nature as the second has to our physical.

Here the question arises, what, in the nature of the case, must be the character and ground of that authority which undertakes to regulate the faith and command the conscience of men, or modify and mould their relations with God and eternity? Can it be any form that carries in it even the possibility of error? Clearly, it cannot; for where is the authority to compel men, in conscience, to trust their salvation to an uncertainty? Chances may do in the world of speculation, where, if you miss, you lose a dollar, or ten, or ten thousand. This is comparative trash. But it will not do where, if you miss, you lose your soul and a happy eternity. No man can preserve his sense of moral integrity and manhood who voluntarily surrenders his spiritual being to the dominion of a possible falsehood. But the absence of the rule of absolutely unerring authority means, in our circumstances, not only the possible presence of error, but always its actual presence. Our nature, through the Fall, is preoccupied with error; but where exists the power to compel men to believe a lie, and, in the significant language of Scripture, be damned? To submit to such authority voluntarily and intelligently is moral suicide. Here is the very taproot of slavery,—slavery of the very deepest sort,—the ruin, in fact, of everything in the form of moral manhood and personal responsibility. And, moreover, very clearly, it is treason against God. Against all such authority we are not only justified in rebelling, but we are bound to do it, even unto blood.

Manifestly, the voice of God alone, or unerring truth, can be authority for the conscience. How can this voice reach us practically, so as to be an authoritatively governing power in our moral nature? No progress can be made until this question is fairly met and satisfactorily answered. Is it directly through the Bible? This, as we have seen, on the principle of the fallible mind, is full of contradictions. Whilst in itself it is conceded to be the inspired will of God, to become a consistent practical rule it must be interpreted. This is the point where the real contest begins. The question is not the Bible, but biblical interpretation. How may the Bible be interpreted in such a way as to assure the conscience that the interpretation is, beyond the possibility of error, the inspired truth of God? for if it is not this it is not the Bible. Can individual reason, which in its own strength may affect to be the measure of this truth, give such assurance? This, as is known to all, is the very essence of shrivelling rationalism. Can the principle of self-authentication, which some few modern theologians affect to hold, do this? No principle has, to a greater degree, caused the divergences and contradictions touching sacred truths

which have arisen during the last three centuries. Is it possible for human creeds, springing into life to-day, to wilt and die to-morrow, the handiwork of restless, ambitious men, to give this guarantee? The question carries its own answer. Can synods and assemblies, which acknowledge in the very act of forging the rule of authority that they have not the grace of inerrancy, that they have often been mistaken in the past, as they may possibly be also in the present act, give this assurance? The fact is, that in the very effort they make to weld the links of a chain to bind this God-given freedom of others they themselves have, in the way of fact, we do not say designedly, repudiated the only authority that can bind the soul.

No! All these various forms of authority, by their own confession, and in their very nature, carry in them the principle of error, and doing this, they cannot be admitted into the conscience with power to bind and control. Instinctively the intelligent spirit shrinks from and resists them, and, acting conscientiously, must feel itself ever bound to do so.

The sense of this is coming to be very seriously felt in all directions. Men are restless under the human shackles which are made to bind them. They feel that their moral nature has been invaded and captured, and is now held in bondage, by an illegitimate power, and the sense of humiliation hereby occasioned gives them real pain. This is the reason of the earnest cry which is raised latterly in all directions against creed. Boldly are men moving into the kindly light, beginning to challenge the authorities that have forged their chains. "What right," they are asking, "have you who acknowledge your own fallibility, and often glory in it, to dictate articles for our faith, and formulate rules to coerce our conscience? Are we not your peers, and do we not stand upon the same platform?"

Clearly, for Protestant "churches," this authority, essential to the very idea of the Church, does not and cannot exist. It is a pure delusion. Their creeds are rapidly losing themselves amid the rubbish of other days. It is a remarkable fact, but a fact nevertheless, and we announce it with respect, that not one of these creeds, which created so much enthusiasm in the 16th century, commands to-day the real inward regard and confidence of its friends. It is coming to be seen in a light without a shadow that no Church, any more than any other form of organization, say the Odd Fellows or Freemasons, which does not possess, and is not able practically to apply the principle of inerrancy, can or dare claim authority over faith and conscience.

The idea of dogma, also in the light of this fact, has been in the various Protestant churches already practically abandoned, and

the policy now generally inaugurated to secure union and carry forward their respective enterprises is an appeal wholly to feeling and sentiment; thus hiding an inherent and fatal weakness, and placing themselves beyond the reach of argument—the end of which, notwithstanding, and in the near future must be, by the acknowledgment even of their own more astute friends, pure naturalism, and thus, at last, absolute failure.

Infallibility alone being God's own supernatural gift is able to give to faith its object, and to conscience its law. This cannot err, and therefore, for us, concretely and practically, it is the only ground of authority for our moral being. There can be none other; therefore the alternative is this or nothing.

No abandonment of moral manhood is involved in bowing to such authority. It is the simple, pure dictate of reason itself, and when done voluntarily and intelligently it is one of the highest as well as freest acts that man is capable of performing. Being the mediated voice of God himself, as it must be, if true, to obey it is to be truly free, and to rise consciously into our own proper being, as connected both with absolute truth and with God himself. *Veritas liberabit vos.* Not until this act is thus intelligently performed can any one fully realize its moral richness on the one hand, and, on the other, the utter barrenness of the whole moral world, where this great principle is not to be found.

Upon this principle, moreover, is solved the great problem which has commanded the finest philosophic thought of every age, viz.: How may liberty and authority be reconciled? Apparently they are mutually exclusive and repellent principles, and yet really the one demands the other, and cannot properly exist without it. Liberty without authority is libertinism, whilst authority without liberty is despotism. How may they be united so as to secure and conserve the proper nature and function of each? In themselves there is nothing to furnish the basis of this meeting and blending. By their own nature they look to and demand a third element, a mediating force beyond themselves, which will yet be in inward, real harmony with both, in and through which they may enter, permeate, and condition each other. Ultimately this third factor can be none other than sure or certain truth, or rather the grace of sure and certain truth.

Liberty and authority, both arising in this truth originally, must here again, and by its grace, become really reconciled. Here is solved what philosophy has vainly labored for ages to accomplish. The reason has no legitimate claims beyond this truth, and reason will so acknowledge. This force entering as a factor, both liberty and authority are governed by it, and thus each is preserved in its true character. Indeed, they become, on this ground, substantially

but the different sides of the same thing, and are only distinguished by different names. In the light of this fact it is clearly seen that to obey is to be free, and to be free is to obey; for the obedience here, seeing that its demand arises in truth infallibly ascertained, is not constrained or forced, as by an external arbitrary power, but springs spontaneously from the human soul, as something eternally right and fitting in itself.

The counterpart of this, as we find it in the State, is strikingly significant, and may serve very aptly to illustrate the point. The authority of civil government, whose ultimate basis is also divine, is no less unyielding, and in its own sphere, and for its own ends, infallible; infallible, however, only in the sense of being ultimate and conclusive; and it is this without even the suspicion of ignoring freedom or being despotic. It is a simple necessity; it must take this attitude in order to be free. The citizen, as such, has no civil rights beyond, or contrary to, the decision of the supreme appellate court. This decision announced, the controversy is ended, and the only duty which remains is that at least of outward submission. Take away this power of finality, or of finally determining civil rights, and the foundation of government itself is at once broken up, and freedom is converted into the merest figment of the imagination.

Here, then, unquestionably, is the ultimate and firm foundation on which rest these two strong pillars in all properly constituted society—freedom and authority—without which society must be, through all its manifold departments, in a perpetual state of anarchy and helpless confusion.

All the interest, therefore, which attaches to the principle of moral authority (and of true freedom as well), and with this, more remotely, to civil governmental authority, connected at the same time with the inward sense of reverence and personal responsibility (and no one can sufficiently estimate this, permeating, as it does, our individual nature, and spreading from thence through general society, constituting the basis of morality, the motive of virtue, and the incentive to pure and noble deeds, touching and inspiring our common humanity at ten thousand secret points); all this, we say, is due, primarily and fundamentally, to the supernatural grace of infallibility, giving certainty, and hence divine authority, to truth.

Looking at the question simply as furnishing the basis and animating spirit of Church government, what is there like it in the whole sweep of the world's history? The Emperor Maximin, in the beginning of the fourth century, who was an ardent friend of pagan worship, and the bitter foe of the rapidly rising and spreading Christian Church, recognized very clearly the mighty power

which the Church possessed in her governmental unity; and, with a view to check her progress, and, if possible, crush her, suggested a similar polity for paganism. A complete external imitation was accordingly adopted. Priests were subjected to the authority of superior pontiffs, and these acknowledged, in turn, the supreme jurisdiction of the high-priests of the province, who acted as the immediate vicegerents of the emperor himself. The white robe was the ensign of their official dignity. The new prelates were carefully selected from the most noble and opulent families of the empire. And yet, with all this compactness of organization and power of magistrates combined, it passed away like the morning cloud, or, rather, suddenly crashed, like the rotten framework of an otherwise massive temple. If the government of the Church were, in like manner, a mere pretence or outward imitation even of Heaven's own government, what could have prevented, long since, a like ruin in relation to it? On the contrary, as history fully attests, its strength has remained firm and steady all through the uprisings and downfallings of states and dynasties; and how can this historical wonder, this singular exception, be accounted for or explained, except on the ground that she actually possesses what she claims, namely, this *rock-foundation*, against which even the powers of hell cannot prevail?

These now, to extend the basis of the argument no further, are some of the positions showing the necessity for infallibility. If these positions are well taken, in other words, if they rest on solid ground, as we believe they do, then the inference must follow with a force which cannot be resisted, that the necessity, as to its nature, is simply absolute. To deny it is—to all intents and purposes—to deny revelation itself; for this, without an interpreter, in nature and authority corresponding with revelation, can never be more than a splendid supernatural abstraction, which, as such, would never have been given. To deny it—though there still would be opinion and vague conjecture touching supernatural truth, there can be no faith in the true sense of the word, and, of course, no unity of faith; for there can neither be an infallibly true object for faith, nor an unerring practical rule by which to relate faith with it. At best its object may be error, as well as truth, and is always more likely—taking human nature as it is—to be error; at least it can never be absolutely sure whether it be truth or a lie. To deny it, no one can conceive how the Church could continue with its several essential attributes, and especially that of unity. To deny it, moreover, there can be no regulated authority for conscience, and our whole inward moral nature is at the mercy absolutely, either of every perverted fancy of a depraved heart and darkened intellect, or of every tyrannical pretence seeking to enslave men, coming in

the name of authority from beyond themselves. In a word, let the denial be general and final, and we are absolutely at sea, with all the magnificent interests of Christianity, connected, too, with all the deep longings of the human soul; so that we can have neither confidence in the present nor hope in the future.

Clearly, this necessity for infallibility is entirely too serious and vital, and the consequences depending on it are too far-reaching and tremendous, not to carry with it at the same time the thing itself to which it points. It cannot be that a loving God would thus mock and tantalize His children, and especially in respect to interests which are so momentous.

Is it possible for any one intelligently to concede the presence of this necessity, so absolute in its nature, and yet think that infallibility itself could be absent? We cannot believe this. As well might you concede the presence of a similar necessity in the system of nature for the law of gravitation, and yet imagine the absence, in fact, of such a law. This cannot be; neither can the other. That, therefore, to which this necessity points, and which it so imperatively demands, must have an actual existence; and, like the law of gravitation, be, in the sphere of the supernatural order, in perpetual concrete operation from year to year and age to age. To eliminate the principle of infallibility from the order of grace, would be like destroying the law of gravitation in the kingdom of nature; in the first, no less than in the last, it would result in a universal collapse.

Infallibility, then, we have a full right from reason to conclude, is a fact, and one of the most vital and vitally far-reaching facts, not only for the Church, which is its centre, but also for the entire world.

Viewed, now, in the light of this rational necessity, instead of infallibility being absurd, as the claim is sometimes said to be by those who have not seriously studied its nature, there is nothing, in fact, that can be in deeper and more perfect harmony with reason. The absurdity lies altogether on the other side—in the flip-pant spirit by which it is decried and denounced. *A priori*, the mind looks for, and expects it, and it would be disappointed not to find it, fully as much as the man who, looking into a clear mirror, should fail to meet his own image. It would argue a radical defect in the laws of moral government. Indeed, if there be one call of reason louder and more earnest than all the rest combined, it would seem to be just that call which seeks to regain what belonged to the reason originally, but which was lost in the fall, and thus, through this reacquired supernatural gift, be surely led back on the bright lines of unerring truth, to Him in whom our being may again become complete.

We pause here to ask, Where is this infallibility, thus necessitated, to be found? Is it in *Episcopalianism*? Reluctantly and slowly the response comes—"It is not in me." Is it in *Presbyterianism*? Sharply and somewhat crabbedly the answer is—" 'Tis not in me." Is it in *Methodism*? In a smiling but slightly bewildered tone, the reply is the same—"It is not in me." And thus on and on, *et id omne genus*; and to the whole, if whole there be, I put the same question—is it in you? And the answer is, a deep and absolute—"No."

Still the necessity continues, and grows more earnest with every successive repudiation, and must exist somewhere. Where? And listening, I hear a calm, mild, and gentle voice, saying, "Here—'tis in me;" and, looking up, I find before me all the outlines of the grand old Catholic and Apostolic Church. She stands peerless and alone in her claim to this transcendent grace; and it is so consistent with this a priori necessity for infallibility that it must, in the view of reason, be admitted to be just.

Yes, here it has been from the beginning. Its tones were heard by kings and princes, and they uncovered their heads and reverently bowed before it. They were heard by the rude barbarian, and under them his savage nature warmed and softened into a high-toned civilized Christian man. They were heard among the lowly haunts of the poor and oppressed, and they inspired hope and courage. Truth here received an incomparable majesty and value, and faith an unconquerable life and power. The martyr at the stake or in the dungeon was by them miraculously nerved and enabled to endure the most excruciating torture in the spirit of the grandest heroism. They sounded forth among the rich and powerful, and these, hearing the call as from God, at once abandoned their ambitious pursuits of the world, and dedicated their influence and gold in rearing massive cathedrals, spacious monasteries, and ample asylums for the poor and afflicted. They entered the ears of genius, and at their bidding, as by magic, Christian art sprang into being, which, by its sweet harmony and perfect lines of beauty, allured and lifted the age-thought to heaven. Philosophy and science, and jurisprudence and history entered, by their influence, upon a new and higher mission. Truth, thus made certain, not only ennobled, but also enlarged and truly freed the human mind, gave to it celestial wings, and bade it soar grandly through the universe. Magnificent universities, at its call, were made to dot and cover the whole fair face of Europe. Civilization was led, as by its hand, to its own proper Christian plane, spreading rich blessings by means of ten thousand different conduits through the whole of society, starting the grand march of the races upwards and onwards to their true goal. And from this grand centre of

condensed supernatural power, all over and around the globe, was found to extend a vast and complicated system of spiritual graces, the like of which the world never saw before; here jubilant, and there depressed, now flattered and then persecuted, comprehending all nationalities, races, and tongues, the most lowly and abject of the human family and the most highly gifted and cultured of earth,—the king, the philosopher, the orator, the poet, the sage, and the saint,—“men studying everything, disputing in everything, replying to everything, knowing everything, yet always agreeing in unity of doctrine, bending their noble intellectual brows in respectful obedience to the one faith”—a system moving grandly through all time; old, yet with the dew of early morn sparkling upon it, kept all the while in absolute unity and harmony, the surprise and wonder of the world, the standing, speaking miracle of the ages! And how, under God, is all this accomplished? The simple answer is, by the still, calm, but potent voice of infallibility.

Truly, “Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord.”

“Do we not here,” in the language of a brilliant writer, “seem to behold another planetary system, where globes of fire revolve in their vast orbits in the midst of immensity, always drawn to their centre by a mysterious attraction. That central force allows no aberration, takes from them nothing of their extent, or of the grandeur of their movement; but inundates them with light, and gives to their motion a more majestic regularity.”

Now, infallibility, carrying with it, as by an inexorable logic as it seems so plainly to do, all the features peculiar and essential to Catholicity, you may see how and why, sincerely believing it, as I cannot help doing, I am now in this service. I am engaged in it, moreover, frankly to acknowledge that infallibility is stronger than I, and humbly to lay at the feet of the Church, from whose bosom it speaks, this little and poor chaplet, in grateful memory of her victory.*

* The writer of the foregoing article is a recent convert. To this the last few sentences refer.

ARCHBISHOP GIBBONS AND HIS EPISCOPALIAN CRITIC, DR. STEARNS.

The Faith of Our Fathers: Being a Plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church founded by Our Lord Jesus Christ. By Rt. Rev. James Gibbons, D.D., Bishop of Richmond and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. London: R. Washbourne.

The Faith of Our Forefathers: An Examination of Archbishop Gibbons's "Faith of Our Fathers." By Rev. Edward J. Stearns, D.D., Examining Chaplain of the Diocese of Easton, etc. New York: Thomas Whitaker. 1879.

THE first edition of Archbishop Gibbons's *Faith of Our Fathers*, appeared in December, 1876, since which time, that is, within the short period of only three years, the book has gone through no less than thirteen editions, equivalent to sixty-five thousand copies. Taking into consideration that it treats exclusively on religious subjects, and mainly, too, on those that are distinctively Catholic, the popularity enjoyed by the *Faith of Our Fathers* appears quite remarkable. And this popularity furnishes an evidence that there existed, and still continues to exist, a general demand for a Catholic publication of its character. Had it met with an indifferent reception on the part of the reading public, it is safe to assert that Protestants would probably have left it pass unnoticed. But as an eminently successful work, the Episcopal Church of this country has found it necessary to issue a counter publication. Reverend Dr. Edward J. Stearns, "at the earnest request of the Assistant Bishop of Maryland," has written a volume entitled *Faith of Our Forefathers*, thus clearly indicating by its very name what it is meant to be, namely, a refutation of Archbishop Gibbons's work.

A merely superficial glance at its contents is sufficient to dispel from any intelligent reader's mind the idea that Dr. Stearns's book can even pretend to any just claim to being a refutation. From beginning to end there is visible but one aim; that is, to cast odium upon the writer of the *Faith of Our Fathers*, and thereby upon the book itself. Its true character, as a grossly personal assault, is shown in unmistakable language on every page; and though, as a matter of necessity, it also directly attacks the Catholic Church, yet one cannot fail to perceive that it is specially designed to impeach the veracity and orthodoxy of the Archbishop. It is, of course, needless to remark that the attack is no less malignant than gratuitous, and falls perfectly harmless before the exalted dignity of the Primate of the Catholic hierarchy in this country. In

this respect it is *vox et præterea nihil*. I propose to take as little notice as possible of its character as a personal attack, but, wishing to assign it to its proper place as a literary production, I shall examine and criticise both works with regard to their parentage as well as issue, because a just and critical comparison of two rivals is always the best way to bring their respective merits or demerits into bold relief.

Inquiring, first of all, into the causes which combined to secure an almost phenomenal success to the *Faith of Our Fathers*, it will be seen that this inquiry will account, to some extent at least, for the vindictive acerbity displayed in the work of Dr. Stearns. A survey of the situation will disclose that its aggressive spirit is a desperate effort to regain lost positions. If we contemplate the attitude of the intellectual world towards religion, as it presents itself to-day, and compare it with what it was even in the recent past, we observe that a remarkable change has taken place. It cannot be said to be merely a change of scenery, a shifting, as it were, from one place to another in the same theatre. Religious strife moves to-day in another sphere altogether from what it did a decade or two ago. There was a time when the burning question of religion was confined more or less within the narrow limits of controversy between Protestantism (with a numerically formidable and steadily increasing array of sects) on one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other. But that time is past. The war then waged has been virtually decided in favor of Catholicity. The decomposition of all religious structures outside the Church of Rome, no matter how skilfully erected, no matter how powerfully supported, ever since the Reformation, goes on visibly before the eyes of men with startling rapidity; and institutions which are awaiting their doom are like falling houses. Ghastly warnings awaken the inmates of the house in the dark of night; the walls quiver, the timbers creak, the partitions can no longer muffle the strange rushing sounds behind them. Protestantism to-day, from whatever side we view it, presents unmistakable signs of having reached that stage which invariably precedes final and complete dissolution. Protestantism itself recognizes that the battle of to-day is in reality a battle between the Catholic religion and atheism, a war between the Church of Rome and infidelity. In this contest Protestantism plays no part. The world of thought shows entire indifference towards it. It treats it with disdain, with undisguised contempt, not even taking cognizance of its existence. It is excluded as a factor of no significance, and that verdict, rendered as it is, not by partisans, but by the intellectual society of the world of culture, is perhaps the most sweeping that has yet been rendered against pseudo-Christianity. If this seems a strong assertion, the move-

ment from which modern atheism has sprung may be pointed to as its verification.

The leaders of the schools of "advanced thought," in proposing their claims to our acceptance, appeal directly to reason for the rejection of the supernatural order. They begin by denying the personal Deity as worshipped by Christianity, and by denying the immortality of the soul in man. These propositions of the creed of the nineteenth century, proposed as they daily are to our mental assent, startle every one who is deeply imbued with religious sentiments. But this is not all, something still more startling lies in ambush, namely, inquiry reveals to us that these propositions rest on precisely the same basis as that on which Protestantism has been erected; for the principle of negation,—and to it the principle of private judgment, the most vital element of all Protestant denominations is admittedly reducible,—underlies also positivism, agnosticism, and whatever other systems of similar atheistic tendencies are now in vogue. Only, and this fact deserves special attention, positivism, agnosticism, in short, the scientific infidelity of modern times possess the unquestionable advantage of being at once more logical and consistent, more honest and courageous than the *soi-disant* religions, the notions of the different Protestant sects, which all draw their main strength from the same source. In the concrete, it may be readily admitted, that it is better for an individual to belong to a Protestant "church" than to no church at all; to profess the ever-changing creed of Luther, or Calvin, or Zwingli, etc., than no creed at all; but, in the abstract, it must be conceded that it is more rational and consistent *not* to believe in God than to believe in Him and, at the same time, to prescribe to Him what He may wish or command us to believe and what not. And it is this perception, of which numbers are becoming more and more painfully aware, which has acted of late so largely as a disintegrating element. The insufficiency of a religious system, with no better authority than the individual's own *bon-plaisir*, has become apparent to all thinking men. Reflective minds now acknowledge openly that they have sunk into what Goethe calls *Weltschmerz*; that is, a sense of vagueness, of hopelessness, for which the faint and disturbed semblance of real faith neither knows nor has a remedy. And, turning away from the dearth and barrenness of Protestantism, they find themselves in this position: they must give their adherence to the scientific atheism of our period, or they must turn to the religion which alone possesses the requisite element of real faith, namely, authoritative certainty. It will thus be seen that Protestantism has been the chief loser since the time that modern advanced thought gained ascendancy. For numbers of Protestants have given in, and are still giving in, their

allegiance to the fashionable creeds of the schools of science; in consequence whereof some denominations have been compelled to join hands so closely with infidelity that their pretensions to Christianity appear as ridiculous as they are fictitious. And others, again, have, on reflection, decided to return to the true Church of God. The ranks of all non-Catholic "churches" have been thinning out in a twofold direction, and this at a ratio so rapidly increasing that absolute dismemberment appears inevitable at no far-distant day. Any one who is doubtful on this point should peruse *Rome's Recruits*, and he will hardly fail to coincide with the gloomy predictions which have been uttered quite recently in the pages of the *Nineteenth Century* by Mr. Gladstone in regard to the future of what he calls "the Anglican Paddock." To the self-same "Anglican Paddock," it must not be forgotten, credit must be given for being, indeed, the most conservative and the most powerfully supported of all Protestant denominations.

Society has, therefore, been benefited by the intellectual movement of our day in this respect, that its attention has been directed anew towards the Catholic religion. The religion that so long has been despised begins now to be examined; the religion which offers love, even where hatred and indifference are the only response to love, begins to be recognized, and to be respected and revered. The prejudice against Rome dies gradually out, not because it is now less carefully nurtured, but because hate towards Rome is found after all to be the only point of agreement in a camp where all else is disagreement. It would not be just, however, to overlook the fact that other reasons also have been actively at work in bringing about a more favorable disposition towards the Catholic Church. It has not passed unobserved that, with affectionate solicitude, she follows man step by step from the cradle to the grave, and that her efforts for securing the spiritual welfare of her children stand not alone, but are, on the contrary, coupled with efforts not less unceasing nor less energetic for ameliorating their earthly condition and procuring for them such share of terrestrial happiness as may properly be attainable. And with this fervent devotion of the Church to all her children, whether obedient or unruly, it is seen that there goes hand-in-hand a cheerful and joyous submission, and an absolute freedom from doubt on the part of those who acknowledge her authority. Submission to her is recognized as the submission of love, and the faith which she imparts is recognized as the faith of certainty. "Whence this submission of love?" and "Whence that faith of certainty?" are questions which naturally suggest themselves, and these questions are being urged now in many quarters with wonderful insistence. And here we have struck the chord that has been set vibrating and is re-echoed by so many honest

minds: it is the willingness on their part to learn from the Church herself what answer she can give; what answer, in fact, she does give to these questions.

Manifestly, however, a readiness for receiving information about the Catholic faith does not mean a close study of the dogmatic teachings of the Church as propounded in heavy theological works. It means a desire to learn in a general way what her chief tenets are and whereon they rest. To oral teaching many still close their ears, but they refuse no longer to read about that strange institution whose strength increases in proportion to the number and power of her enemies; about that strange religion which alone has withstood the dissolving test of time, and which they admit, tacitly, it may be, and only in the innermost depths of their heart, but which, nevertheless, they do admit, to be the one and the sole lever by means of which man's soul can be lifted up, even to the embrace of divinity itself, and by which alone we can become "true children of God."

This is and has been the want of the intellectual world, and to meet this want the *Faith of Our Fathers* was written. If its author had not taken a clear comprehensive view of the religious issue of to-day, the book could hardly have failed to fall short in some respects at least. But this is not the case. The least that can be said of the Archbishop's work is, that he not only wrote what was needed, but exactly in the way in which it was needed.

There is no trace in it of the acrimonious spirit, so frequently encountered in works of this character. In a popular, yet dignified way the main doctrines of the Catholic religion are laid down so plainly and so clearly as to make misapprehension impossible. The proper distinction between a non-theological book and a professedly controversial treatise is carefully observed. The precision and minutiae of the latter are not required, and would be altogether out of place in a book intended for all classes of readers; yet, whenever either the nature of a doctrine or its history is concerned, forcible logic is invariably combined with fulness of argument and great clearness. The author indulges in no futile efforts to divest the mysteries of faith of their character as mysteries. Of mysteries we know and can know nothing as regards the intimate relation between subject and predicate; we can and do merely affirm their coexistence by an act of faith. Still, though all mysteries are destined to remain mysteries as long as our reason is incased in a material prison, that is, during the term of our terrestrial existence, there is a certain justness and a certain reasonableness attached to these mysteries which make them comprehensible to the human mind, and from which, when properly presented, we cannot withhold our assent. Now, to this side of the Catholic religion the

author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* calls particular attention. The entire conformity of the doctrines of the Church with the wants of human nature has been treated in a singularly felicitous manner, and it certainly is an aspect of true religion which can never be too clearly brought to view. The most rigid dogmatism blends harmoniously in the Catholic faith with a proper appreciation of the fact that the individual has, besides reason and will, a heart also, to the throbbings of which nature demands imperatively a response. Just here pseudo-Christianity shows its greatest weakness, the Church of Rome a divine parentage; and the gospel of hatred always shrinks away when brought into contrast with the gospel of love.

Nor is this all. The cordial welcome which Catholics and non-Catholics alike extended to the *Faith of Our Fathers* stands on other grounds also. The book in itself, taken simply as a literary production, has merits which no just critic can pass over in silence. It is distinguished by a happy elegance of diction. The language flows easily throughout, delights, yet never fatigues the reader; it enlists his interest, and does not weary; and, where occasions arise, passages of exquisite eloquence enliven the calmer tone of the narrative form. In a condensed form it brings before the reader the main doctrines of the Catholic religion, yet truth is not sacrificed to condensation. Of works of this kind the instances are rare where the critic can say as of this: "Correct in matter, concise in expression, pleasing in style, and elegant in language."

From the wide circulation which Archbishop Gibbons's book has obtained, results the uneasiness it has created in the ranks of Protestantism. The Protestant camp, very naturally, could regard it only as a dangerous enemy. And when edition followed edition, the uneasiness increased, and not unreasonably; for the apprehension that it would gain an influence proportionate to its circulation was well founded. An attempt, therefore, to check this influence by a counter-publication is a perfectly comprehensible act of self-defence and self-preservation, on the part of the Episcopal Church. Nor could anything have better served that purpose than a well-written refutation. Hence, it is easy to understand why the Reverend Dr. Edward J. Stearns was commissioned to write the *Faith of Our Forefathers*; why he was relieved during the time spent on its compilation from the onerous duties of the Episcopalian ministry; and why every aid and assistance that would further the object in view was freely given him. The difficulty of the task must not be underrated. To *have* to refute what, *ipso facto*, cannot be refuted may well overtax even a professional controversialist's good-humor. Moreover, it was not enough to publish simply a reply to the *Faith of Our Fathers*; it was necessary that the reply should

be so crushing as to annihilate utterly both book and author. If we consider, moreover, that Dr. Stearns devoted upwards of a year to finish a book of which fully one-half is a reprint of passages from the Archbishop's volume; if we consider the vast, though quite unnecessary, amount of reading which he undertook; if we consider, further, that Dr. Stearns is by his own admission familiar with controversy, a professional author, well versed in the Fathers and at home in ecclesiastical history; if, I say, we consider all this expenditure of time, and learning, and ability, and turn from this consideration to what the *Faith of Our Forefathers* really is as an answer to the *Faith of Our Fathers*, then with striking force Horace's famous line recurs to mind:

"Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus."

It is, after all, not incomprehensible why the pretended refutation proves to be only an unsuccessful attempt to impugn the fair character of the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers*. But unfortunately what may often serve as a satisfactory explanation of conduct, does not always serve as an exoneration or excuse.

As a professional author the learned doctor ought to have known that the age is past when a personal onslaught in vehement language meets with the approval of society. Culture and civilization have advanced beyond the stage where such productions please the reading public. The *Faith of Our Forefathers* savors strongly of the times when blind fury made the proclaimers of the gospel of hate regardless even of the decency of their own age. In our days, happily, such violent outbursts appear only sporadically as the remnants of an obsolete fanaticism. An earnest craving after truth forms a clearly discernible feature of all contemporary writing on the religious question, and distinguishes even the school of "advanced thought." It is missing entirely in Dr. Stearns's book, for he aims not so much at enlightening the world in regard to truth as at impressing it with the idea that his adversary is deficient in even those virtues which are most essential in the daily intercourse of life between man and man. Instead of being bent upon throwing what light he can on doctrines where the Episcopal denomination differs from the Catholic Church, he prefers to indulge with the utmost recklessness in malevolent misrepresentation. As has been already remarked, a most praiseworthy characteristic of modern literature consists in the unimpassioned temper which has obtained, and which is now as willingly conceded to discussions on the question of religion as to scientific controversy. Of this temper no trace can be discovered in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*. In its literary aspect alone, as regards style and language, the production is far below the standard of excellence of our times. An ill-selected

vocabulary does not surprise us in a demagogue haranguing, perhaps, a laborers' mass-meeting; but it justly surprises us in an author before whose name we find the prefix "Reverend." That prefix, it seems to us, ought to be a sufficient assurance of the presence of culture and refinement, and of freedom from grossly abusive language and vulgar expressions. It is a well-known truism, that whatever we may have to say, much, very much, depends upon the manner in which we say it. The observance of this wise precept has been entirely forgotten by Dr. Stearns. On the contrary, he heaps the most gratuitous slanders on all that is Catholic, and particularly on the exponent of the Catholic Church with whom he is dealing. Some specimens of the utter recklessness with which he applies himself to this undertaking will be furnished before we close our remarks. The extent of his ignorance will prove no less astonishing than the fact that in every instance he dug a pit for himself from the depth of which no power can rescue him. Before proceeding, however, to take up any of Dr. Stearns's charges and assertions, it is proper to state what the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* himself claims for his book.

In the preface he says that he wishes to "present in a plain and practical form the principal tenets of the Catholic Church." . . . "The book was compiled during the uncertain hours which he could spare from the more active duties of the ministry;" and, finally, he avows that, "though he has sought to be exact in all his statements an occasional inaccuracy may have inadvertently crept in." From these statements several conclusions are quite obvious. In the first place, the work does not pretend to contain *all*, but only the principal tenets of the Catholic faith; it does not, therefore, claim to comprise within its limited compass *every* doctrine; and, hence, either an entire absence or but a brief allusion to some dogmas ceases on that ground to be chargeable against the author. Then, from the mode of its compilation it is evident that the author neither harbored the intention, nor had sufficient time at his disposal to furnish to the reader, in every instance, the exact page and volume where references or quotations were to be found. Nor is this at all a requisite in a book destined to reach the many, and not destined for the very few who, perhaps, might take the trouble and the labor of verifying every quotation. If, therefore, no other reference is given for a quotation than simply "Thomas a Kempis," no charge of inaccuracy can in fairness be preferred on that account. Lastly, if in a manuscript not carefully revised, a comma instead of a colon appears, it is not admissible to fasten on that, which very likely might be a printer's mistake, as proof of wilful and inexcusable inaccuracy or vagueness or falsification. As a matter of fact every writer knows that few manuscripts leave

the press in entirely satisfactory form. When, however, an author takes the precaution of declaring at the outset that his work does not pretend to be exempt from those slight mistakes which are found in almost every publication, no fair-minded critic can hold him responsible for these errors to such an extent as to impair the value of the work.

These preliminary remarks seem called for by the unwarranted manner in which Dr. Stearns endeavors to build upon flaws of this kind an unanswerable accusation against Archbishop Gibbons. In the preface and introduction to the *Faith of Our Forefathers* we find in a most obliging and, for our purpose, exceedingly convenient manner summed up, as it were, the crimes of which the Catholic prelate is guilty. It would be quite useless to deny their serious nature, *if true*; for veracity, that is love of truth, is a principle dear to every human being, an essential condition to securing the respect and esteem of our fellow-men, and is indispensable in the daily intercourse of life. And "lack of straightforwardness," as Dr. Stearns calls it, is what he first detects in his opponent. Next he finds him guilty of "gross and glaring misrepresentations," which designates probably the next higher stage on the ladder of depravity. But even there the crowning vice is not yet reached, for the culminating immorality of the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* consists in nothing less than "a significant keeping back of the accredited teachings of the Church;" on account of which "propensity" Dr. Stearns considers it necessary "to commend his prudence, though he would much rather commend his candor." Now, in a high dignitary of the Church this amounts either to downright dishonesty or to culpably deficient orthodoxy. These three impeachments are made in clear language. How utterly devoid they are of all foundation will be presently seen. As to all other charges, they are based upon a radical misconception on the part of the Episcopal divine as to what the main doctrines of the Catholic Church are. He labors, we regret to say, under an erroneous impression, for whatever constitutes in *his* opinion and in *his* estimate a main doctrine of the Catholic faith forthwith acquires, on the strength of his opinion and in virtue of his estimate, validity as such. The deplorable blindness of the Catholic Church is, however, so great that it has ventured to hold for wellnigh two thousand years, and will venture to hold in the future, an opinion independent of Dr. Stearns's view of the matter. A misconception of this sort invalidates, of course, many of his bold assertions. If conversant with integral calculus he probably would have differentiated more properly between "Catholic doctrines" and "*his* opinions of Catholic doctrines." And with this remark we dismiss the bulk of his slanderous attack.

Waiving, however, this point as to the three grave impeachments, we may ask what is the basis on which the alleged "commendable prudence" and "lack of straightforwardness" rest? What evidence supports them? Are they to be admitted as well-founded charges, or are they entirely gratuitous assertions? Dr. Stearns opens fire with a complaint. He says: "Here is *all* (italics ours) I can find in the whole four hundred and thirty-three pages on the Immaculate Conception," and gives then the following very clear and very concise, though condensed definition of the dogma at the end of the quotation: "In the doctrine of the supreme power of Peter as the visible foundation of the Church, we have the *implied* assertion of many rights and duties which belong to the centre of unity. In the revelation of the supereminent dignity and purity of the Blessed Virgin there is implied her exemption from original sin, etc." "Hence, Pascal truly says man is a greater mystery to himself without original sin than is the mystery itself." "The Church, however, declares that the Blessed Virgin Mary was exempted from the stain of original sin by the merits of our Saviour, Jesus Christ; and that, consequently, she was never for an instant subject to the dominion of Satan. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception." Commenting on this discovery, Dr. Stearns goes on: "Here is the whole 'exposition and vindication,' and, coupling it with the absolute silence of the book on any special veneration of the Virgin above that of the other saints, and, contrasting it with the well-known and universal practice of the Roman Church, we may well say, we have here the tragedy of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out." The fact, therefore, that the *Faith of Our Fathers* contains only a definition of the dogma, a definition which is full and covers the whole teaching of the Church on this point,—a fact that Dr. Stearns does not controvert at all,—this fact then goes to prove, according to Dr. Stearns's logic, that the Metropolitan of the Catholic hierarchy abstained on purpose from dwelling at any length on the subject, else he would have devoted a greater number of lines to its elucidation. This, to say the least, strikes us as rather a novel mode of reasoning. Let us take an analogous case. A learned mathematician publishes a popular work on geometry; to the Pythagorean thesis he devotes only, say, nine lines. Now the critic must find, according to Dr. Stearns, that the professor of mathematics is either deficient in the knowledge of mathematics, or that he is afraid the thesis, if expatiated upon at any length, would invalidate other parts of his book. Such complete tergiversation on common-sense, not to say logic, is, indeed, very rare in the annals of controversy. Dr. Stearns is, of course, at perfect liberty to infer from the number of lines in which certain information is imparted, a conscious suppression of

truth on the author's part; he is at perfect liberty to strain every premise beyond its capacity and draw inadmissible conclusions. For this we do not find fault with him; but what we do find fault with him for is that he offers his ridiculous assertions as incontestable evidence to the reading world, which he ought to suppose possesses at least a moderate share of sound sense. We certainly do not object if he chooses to amuse himself in this harmless way, but such arguments do not serve as a favorable introduction to intelligent readers.

But this is not all; he omitted, strange to say, to ascertain even whether this negative evidence, meagre and worthless as it is, is supported by reality, and it so happens that reality does not support it. The facts of the case briefly stated are these: Before the printer's ink was dry on the pages of the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, in not less than fifteen thousand copies of the Archbishop's book sold *before* the appearance of Dr. Stearns's volume of slander, there is to be found a chapter of thirty-eight pages, in which the veneration paid by Catholic Christendom to our Saviour's Mother is fully explained. This fact stands on no debatable ground, because as many copies as have been printed and sold with that chapter in them, so many witnesses declare Dr. Stearns's assertion to be a base calumny. Supposing that the chapter in question had not been added until the complaint of Dr. Stearns had been lodged in print; in that case, even, the insertion of thirty-eight pages on the Blessed Virgin would have virtually contradicted all that the Episcopal controversialist had the boldness to assert. But when he cannot deny that he asserted in a positive manner as true what at the time he wrote the assertion, at any rate at the time the statement appeared in print, was *not* true, he will have to admit that the "gross and glaring misrepresentations," of which he was so anxious to find another guilty, fall back upon and remain fastened on himself.

No attempt has ever been made to erect a structure of vilification on a more shadowy basis than Dr. Stearns's. At the time he had the manuscript ready for the press, he *might*, and, as a controversialist who "knows something of the windings-in-and-out of Roman controversialists," he *ought* to have been circumspect enough to ascertain whether any change had been made in the editions subsequent to the one he had before him. He would, thereby, have saved himself the unenviable position of telling to the world what every purchaser of a copy of the *Faith of Our Fathers* discovers at once to be absolutely and undeniably untrue.

Where then is the proof that "out of prudence" and out of "lack of straightforwardness" the first few editions contained no more about the Blessed Mother of Our Lord? Did not, on the

contrary, the author, the moment he saw his book acquire a circulation beyond his most sanguine expectations, at once decide to carefully revise the whole, and to add to it a chapter on a point which is properly understood by few persons outside of the Catholic Church? Did he not perceive himself that the numberless hands through which the book passed made it desirable to be more explicit on the dogma of the Immaculate Conception? So much as to this "gross and glaring misrepresentation," which, on examination, has turned out to exist not in the *Faith of Our Fathers*, but in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*. True, Dr. Stearns probably does not share the sentiments which Catholics nurse carefully in their breasts for the Mother of Him who gave us back to life, and who placed forever the Virgin Mother between us and the Serpent. Nor does he, though minister of a "church" that claims to be Christian, rise to the height which outsiders reach in our day in reference to the Catholic devotion to the Blessed Virgin. He may not appreciate the deep truth so beautifully expressed by a literal skeptic in the following words: "Whatever man most reveres in mother, wife, and sister, that he will know is holy everywhere and forever, and is exalted high over all things in one of like nature with theirs, the Mother of Grace, the parent of sweet clemency, who will protect him from the enemy, and save him in the hour of death." Still he might have spared himself the ridicule attached to the absurd belief that the incumbent of the See of Baltimore does not hold the accredited teachings of the Church on this point. Apart from all this there are other considerations which ought to have proven more than sufficient to keep Dr. Stearns from this *faux-pas*. He pretends to know the Catholic Church; he admits her to possess a wonderful organization; he states himself that she cuts off from her fold relentlessly whosoever does not believe the fulness of her teachings. Nevertheless he is ready to believe that a high dignity has been suffered to palm off as Catholic doctrine for three years what she repudiates as incorrect.

On all grounds, therefore, the charge based upon Archbishop Gibbons's alleged reticence, or suppression of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, presents an aspect as senseless as it is ridiculous. It is a libel in its very nature, so much so that it offers to intelligent and well-balanced minds neither a point of dispute nor of difference of opinion concerning its true character. Against arguments of this kind, if it be allowable to call this mental process argument, it is impossible to contend. The fault of the critical judgment of Dr. Stearns in this matter is not its greater or less deviation from the standard of justice and truth, but its want of any relation whatever to any such standard. The reading public, at any rate the fair-minded portion of it, recognize that sympathy

and antipathy will influence more or less the verdict of every writer ; but all agree in this, that personal likings or dislikings must be kept from seriously interfering with the justice of the verdict. If the reverend doctor's judicial faculty appeared to be biassed only in this, or a few instances at most, it might be pardoned, but his *naïveté* in maintaining that the verdict which he renders is the one that ought to be rendered, because it is the one he desires to render, is kept up throughout, and becomes, consequently, a propensity absurd as well as irrational, especially in a professional controversialist.

In one place, indeed, he has not hesitated to lay before us an example of it, which will serve as a sufficient illustration that he really and truly holds his personal opinion alone infallible, and consequently thinks it must virtually supersede the universal opinion of Christendom down to his day. He instructs us in one paragraph that our Lord did not say to Peter, "Thou art a rock, and upon this rock, etc.," but simply "Thou art rock, etc." In the preceding paragraph he kindly informs us that "they (that is the Fathers, who, as he admits, make Peter the rock) are all off the track, as are also all the modern commentators that I have consulted, and they are not few." From this declaration it is manifest that the whole world, Protestant and Catholic alike, has been deeply in error so far as this passage and its proper interpretation are concerned. For he declares that the Fathers are "off the track," and all the authorities he consulted, and hence must have necessarily misinformed the Faithful. Poor error-stricken humanity ! one is tempted to exclaim, for nineteen hundred years hast thou lain in darkness, until Dr. Stearns has rescued thee from obscure visions. Render thanks to him, who, not out of Christian charity, however, but out of malice against his opponent, dispelled thy illusions and gave to thee the light of truth. How deeply must not the world feel indebted to Archbishop Gibbons for having been the means of eliciting from the Episcopal minister that precious light, which, for all we know, might otherwise never have dawned upon it.

But let us turn to another amusing example of precious logic. It occurs in the chapter on the infallible authority of the Church. Quoting from the *Faith of Our Fathers*, Dr. Stearns begins : "There can be no faith in the hearer unless there is unerring authority in the teacher," and comments upon this statement as follows :

"Is this so ? Either the Archbishop *knows* that there is 'unerring authority' in the Church, or he does *not* know it. If he does not know it, then, according to his own argument, only six lines above in the same paragraph, he does not know, when he is listening to her, whether he is 'listening to truth or to falsehood.' If he does know it, then his reception of her teachings is not 'faith,' but 'sight,' that is knowledge ; there is no moral quality in that reception any more than in his reception of the truths of arithmetic and geometry above mentioned ; he simply walks by sight, not by faith, contrary to the example of St. Paul, who walked 'by faith, not by sight.' It is not

true then, necessarily, that 'faith excludes doubt.' It may, or it may not; that depends on its strength. *Knowledge* excludes doubt; but it excludes faith (religious faith) also. Hence in that world where we shall know as we are known, faith is lost in sight, as hope also is swallowed up in fruition."

Here we have an ill-concealed sophistry before us; for, as will be shown presently, to possess the knowledge that a teacher is unerring, is not equivalent to possessing the knowledge of what he teaches us, that is, a full comprehension, to the exclusion of doubt, in regard to what the teacher proposes to our mental assent. For instance, we believe that God is One and yet Three, Trinity in Unity. We believe this, not because of our knowledge that three is one, but because it is presented to us by an authority which we do not question. Our knowledge, therefore, that the authority on the strength of which we assent to the proposition is incapable of proposing to our acceptance anything but truth, this knowledge alone makes us believe it; but this knowledge imparts to us no knowledge equal to sight, of the intrinsic nature of the proposition. We believe in the Triune God, because He, the author of truth, has revealed it to us, but not because we know that three make one, or that one is three. Hence, to believe in the infallibility of the Church does not involve, as Dr. Stearns means to imply, an absolute knowledge, a complete understanding of what the Church enounces to her children as true and bids them believe. And in this sense, and in this sense only, as the Archbishop maintains, does faith exclude doubt; that is, we feel certain, absolutely certain. We possess the knowledge of the inability on the part of God's Church to propose anything as a dogma to be believed but what is true. Faith, again, is not thereby bereft of its moral element; for, all the mysteries of Christianity cease not to be incomprehensible because of our knowledge of the infallibility of the Church as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the Divine Founder Himself. Without that knowledge, on the contrary, faith would lose its moral element; for, in emphatically declaring that three is one, we assert something which would be irrational and absurd were it not for our knowledge that God is truth, by which alone our belief acquires virtue as a morally meritorious act of faith. It must not be presumed, however, that ignorance of where the line between faith and knowledge is drawn misled Dr. Stearns. For, in the paragraph immediately following the one which we have quoted, the acquaintance of the author of the *Faith of Our Forefathers* with the correct meaning of both words is clearly evinced. He imputes to them an erroneous sense only as long as by doing so he can misrepresent Archbishop Gibbons. It ill befits a candid intellect to resort to such means in order to pervert a correct

statement. In a child such behavior would be termed silly. What shall we call it in a full-grown man when treating subjects of the gravest import?

A strain of reasoning similar to this in point of soundness winds from page to page. Occasionally a passionate personal outburst, and sometimes vehement invectives against all that is Catholic, break the monotony. The reiteration that Dr. Stearns's interpretation is the only correct and admissible interpretation, appears with disgusting frequency, and ends invariably with the refrain, "those who differ from me are wrong." The book is written with an unwarrantable assumption of authority, and it is a foolish notion to presume that society is so circumstanced that it lends a credulous ear to stories the contents of which, before they can be accepted, require reason to abdicate its proper functions. Any one who is bent with all earnestness upon finding fault with another, is liable to be carried away by overzeal. It seems to engender a certain recklessness, and that probably led to the subsequent charge on turning to the Sacrament of Penance. It is there that the author promises in the preface to adduce proofs of what he affirms to be the gravest offence of the opponent. Let us tell how the pledge is redeemed.

Dr. Stearns's charge is garbling. St. Basil furnishes the material—the *corpus delicti*. It is not, however, garbling pure and simple, but garbling under aggravated circumstances. To use, for the sake of unimpeachable accuracy, the elegant language of Dr. Stearns, we quote at length the following:

"I am sorry to say I have detected him (the Archbishop) in a garbling of St. Basil in what purports to be a continuous and consecutive quotation from the *Regule breves*—lumping into one continuous paragraph sentences that are *only* twenty-four folio pages (of the Benedictine edition) apart from each other, and stopping short in the first part of the quotation with a period where St. Basil puts a comma, because to have given the rest, which could have been done in half a dozen lines, *would have defeated the purpose for which the citation was made!* The proof of this will come in due time."

Happily we have here a positive assertion, an explicit statement of facts, and facts, moreover, given with enough detail to be capable of proof. And the proof, let us remark, in order to be valid and full, must cover two points. In the first place, it must be shown that the omitted part of the sentence alters materially the meaning and virtually defeats the purpose for which the quotation was made. And, in the second place, it must be established that the period, instead of the comma, has been put there with the intention to deceive the reader into the belief that the two sentences form one whole. If the first point be settled in Dr. Stearns's favor, we admit that it would furnish strong presumptive evidence that the

period had been substituted for a comma with the intention and purpose of deception.

In this case, again, there are no less than fifteen thousand witnesses, namely, so many copies of the revised edition of the *Faith of Our Fathers*, proclaiming the value which Dr. Stearns's emphatic promise possesses; for the passages from St. Basil do not appear as "one continuous whole." The obnoxious comma and period are done away with and the two passages are separated by an interpolated sentence. Irrefragable evidence, therefore, points clearly to this: that there could not have been in the mind of the author any intention of making the two citations appear to be one continuous paragraph. And this evidence becomes conclusive if we bear in mind that the two passages were separated at a time when Dr. Stearns's objections were still lurking in the dark. Obviously, then, whatever Dr. Stearns's view of the matter may be, in Archbishop Gibbons's estimate their severance did not impair the value of their testimony, else, on revising his book, he might just as well have eliminated both. There still remains another question to be answered: Do the passages, if given in full, change the sense or not? Do they, as Dr. Stearns asserts, defeat the purpose for which they were chosen, or do they not? And since the Episcopal divine refers with an almost triumphant voice to chapters xx. and xxv. of his volume for proof, it may serve a good purpose to inspect closely the nature and the weight of his testimony. Turning to chapter xx. one is surprised by the fact that it contains not so much as the slightest allusion to St. Basil and the alleged garbled passages. So, without further animadversions, we pass quietly to the chapter on the Sacrament of Penance. To understand properly this chapter in the *Faith of Our Forefathers*, it is, however, necessary first to go over the corresponding chapter in the Archbishop's volume, and so I shall state briefly what points are mainly dwelt upon therein.

The Sacrament of Penance is shown to be a divine institution from Scripture texts which admit no misconception. Then, taking St. John xx. 21-23, the Archbishop draws three conclusions from the unequivocal language in which our Lord confers therein the power of forgiving sins upon the Apostles. These three conclusions are: First, that the power of forgiving sins was not restricted to the Apostles, but is transmitted to their successors in the same manner in which the power to preach, baptize, confirm, ordain, etc., is transmitted; secondly, that the forgiveness of sins was to be obtained ordinarily through the ministry of the Apostles and their successors; thirdly, that this power of forgiving sins on the part of God's ministers involves the obligation of confessing them on the part of the sinners. These three deductions are made with an

irresistible force of logic, and in language so precise as to leave no doubt on the reader's mind. Yet to augment the strength of the Scripture texts, quotations from the Fathers are added, because "their testimony as witnesses of the faith of their times" must be accepted even by those who call in question their personal authority. The object in citing the Fathers is defined to be this, that they confirm the existence of sacramental confession in the Church at all times, and that they all unanimously insist upon the necessity of sacramental confession as a divine institution. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that any passages having particular reference to public confession can in no way go to disprove private or auricular confession; for public, as well as private confession, is comprised in the term "sacramental confession." And this is all the author of the *Faith of Our Fathers* desires to establish by the testimony of the Fathers, as is rendered more obvious by the fact that the word "private confession" is not used until later on.

Again, confession, whether public or private, embraces all sins, sins of thoughts, of words, of actions, and of omissions, and extends the obligation of confessing all mortal sins to all who resort to the tribunal of penance, while the confession of venial sins is strongly recommended. I have endeavored to make this point quite clear, because it is not admissible to impute a meaning to a word used by an author different from that which the author himself imparts to it, and it is still less admissible to presume that a Catholic prelate in an exalted position, writing for the instruction of the public, could be ignorant of the meaning of "sacramental confession." And now to the questions themselves. In the early editions of the *Faith of Our Fathers* we find;

"St. Basil writes: 'In the confession of sins the same method must be observed as in laying open the infirmities of the body; for as these are not rashly communicated to every one, but to those only who understand by what method they may be cured, so the confession of sins must be made to such persons as have the power to apply a remedy. Necessarily, our sins must be confessed to those to whom has been committed the dispensation of the mysteries of God. For thus also are they found to have acted who did penance of old in regard of the Saints. For it is written in the Acts, they confessed to the Apostles by whom they also were baptized.'"

In the revised editions, after the word "remedy," Archbishop Gibbons remarks: "Later on he (St. Basil) tells us who those persons are," and continues then "necessarily, etc." Dr. Stearns gives his translation of Question 229 and answer, and Question 288 and answer, as found in the Benedictine edition, as follows:

"Q. 229. Whether forbidden actions ought to be laid open, *citra verecundiam*, to all, or to whom and of what sort?

"A. The discovering of sins has the same rules as the making known of bodily ailments; as, then, men do not reveal the ailments of the body to all, but to those skilled

in their cure, so also the discovery of sins ought to be made to those able to cure them, as it is written (Rom. xv, 1), 'Ye, then, that are strong, bear the infirmities of the weak, *i. e.*, by care remove them'

"Q. 288. Whether he who wishes to confess his sins ought to confess them to all, or to any chance persons (*quibuslibet*), or to whom?

"A. . . . Sins must be confessed to those who have been put in trust with the mysteries of God. For thus they also are found to have acted who of old did penance in the presence of the saints (*ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων*, *coram sanctis*). For it is written in the Gospel (St. Matthew iii.) that they confessed their sins to John the Baptist, and in the Acts, to the Apostles themselves by whom they were also baptized."

Dr. Stearns maintains that the first question and answer relate not to confession of sins, or, as he puts it, to the disclosing of spiritual ailments by the laity to the clergy, but "by the weak to the strong." For that reason he translates "*peccatorum confessio*," which occurs twice in the answer of St. Basil, not with "confession of sins," but with "discovery of sins." Now, if Dr. Stearns's version of the case were true, St. Basil would do nothing less than affirm the absurdity that the power to forgive sins was delegated to clergy and laity alike, which would flatly contradict his own words; whereas, if we apply the only correct and possible interpretation, we find St. Basil enjoins upon the ministers of God to cure the weak from their infirmities, that is, as Dr. Stearns himself admits, "to remove them by cure." The addition, therefore, of Rom. 15: 1 to the Archbishop's citation, far from changing the meaning of the preceding words, only strengthens and affirms them. And the passage chosen from answer to Question 288 has been selected most advantageously, because it leaves no room for doubt whom St. Basil meant by the "strong." "*Peccata iis confiteri necesse est quibus mysteriorum Dei concredita dispensatio est*," runs the Latin in the Benedictine edition, though Dr. Stearns quietly ignores in his translation the "*necesse est*" altogether.

Now, is it possible to conceive that St. Basil understands by those "to whom the dispensation of the mysteries of God has been committed" clergy and laity? This passage, taken together with the answer the Saint makes to the question, "whether forbidden actions have to be laid open to all," namely, to those only "who have the power to apply a remedy," establishes, we take it, beyond the faintest shadow of doubt, and in a most conclusive manner, that by "the strong" he meant only the Clergy.

He talks about "confession of sins" in both cases; he bids the Christians of his time to confess only to those who can heal in the one case, and only to those to whom God has intrusted the dispensation of His mysteries in the other case. Does it not obviously follow that the latter distinction confers upon them the privilege of possessing the healing powers he alludes to in the former? All, then, that is required to reduce Dr. Stearns's absurd assertion to

its proper value, is an analysis which every intelligent mind can make without any exertion. Dr. Stearns contends, however, that the whole answer to Question 288 refers only to public confession, as if public confession were not sacramental confession! And, therefore, he says with much emphasis, "the Archbishop has *prudently* omitted the reference to John the Baptist"! This caps the climax. The fact that confession was made to John the Baptist weakens the fact that confession was made to the Apostles! Unless we assume this, the omission of the words in the Gospel, "they confessed their sins to St. John the Baptist," is quite irrelevant.

For this omission an obvious reason suggests itself. The author of the *Faith of our Fathers* is engaged in demonstrating the existence of sacramental confession since the earliest days of the Church. Confession to the Apostles is, therefore, quite important to note; but, so far as his object is concerned, it is quite immaterial whether, or not, the precursor of our Lord prepared, by "confession before the dispensation," the way to sacramental confession. But, under all circumstances, confession in the time of St. John the Baptist cannot detract from, but only add to, the weight of confession in the time of the Apostles. Besides, on what ground does Dr. Stearns base his persistent assertion that the confession to St. John the Baptist was public? It is a perfectly gratuitous assumption on his part, for Scripture defines in no place whether that confession was public or private.

As long as we follow the dictates of common-sense, and reason, and logic, the evidence put forth by Dr. Stearns to invalidate the testimony of St. Basil, as given in the *Faith of our Fathers*, all turns against the Episcopal divine. And it is difficult, indeed, to stretch imagination far enough to assume that St. Basil honored Dr. Stearns with a private interview in order to enable him to disabuse the world of the opinion that St. Basil was a learned and great Saint, enjoying a well-deserved renown for his deep knowledge of philosophy and theology, and to authorize Dr. Stearns to exhibit him instead as a simpleton, who meant to prove one thing, but unfortunately proved its opposite.

It will thus be seen that the Archbishop simply conformed to the custom of the literary world in using only parts of the answers in his book; for, where he stopped, there the sentences virtually end which he proposed to introduce; and this is in accordance with universal practice. It is true that, in the first editions of the *Faith of our Fathers*, after the word "remedy," a reference on the margin of the page that it stands on page 492 of the Benedictine edition of St. Basil, *might* have been given, had Archbishop Gibbons designed his book for learned scholars; but for doing this in his present work one fails to perceive a reason, since, as has been re-

marked before, the book is a popular exposition intended for the generality of readers, where briefness must be the principal object, and where such a reference would have been pedantry.

These charges, therefore, which the writer of the *Faith of our Forefathers* regards as of the utmost importance, dwindle down on close examination to an insignificant omission of an asterisk, which grave crime, however, is confined to the first editions of Archbishop Gibbons's book. Only by a complete disregard of logic and common-sense, and by arrogating to himself the privilege of knowing better what St. Basil meant to say than common mortals can infer from the Saint's own words—only thereby has Dr. Stearns been able to establish a semblance even of truth; whereas, in reality, the whole testimony turns against him, and sustains in full the Archbishop.

Instances of a like acute mode of reasoning are not rare in the course of Dr. Stearns's work; but, since it is not within the scope of this paper to refute the *Faith of our Forefathers*, the instances given must suffice. There is a copious array of quotations from the Fathers in the book, showing great diligence and a praise-worthy familiarity with them on the part of this Protestant minister, but he presumes rather too much upon the credulity of his readers by invariably insisting that the Fathers who say one thing in the Catholic version say just the reverse in *his* version. Yet these are the only points raised which require even an examination to clear up. If we turn to the others which Dr. Stearns attempts to raise we are at a loss how to proceed, for he exhibits a supreme contempt of all rules of logic, and rejects what is commonly considered evidence as no evidence at all, while what all others deny to be competent evidence he insists must be accepted as conclusive proof.

For instance, special correspondence of a second-class newspaper, a sectarian paper, moreover, that circulates only among the adherents of certain denominations, is presented as irrefragable historical proof. It needs only a slight acquaintance with the amount of reliance that can be placed upon newspaper correspondents to see that testimony of that character may serve well in a political campaign, but is not in its proper place in a serious controversy. And in both cases in which Dr. Stearns jubilantly flourishes a newspaper article as solid incontrovertible testimony before his readers it so happens that he refers not to leading papers of well-known standing, but to very obscure publications.

More hopeless, still, does the case grow when he touches upon ecclesiastical and secular history. In the chapter on the celibacy* of the clergy various tendencies, we presume, lead him to enumerate not less than "three female popes" and "not less than a hun-

dred thousand mistresses in fifty thousand parsonages." Now a standard history, though by no means indisputable evidence, carries at least a certain weight; for on the strength of recognized historians many falsehoods concerning the Catholic Church have obtained currency. But it is not to historical works of established standing that Dr. Stearns refers us. He refers us to a historical sketch of sacerdotal celibacy, which is as unknown as it is untrue. In our days historical researches are being made with such rigid impartiality, even by Protestants, that it is sheer recklessness to ignore the concurrent testimony of the latest investigations. Charles Gebler, accepted by English critics and English historians as a most thorough inquirer, threw light upon events hitherto maintained by some authorities, which it would be irrational to believe now. Dr. Stearns has overlooked Dr. P. Tams's work on the Spanish Inquisition. But passing by these specialists of recent date, is it possible that Schlosser, Becker, Welter, Puetz, Ditmar, Armegarn, and others of equal renown and equal standing in the eyes of the civilized world, are unknown to Dr. Stearns? Yet they all pronounce against Dr. Stearns, and they are historians of a period with which one "well conversant with history" ought to be well acquainted.

We hesitate not to say that the *Faith of Our Fathers* might have been and could have been made more complete, more exhaustive, nay, stronger even in some respects. But, in that case, the work would have grown into a ponderous volume, and in that case it would have necessarily failed to accomplish the end for which it was intended; so that, while not absolutely free from imperfections—and what book was ever written with which a critic could not find fault—it retains its place of usefulness nevertheless, and will continue its beneficial mission despite the assault of Dr. Stearns.

Meanwhile we may suggest to Dr. Stearns to ask himself whether he seriously expects that his own unsupported individual declaration will upset the opinion of the world. According to him, all Catholics, along with Cardinals Manning, and Newman, and Wiseman, are "drivelling idiots," who must plead "guilty to moral and intellectual suicide," a verdict wherein the world does not quite agree with our infallible Episcopalian. It may so happen that he will not "take up the corpse and carry it forth and bury it out of sight," but rather that the world will leave his book

"To lie in cold obstruction and to rot."

ENGLISH MANNERS.

SOCIETY in any country must be largely affected by its political and historical institutions. A monarchy and a republic breed different ideas. An autocracy makes sharper lines than a constitution, though a constitution creates many more classes; it creates, therefore, a variety of aristocracies. In England there are five kinds of aristocracy, each distinct, yet each woven into the other; but all, more or less, naturally developed out of the traditions and characteristics of the people. There is the aristocracy of title, of land-owning, of political power, of money, of reputation, of personal caste. ("Birth" is but the accident of all five.) Personal caste is the least definable of the number, being rather an impression or an appreciation than an arithmetical estimate of worth. It will sometimes happen that a man who is a nobody, either by birth, by position, or by property, acquires a social status which is regarded as being his right, though he does not seem to have done anything to earn it. This is the rank of individuality. In every country it is seen to exist, but in England it exists as an institution. It is an institution which has no canons, no embodiment, but which is sovereignty self-asserting, yet accepted. Its acceptance is the homage which the smallness of conventionalism offers to all personal superiority. There are many men of title in England who have less social caste than certain commoners; and there are certain commoners, too, who without being "self-made," are made by nature to take precedence of lords. England is a free country in spite of its aristocracy; nor does any country in the world more appreciate personal caste, while at the same time it bows low to "the great." The English are both vulgar and sublime. They bend the knee to the accidents of greatness, but they bend the head and the heart to its essences.

Most conventional yet most independent of people, the English are anomalous yet consistent. Let us assume for a postulate that every people in the world both possess and look up to an aristocracy. The red Indian lowers his head to his great chief, to the father of his tribe, or of his settlement. Every household in this world has its "best," in point either of authority or of gift. To ridicule aristocracy is to ridicule creation, for there is scarcely an atom of it without a higher and a lower. The only question for the philosopher is how in modern society to establish the truest canons of respect. Now in England there are certain broad, popular fallacies, as distinct as are the five aristocracies. We do not mean to say that such fallacies are purely English, but that English institutions give them play. The same fallacies exist every-

where in kind, but they are not everywhere so demonstrative or so blatant. A titled aristocracy of itself begets the fallacy that an aristocracy without title is less distinguished. The mere calling of names is assumed to exalt a person, as though his name became a part of his very nature. Yet a name cannot in any way offset a person. His possessions like his merits remain precisely what they were before he was made Duke of London. But title, it may be said, is a recognition of distinction. It is so, undoubtedly, in the first possessor; but its inheritance is an accident of birth. Accept it, however, as a recognition of merit, in the person to whom it is first given; yet it is not the title but the personal merit which should command intellectual homage. Now the English worship primarily the title, and render inferior homage to the merit. There are no people in the world who so profoundly worship title as the free and enlightened British public. You have but to mention a lord,—or even a half lord, a baronet,—and there is an immediate disposition to look up to him as essentially, not accidentally, your superior. There are some good people who put themselves to dreadful pains to get into the society of lords; who make themselves miserable, and live far beyond their means, so that they may be able to boast of great acquaintances. There are others who have the peerage at their finger's ends, and who never seem so happy as when they can correct you as to the mysteries of "De Brett," and "Walford," and "Burke." You will hear a "tuft-hunter" speak of some third-rate insignificant as being essentially a man to be known, because he is a cousin of Lord B. Character, attainment, high breeding, even heroism, are all subordinated by such persons to rank. To be titled, or near to title, is life. And this disease, the morbid worship of big names, permeates the whole range of the middle classes. Even those who are not infected by it breathe the taint. While most Englishmen thoroughly appreciate real worth, few Englishmen turn the back on empty name.

* It follows that a man who is the bearer of a title must esteem himself more honorable than a commoner; and so he may be, at least, in this one consequence, that some titles imply a seat in the House of Lords. But it is due to titled Englishmen to say that, as a rule, they do not vaunt their own titular superiority. Perhaps they have no reason to do so. Their "inferiors" vaunt it quite enough for them. Yet English peers are not boastful or vulgar men; on the contrary, they are conspicuously well-bred. It is quite the exception for any really great man to give himself airs or take liberties. There is even a fashion of modesty about this class. And it is a little singular, that the vulgarity of title-worship is confined almost exclusively to the untitled. Per-

haps it may be said that the sublime complacency of rank—or what Disraeli called the “magnificent affectation”—is an elegant and graceful substitute for obtrusion. Yet this would be to judge too interiorly, and it would, too, be dishonoring and not just. No, the English aristocracy is a representative body of good breeding, high intelligence, and fair merit. It is only when we get down among the sham aristocracy,—the lower strata of pushing, struggling, would-be great,—that we are sometimes made to smile at pretensions to exaltation, without its social or its personal credentials.

Indeed, the pushing and the struggling which goes on among the middle classes, among the incalculable strata of “the respectable,” is suggestive of a “Sisyphusism,” which is always rolling itself up hill, but always hurting itself by reaction. Most comic are the subdivisions of respectability, which are accepted and even approved by the middle classes. The retired tradesman, who lives in a neat villa, presses close upon the heels of the struggling merchant; while the struggling merchant is fondly flattered by the notice which the successful, opulent stockbroker may extend to him. This is no more than human nature; yet it has one positively demoralizing weak side, and that is disrespect for inferiors. The worst bane of English manners, and this too in all classes, is the graduated scale of politeness, or of rudeness towards either the superior or the inferior. Thus a man will very seldom raise his hat in return to the salutation of an inferior; he will take the inferior’s homage as his right. He will nod to him, smile on him, even speak to him, but he will not recognize his claim to politeness. Inversely the inferior will “pocket” the indignity, as no more than what is becoming from a superior. Ten thousand a year has the right to be impertinent; one hundred a year must not resent it. It is true that mere money does not make the sole distinction; yet accepted social grade marks the canons. A shopkeeper is not “hatted” by a gentleman. This is the established English canon. A thorough-bred gentleman will, of course, “hat” a shopkeeper if a shopkeeper respectfully salutes him; but the thorough-breds in nature, not in place, are as rare in Great Britain as in the States. It will be replied that on the Continent, say in France or in Italy, the reciprocal salutation is but conventional; it is rendered, it is even demanded, between all classes, but it has no further signification than established rule. Accepting such a statement—which, however, admits of argument—we should only answer that the Latin races have the best of us. But we venture to assert that there is a deep religious meaning and Catholic and most interior philosophy, in the principle of outward homage to inferiors. The principle is the confession of the dignity of poverty,

and of the unmerited good fortune of wealth. It gives to virtue, and natural gift, and acquired merit, a just claim to be recognized and respected. It may come to be but conventional in its hourly uses, but its repudiation would be esteemed to be brutish. To salute may mean but little, perhaps nothing; not to salute would mean much. And, in addition to the philosophy of mutual homage, its Christian and even natural sound sense, there is the question of convenience, which is painfully important in our hourly interchanges with one another.

In England the inconvenience of bad manners embitters a good deal of the social life. A man is always liable to be offended by the graduated impertinence of his superiors, and always liable to cause pain to others by not seeming to recognize just claims. The way servants are treated in England, and even sometimes poor clerks or any hireling, is less feeling, less thoughtful, and less sympathetic than the way in which "slaves" are commonly treated. And one result of this atrocious vulgarity is to make inferiors as vulgar as their superiors. This fallacy obtains all down the strata of society, from number two in social rank to number a hundred.

Between stiffness and familiarity, between presumption and want of dignity, few Englishmen know how to preserve the mean. Conventionalism taking the place of high breeding, the "proprieties" of generous sensibility, patronage of modest politeness, the different ranks of society can never be quite at their ease, for they must stand on the tiptoe of egotism. Now, let it be granted that the born, high-bred gentleman,—not in conventional but in interior sense,—is as rare as is magnificent virtue, it follows that such social canons as oblige all men to pay homage are the most convenient for the world's big majority. The exquisite must be always very few, the tenderly just and tenderly generous must be rare; and, therefore, the code of manners which compels exterior homage is at once the most convenient and the most Christian.

Yet it would be absurd to deny that there are in England such "gentlemen" as are not to be eclipsed in the whole world. Especially now that Englishmen travel much, and pick up hints and large ideas from other countries, there is a greater ease and much more heartiness of manner than there used to be five and twenty years ago. The principle of esteeming every stranger to be a blackguard until he has proved himself not to be one, has given way to the principle of imputing respectability where its absence is not conspicuously demonstrated. Strangers coalesce now with a freedom which would have been thought insecure in earlier days. When Englishmen first began to grow their beards, which was immediately after their last war with Russia, they began to regard the "clean shave" as not identical with decorum, and manly ease

as not fatal to self-respect. Speaking from the experience of half a century as to the gradual development of English manners, the conviction is unqualified that their change for the better has been remarkable both in kind and degree. [What manners must have been in the days of George the Third, our grandfathers have told us with a blush.] Men no longer drink deeply at dinner parties as a mark of good birth or fair position. Swearing is tabooed as intensely vulgar. Low games, such as prize-fights or cock-fights, would be offensive to (conventional) good taste. Dress has become singularly unobtrusive. Jauntiness, with all pretension, are out of date. To be tranquil in demeanor is a first requisite. To be silent about vices is of obligation. Morals may be precisely what they used to be; human nature does not change with the fashions; but for a man to vaunt his vices, even to mere friends, would class him among the low-lived and despicable. At the best clubs members affect moral decency; even to play high at cards is thought equivocal. Men veil their moral weaknesses, if they have them. And thus far, at least ostensibly or exteriorly, English manners have made great advances. It may be all superficial. There may be no growth of principle; as to religion,* there may be as little of it as there ever was, yet there is a certain gain in the outward homage of decorum, if only in the sense that it lessens scandal. Some moralists will have it that "Englishmen are hypocrites." They are not outspoken as is the average Frenchman. The naughty Frenchman will tell a stranger that he is an unbeliever, or a voluptuary, but an Englishman keeps such counsel for his intimates. But is the bombast of immorality a social gain? Granted that hypocrisy is individually contemptible, it has the merit of respecting others' feelings.

That Englishmen of different classes do not mix freely with other classes, and that the rich seldom visit the very poor save in a patronizing or eleemosynary spirit, is a natural result of this pride of superiority which artificial social canons must generate. Big people do not associate with little people; this is an axiom and a fact. Grosvenor Square knows no more of humble industry than it knows of the occupation of the angels. Grosvenor Square does not recognize poverty. And the trim villa, or the garden-fronted cottage, rails off its little grandeur from the struggling. To give a check to the parish clergyman for Christmas blankets and coals is the sole interchange of greatness with suffering, and to put something into the offertory plate once a week, or once a month, is the sole interchange of the middle classes with want. Exceptions do not, in the least, change the rule. Many exceptions there are,—brilliant, bountiful exceptions,—but we speak only of established social canons. Personal communication between the

prosperous and the needy is regarded as undesirable, perhaps risky. One reason of this fallacy is that, English manners being stilted, free converse might result in disrespect.

It might also be unwelcome to inferiors. There is nothing so offensive to a poor man as to be patronized by money or by rank; and few Englishmen possess the happy faculty of being at once sweetly modest and dignified. It has been said that a true test of supreme breeding is to be able to confer a favor with such a grace that the recipient is under the impression that he is conferring a favor in the act of consenting to receive one. This may be hyperbole or idealism, but certainly it pictures both a lofty Christian standard and also an extreme beauty of refinement. Now where the converse is demonstrated, and every act of beneficence assumes the color of self-glorifying compassion, the poor man feels degraded by his benefactors, who lowers him in the proportion of serving him. There are, indeed, some graceful English people to whom such cynical comments cannot apply; but this is simply because such people are less English than they are abnormally gifted by nature. Again, be it said that the highest type of Englishman has no superior in the East or in the West. When he superadds wide knowledge to a high nature, he may sit for a portrait of a gentleman. More than this, his religious appreciations, his manly, robust notions of duty,—and of its handmaid, a chivalrous sentiment,—make him at once an ideal of the superiority of the natural and the Christian culture; yet it is just here that we have profoundly to regret that his graces do not permeate the social strata. He is alone, or in a world but of few. The million seldom hear of his existence unless they see him on a platform or on horseback. He belongs to his class; they to theirs; nor do the classes even touch by points of contact. Is there any remedy for this insociable social malady? Does not "Socialism," which is the extreme of levelling folly, gather some degree of pretext from insociability? Would the wild theories of the *sans culottes* of the Russian Nihilists, or of the German Democrats find an atmosphere in which to be developed, if the different ranks in all countries held the salutary principle, that the prime duty of superiority is to impart? "I hate you, not because you are above me, but because you avoid me for my lowness," is the attitude of thought which is bound to remain hostile, because vanity is more sensitive than is interest. The mere fact that in England a constitutional government theoretically opens high places to all, cannot reconcile the masses to their daily experience of the iron subdivisions of class. Self-respect taking the form of social pride, respect for others being mainly measured by their status, polite manners being the recognition of class, or inward homage being expressed only to outward place, the ideas

of moral worth become subverted, and so do true ideas of civilization. The twin gods, respectability and comfort, being enthroned by all the ranks who can cherish them, such small divinities as graceful modesty and deep charity are rather esteemed as moral exotics than as principles.

Yet it is one thing to speak of the unreality of public manners, and another of the unreality of character. The extremest urbanity of the outward form of a gentleman may but cover a sepulchre of heartlessness. Take an example of a typically polite class,—the highest class of the titled laity of Rome. Now here we have the dogmata of etiquette carried to their most transcendental pitch. Yet it must be allowed (at least a long residence in Rome may perhaps justify the individual opinion) that there is no more impression of reality of character conveyed by Roman than by Bagdad etiquette. No one would say that the reality does not exist; it does exist, and, in some persons, profoundly; but only that the impression of the urbanity is far stronger than the impression of the sincerity. It is of impression alone that we are speaking; and the remark applies only to some "big" laity. Yet when we come to associate with the middle and humbler Roman classes, we find quite as much sincerity as in other countries. Hence it may be argued that exterior politeness towards each and every class of society—and the "big" laity in Rome show this politeness—is not necessarily a proof of magnanimity of character, but may be sometimes mere convenience and conventionalism. The truest code of manners would be that code which made charity, in its sense of earnest sympathy and modesty, the sole test of any man's being a gentleman. And though we have suggested that English manners are abnormally conventional, and English canons of interchange frightfully narrow, yet there is this immense advantage in all English social strata, that the domestic element saves the whole nation. "Home" is so supremely unconventional that it rectifies the injuries from outside. The very people who are most conventional in the street, in the ball-room, at the watering-places, in Hyde Park, enjoy the frolicsome mockery of the very canons they obey the moment that the house-door is shut. They may obey, but they laugh at their own obedience. And they laugh the most loudly at other people's. Home is the salvation of English manners. It is a paradise which knows no conventionalism. So that we should be inclined to say of the English that they are quite as real as any people, a good deal more real than are most people, in domestic and in individual character; while at the same time their manners and all external demonstrativeness are cramped by the fallacies of rank. But it is totally impossible, in any huge national society,

to avoid fallacies of one kind or another; and travellers in Austria, in Japan, in Brazil, detect easily where such fallacies lie.

We will not introduce any remarks about religion in its influence upon national manners, because we must get into this scrape, that, the higher the religion the greater the expectation which it justifies. We might hazard the theory that a pure Catholic society would present the most typical code of manners, and we might point to certain countries where, such society existing, the manners are, in fact, almost perfect. But the crowding of business masses, of worldly or striving throngs, in all cities, whatever their religion, tends to the obscuring of the graceful influences of religion and to the triumph of selfishness over modesty. In England, where the religions are various, it is not possible to trace their social influence. Controversy does not breed gentle homage any more than it unites social strata. Yet the days are passed when sectarianism in England threw up barriers of "religious" demarcation. At one time they did so; they do not now. A Catholic and a Dissenter are equally welcome in a drawing-room if they bring their contributions of good breeding. Englishmen are simply weary of "polemics." They talk religion, but only as they talk politics. There are, of course, bigoted people, but they are laughed at if they make their bigotry a pretext for any personal depreciation. This is the rule with the vast majority. It may be said that this is a good sign and a bad sign. Sincerity is usually ardent if respectful. Indifference may be polite, but it is not Christian. Here we touch on broader questions than manners, or the social canons of exterior interchange. We have spoken only of superficial manners, and of certain natural, broad fallacies in their promptings. We should conclude that the generous race that is now spread over the earth has as much earnestness of character as any other race, and that its foibles of manners are rather created by social accidents than by a dimness of perception or of sympathy. Nay, we should go beyond this, and say that such foibles, in their purely external silliness or vulgarity, are often but a set-off against an inner appreciation of whatever is admirable in character. Even very bad manners are sometimes a shy covering of certain nervous or untrained sensibilities. Why should we expect that the majority, in any country, should be any better bred than it is disciplined? A "gentleman," in any country, is that very rare being who unites every grace that makes a man. There must be this delicacy of the nature, with this breadth of the intelligence, and the culture which gives charm to both. Yet, sometimes, even in the humblest classes—in England and everywhere else—we meet with a natural winningness of manners which is inborn, ineradicable, without merit, being the gift of mother nature, not of "society." This kind of "gentleman-

liness" has no country. It can neither be created nor extracted by art, and, like genius, it acknowledges no laws. Perhaps it may be said that an average modesty of position is most favorable to a modest grace of manners. And, on this principle, we can explain why, in England, the best manners are generally seen in the educated humbler classes.

IS FROUDE A HISTORIAN?

Romanism and the Irish Race in the United States. Part I. James Anthony Froude, *North American Review*, December, 1879.

THE December number of the *North American Review* affords matter for wonder and surprise, and we ask ourselves whether this ancient quarterly, in which so many of the best efforts of American literary ability have appeared, has lost all dignity and all decency by removing to New York. Leaving the narrower circle of New England thought for the more cosmopolitan atmosphere of New York seemed to promise freedom from many prejudices and grooves of thought that were apparently inevitable in its former home. But the leading article, which in its first word applies to seven millions of Americans a term of insult, a degrading opprobrious epithet, drawn from the rogue's lexicon or the vile invective of polemic pulpits, makes one think it some remnant of olden time, some fierce philippic of a New England clergyman, written in the days when men were hounded on by "pulpit, drum ecclesiastic," to burn the convent at Charlestown. But there it is, in black and white, in the forefront of the *North American*.

The epithet *Romanism* shows the writer to be an unscrupulous enemy, one whose moral sense is so warped that it is useless to expect any fair or moderate treatment at his hands. All we can look for is skill. The article bears the name of one who has written on subjects connected with the history of the British Isle. For that work his studies may have fitted him so far as his powers of appreciating motives and events permit him to write history. But it is a surprise to find him treating an American subject. A passing visit to this country, without any special study of our complex and strange history, certainly did not fit him to write on such a theme with any credit to himself or usefulness to his reader.

We can hardly conceive the article to have been spontaneous; or, if really such, that the editor would accept it on its merits. It is impossible that any American scholar would accept such an article as at all adequate to the subject or fit for the position assigned it. Are we, then, to infer that it was written to order; that an American quarterly employs the hireling pen of an ignorant foreigner to treat one of the perplexing questions in this country: the actual position of the Catholic Church here and the influence it is likely to produce on the Protestant element, or receive from it, and consequently the result on the local and national affairs during the next fifty years.

We blush as Americans to see an English writer thus retained to vilify any part of the American people. Time has brought its changes. Sixty years ago all America hailed with pride a work of a Catholic writer, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain respecting the United States of America, and Strictures upon the Calumnies of the British Writers*.¹ Now a great American review becomes the accessory of a calumnious British writer in assailing Americans.

Mr. Froude ranks among historical writers. His attractive style, his vivid imagination, his warm partisanship are admitted; his historical accuracy has been questioned. Meline, in defending Mary, Queen of Scots, against Froude,² obtained from the State Paper Office documents cited by this English writer, and proved, as English judges mildly expressed it, that Mr. Froude did not seem to know the value of quotation-marks; in fact, that he garbled documents by suppressing passages and making paragraphs read on consecutively, which in the original had no relation to each other.

But such investigations have little attraction for readers generally, who shrink from the study of old documents with obsolete language and quaint forms. They leave this critical work to dry-as-dust antiquarians, and are content to enjoy a writer's volume who tells his story plausibly and attractively, even though from the highest standard of morality and historic truth it cannot be said that he tells it well.

Now, however, that Mr. Froude takes up a subject of American history reaching far back into the past, and with a future that merits the most serious thought of the American statesman who has the true interests of his country at heart, the position of affairs changes. Here the matter is, to a certain extent, familiar to us all. Our history dates back less than three centuries, and though the

¹ By Robert Walsh, Jr.

² Mary, Queen of Scots, and Her Latest English Historian.

number of those who are professed students of our forefathers' days is much smaller than we wish, our numerous historical societies are a nucleus around which thousands gather, becoming daily more and more interested in the topic.

Let us see, then, how Mr. Froude treats his American topic, and we appeal to our historical societies for a decision whether such a man shows either the research of the student, the knowledge of the subject, the careful weighing of clashing testimony, or the impartial, sober, critical judgment that constitute an historian.

He does not cite an authority for a single statement from the first line to the last. We shall endeavor to extract from his rambling and declamatory text various propositions, and meet them by the fruit of thirty years' study and a collection of nearly two thousand books, pamphlets, and volumes of papers and periodicals bearing on the Catholic Church in the United States.

He assumes that the Catholic Church has just begun to attack the various Protestant denominations, and that the latter have just awakened to their danger, especially as Catholic Lower Canada is on the north and Catholic Spanish America on the south. "That religion," he says (p. 523), "unfortunately is, by its own choice, at war with every other." "And they (the Anglo-Americans) are *now* confronted with the unpleasant fact that the Catholicism, which they have already so much cause to fear, is in all these countries overwhelmingly predominant." (P. 525.)

Now, as matter of history, has the Catholic body here from the early days been on the offensive or on the defensive? The question is easily answered. They have been altogether on the defensive; not attacking but attacked, often meeting from the majority around them persecution, oppression, unjust legislation and judicial action, as well as lawless violence from the mob, and unfair discrimination in various departments. They have had to contend with a feeling of strong prejudice and antipathy, excited against them by the governing body in England to effect the change by which that country, the majority of whose people were still Catholic in the reign of Elizabeth, became Protestantized. This prejudice, long cultivated and kept alive by misrepresentation of Catholic doctrines, Catholic practices, and the facts of Catholic history, has become a second nature to most non-Catholics. While all other matters require study, everything Catholic comes to these people by a kind of intuition. They will tell you an immense deal about the Mass without ever having seen a Mass offered or once read seriously through the liturgy of the Mass, and so with a hundred points. Even among those who have ceased to believe in the dogmatic teaching of any Protestant denomination or avail them-

selves of its ordinances, the feeling remains strong that Catholicity is wrong and that Catholics must be put down.

Catholics are perfectly aware of this feeling, and are living it down, confident that the time will come when this strong prejudice must yield to the force of common-sense; that sooner or later those who wish to know what Catholics really believe and what they really do, will take the same steps to acquire information that they do in regard to other matters, and not depend on old wives' tales, whether put forward by some old crone or by an English historian.

The first document bearing on the position of Catholic and Protestant in this country is the charter of Maryland. It grew out of an event which raises no blush to the cheek of the Catholic. Turning from the inhospitable Avalon, which he had planted on the shores of Newfoundland, and attracted by the glowing description his wife gave of Virginia, which she had visited, Lord Baltimore resolved to contribute all his influence and colonization to the increase of that province. "When, in October, 1629, he visited Virginia in person, the zeal of the assembly immediately ordered the oaths of allegiance and supremacy to be tendered him. It was in vain that he proposed a form which he was willing to subscribe; the government firmly insisted upon that which had been chosen by the English statutes, and which was purposely framed in such language as no Catholic could adopt." (Bancroft, i. p. 240.) Certainly Catholics were not the sinners here against the broad principles of toleration and religious freedom. Lord Baltimore asked only what he had established at Avalon, in Newfoundland, and failing to obtain it from Virginia, he sought from the king a charter for a colony adjoining that which repulsed him for his faith. Of Maryland, which under his charter his son founded, Bancroft wrote: "Every other country in the world had persecuting laws; through the benign administration of the government of that province, no person professing to believe in Jesus Christ was permitted to be molested on account of religion" (p. 248).

As a contrast we find Massachusetts, in 1647, forbidding Jesuits to enter Massachusetts, banishing them if they did, and visiting them with death in case they returned. (General Laws, p. 67.) As early as 1631, one Sir Christopher Gardner, suspected of being a Catholic, was summarily sent out of the colony, and this same year Massachusetts initiated the policy by which none could be admitted as freemen who were not members of some church in the colony, and as none but Congregational churches were permitted, this effectually barred all others from any voice in public affairs. (Palfrey's *New England*, i. pp. 329, 330, 345.)

Maryland, in which the majority had by this time become Cath-

olic, passed, April 2d, 1649, an act for general toleration, but Mr. Froude would not probably admire it, as it punished whoever dared to stigmatize his fellow-man by any name or term in a reproachful manner relating to religion. Where such a law prevailed he would have had perforce to use the language of a gentleman. The example did not find imitators, for no sooner had the Puritans gained the ascendancy than, in 1654, Catholics were prohibited from voting for or sitting as delegates in the very colony which they had done so much to establish. Nor was this spirit confined to the English colonies. In New Netherlands under Dutch rule no worship but the Calvinist was tolerated, and in 1658 a Catholic on Long Island, who remonstrated against being compelled to pay for the support of the Protestant minister, was fined for his insolence.

The New York Bill of Rights of 1683, under the influence of James, Duke of York, granted general toleration to all Christians; and if the original Rhode Island charter of 1663-4 did the same, it was soon altered so as to exclude Catholics. (Walsh's *Appeal*, p. 428.)

The advent of William III. was followed by penal laws in several colonies. A New York act of 1691 excepted Catholics from toleration (Brodhead, ii. 645); as did a similar act in South Carolina in 1696 (Ramsay's *South Carolina*, i. p. 51). In 1692 Maryland established the Church of England by law, and in 1702 gave the minister of that church forty pounds of tobacco from every person in his parish, a tax that bore heavily on the Catholic settlers. New York and Massachusetts, in 1700, passed acts to punish any Catholic priest entering the colony; the next year the former colony disfranchised Catholics; in 1704 Maryland had her law to prevent the growth of Popery, and eleven years after the first of a series of laws to prevent the importation of Irish Papists. (*Maryland Colony Laws*, pp. 16, 158.)

Virginia had her series of penal laws, culminating in one which made a Catholic inadmissible as a witness in any court, while Maryland levied a double tax on these unfortunate people.

The state of feeling may be seen in the slaughter of Father Rale by the people of New England, at Norridgewalk, in 1724, and of the Franciscan fathers in Florida, by an expedition from Carolina, in 1702, and in the execution of Ury, a supposed priest, at New York, in 1741, on suspicion of being concerned in a negro plot, after a trial under the act of 1700.

The charter of Georgia excluded Catholics from toleration, and the historian of the State tells us (I. p. 417) that "it was one of the express conditions on which Georgia was settled, that no Papists should be permitted in it." Hence, when they began their prose-

cution of John Wesley, one of the weightiest points was that he was suspected of being a Roman Catholic. (*Ibid.* p. 336.)

The story of the Acadians, who were torn from their homes and scattered along the seaboard from Massachusetts to Georgia in 1755, is well known; but it is not generally known that the precise cause of their treatment was that they were Popish recusants who had refused the oath. (*Nova Scotia Archives*, p. 256.)

Now we here see that this war is an old one, and was made against Catholics, not by them. So far as their influence went it was in favor of toleration, never against it. In Maryland the number and severity of the penal laws led to a project for a general emigration from the colony which they had founded.

The feeling which dictated all this hostility was too deep to be easily eradicated. Mr. Froude and the anonymous author whom he cites propose similar legislation in the nineteenth century. Better far to imitate Pennsylvania, which from the earliest period gave Catholics a shelter and a home, and which, under severe pressure from England, held nobly to her glorious principle of toleration, and never persecuted any of her settlers for their religious opinions. She stands peerless among the colonies, with no blot on her escutcheon.

Leaving the colonial period we come to the period of the Revolution. As to that Mr. Froude is wisely silent. The feeling against Catholics was kept alive in the north by the proximity of the French in Canada; in the south by that of the Spaniards in Florida; in Virginia by the fact that Maryland, her neighbor, contained a large body of Catholics groaning under intolerant laws, and who were to be repressed with that instinct of cowardice which dictated the maxim, "Humanum est odisse quem læseris."

To accomplish the overthrow of Catholicity in Canada, New England and New York had, from 1691, stimulated by England, lavished blood and treasure. One New England expedition went forth, the chaplain shouldering an axe, to hew down the images in the Catholic churches. When after a desperate fight Canada fell, the Northern colonies naturally expected the home government to gratify the bigotry it had fanned, and to sweep Catholics and Catholicity from that province as it had from Acadia. When, however, England allowed the Canadians to enjoy their old laws and to practice their religion undisturbed, the exasperation in the old colonies was intense. The Quebec act was one of the wrongs that prompted the Revolution, which was in its origin so anti-Catholic that the first flag raised in New York bore the legend, "No Popery;" and the party of Scotch Catholics settled in the North, alarmed at the demonstrations against them, fled with their priest to Canada. Toned down as the Declaration of Independence was,

it requires no searching eye to detect this feeling there. The earliest constitutions formed by the Colonies after asserting their independence are deeply imbued with hostility to Catholics. In that which New York formed in 1777, every effort was made by John Jay, afterwards Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to exclude Catholics from all civil rights. He wished them excepted from the general toleration to be given to all religions. When defeated by men of more Christian mind and grasp, he succeeded in introducing a clause under which he hoped to effect covertly what he could not do openly. In the clause bearing on naturalization he was completely successful, and down to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and the enactment of a naturalization law by Congress, no Catholic could become a citizen of the State of New York. And even when he did, the tortuous policy of John Jay barred him from office, as an oath was prescribed which he could not conscientiously take. (*Journal N. Y. Convention*, pp. 842-846.)

There is not a whisper of accusation anywhere that the Catholics, as individuals or as a body, had not contributed to develop the wealth and resources of the country; that they were turbulent, idle, factious, or troublesome; no charge that they did not sympathize with their fellow-colonists in opposing the demands of England. Yet here, at the very outset of a long struggle, the strong anti-Catholic feeling made men spurn toleration as an "evil egg," as cordially as New England did a century before.

How did the Catholics act? Did they throw themselves into the hands of England, to do battle against their old neighbors, who showed such illiberality? No, they knew their neighbors better; knew that it was not their better selves that dictated this miserable policy. The Catholics of the Colonies to a man rallied around the standard of independence. You may con Sabine's *Loyalists* from cover to cover, but you will not find a Catholic Tory. Carroll the statesman, and Carroll the priest, went with Franklin and Chase to Canada to win the Canadians to the American cause; and the project which Catholics did their best to carry out was defeated by the bigotry of John Jay. (*Journal of Charles Carroll*.)

From the outset of the struggle Catholics did their part on sea and land; in the ranks and in command; in the council and Congress. Every Catholic hand, every Catholic heart, in the limit claimed by the United States, gave its aid to the cause. The idea of the new government was one that Catholics took to at once, and no wonder; we Catholics have a Bible that praises a republican form of government, while Protestants have not. The Government of the United States, as established in 1776, had the com-

plete, instant, continuous support of all Catholics within its bounds. The Catholics in the thirteen Colonies were all Whigs; the Catholic Indians of Maine at once sent to Boston to join the cause; the Catholics on the Illinois and Wabash co-operated with Clark, and, as Judge Law declares, secured the Great West to the Republic. (*Colonial History of Vincennes*, p. 65.)

And not only was this government accepted by Catholics at home; but in Europe every Catholic state gave it its sympathy, and Catholic states gave direct aid and helped indirectly by stopping the levying of troops in Germany. What preposterous folly to arraign Catholics as enemies of a government which they cordially helped to found. There was no exception in their case. Other denominations divided, some siding with the mother country, some with the Colonies; but with the Catholics there was no division. They were a unit for the Republic. Mr. Froude can conceive what a queer look a Catholic descendant of the Catholics of those days must put on when some descendant of a Tory or a Hessian tells him that a Catholic cannot be loyal to the United States!—that there is something in Catholicity incompatible with republican institutions.

The war ended, with the army and fleet of Catholic France battling beside the American. Peace came.

"In 1785," says Mr. Froude, "there was one Roman Catholic bishop in the United States, with fifty priests and twelve churches. The Roman Catholic population was French or Spanish." Now really, are Mr. Froude's so-called histories made up in this way? Are we to take this as a specimen of historic accuracy? Had he been writing for an English public, who might be supposed to know little and care less about American topics, well and good; but surely when he addresses Americans *de rebus Americanis*, he ought not to make himself ridiculous. In 1785 there was a recognized country called the United States, but in 1785 there was not a Roman Catholic bishop in the United States aforesaid. The oldest See in the United States is that of Baltimore, established in 1789 by Pope Pius VI. (*Bullarium Romanum*.)

The first Catholic bishop was the patriot, Rev. John Carroll, who was not consecrated till August 15th, 1790. (*Brent's Life of Carroll*, p. 113.)

The next statement of this wonderful historian is that there were in 1785 fifty priests and twelve Catholic churches in the United States. These figures are far beyond the reality. Bishop Carroll, in his statement of the position of Catholics in the United States, later than this says nine priests in Maryland and five in Pennsylvania. (*Brent*, p. 71.)

But his next assertion is comical in its utter absurdity. Hear

this grave English historian. "The Roman Catholic population was French or Spanish." Spanish! Where in the thirteen Colonies was this body of Spanish Catholics? The historians of Maine know nothing about it; Minot, and Belknap, and Trumbull tell us nothing; New York writers have never found them; they do not appear in the Pennsylvania archives; McMahon, Bozman, Burk, and Campbell fail to note their existence in Maryland or Virginia; and when we ask the Carolinas and Georgia to give us some information about this body of Spanish Catholics of 1785, they stare at us. There were a few Spaniards scattered among the people, doubtless, but there was no Spanish settlement anywhere in the country. There was no territory taken from Spain or ceded by it, and no body of Spaniards had come to settle here before the Revolution or afterwards.

If by French he means natives of France, there was no body of them here; no settlement of French Catholics. The Catholic body in the United States was mainly in Maryland and Pennsylvania. In Maryland they were the descendants of the original Catholic settlers, the emigration of Catholics having been so far prevented by penal laws that comparatively few Catholics came over from the days of Cromwell. Hence, the Catholics in Maryland were mainly American born, and it would require very ingenious sophistry to make them out either French or Spanish. In Pennsylvania the Catholic settlers had been Irish and Germans. The immigration began soon after the settlement of the colony and continued almost to the commencement of the Revolution. Many of the Pennsylvania Catholics of 1785 were of the second or third generation born in America, and as fully American as any around them. Probably not one-third were natives of Ireland or Germany. Now we have official statements of the number of Catholics in Pennsylvania in 1757, when a report made to Lord Loudoun gives 901 as German, or of German origin; 364 English and Irish, or of English or Irish origin; in all 1365 over the age of twelve. (Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 3.) Bishop Carroll after the war estimated the Pennsylvania Catholics at seven thousand.

The Catholics on the prairies from Vincennes to the Mississippi, and at Detroit, were nearly all natives and all of families for generations in America. They were, when the war began, British subjects, like those on the coast. They were neither by birth nor by political relation, French. The same is true of the handful of Acadians who lingered in Baltimore. It is an abuse to call these French. They were taken to Maryland as British subjects.

It is very clear that the Catholic population of the United States in 1785 was neither French nor Spanish. It was mainly native born; of English origin in Maryland; of Irish and German origin

in Pennsylvania; of French-Canadian and Acadian stock in Baltimore and the West; of Indian origin in Maine, Northern New York, and the Upper Lakes.

Mr. Froude asserts that the Catholic body in 1785 was declining in numbers; but as he cites no statistics the assertion must be taken with due allowances when coming from a writer who so pretentiously displays his ignorance. We leave to our friends of the New England Historic Genealogical Society to give us the names of the Irish Presbyterians who Mr. Froude tells fought the battle of Lexington against the English troops.

We have seen how little Mr. Froude really knows of the position of Catholics in the United States in the days of the Articles of Confederation. Let us now come to the Constitution.

On the word of an anonymous writer Mr. Froude proceeds to tell us what the Constitution of the United States contains. Would it not have been well for a grave historian to read that not inaccessible document for himself and learn something of its formation? He represents the Catholic Church as having condemned the Constitution of the United States and forbidden obedience to it. "The Constitution requires all the people and all the churches (!) to obey the laws of the United States. The Pope anathematizes the provision, because, etc." (p. 531). Now as an historic fact is it true or is it absolutely false that any Pope from Pius VI., who occupied the See of Peter when the Constitution was framed, to Leo XIII., who occupies it now, has ever condemned the Constitution of the United States or any of the amendments, either as a whole or any provision in any part? There is nothing in the Bullarium, in the *Acta Pontificia*, or any known collection of Papal acts. Of the thirty-eight members of the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States; two were Catholics, Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, and Daniel Carroll, of Maryland. They were earnest supporters of it, and not a voice was raised by Catholics against the Constitution when it was submitted to the States. The States which declined to accept it were not Pennsylvania and Maryland, where the Catholics chiefly were, but Rhode Island and North Carolina, where Catholicity was scarcely known. Catholics helped to frame the Constitution, Catholics helped to pass it, at a time when it passed with great difficulty. Catholics have never, from their pulpits, much less in the councils of their bishops or the acts of their Sovereign Pontiffs, pronounced it "a covenant with hell." This theological opinion has not been taught in Catholic seminaries, and if Mr. Froude will drop a line to the *London Notes and Queries* he may ascertain from what theological school this opinion emanated, and by what clergy it was sustained. Is it not mere rubbish then in the face of events to say as he does (p. 524): "It

is only as long as they are a small minority, that they can be loyal subjects under such a constitution as the American."

The statement that the Constitution requires "all the people and all the churches to obey the laws of the United States," is rather a free rendering. The word "church" does not occur in the Constitution at all. What is said in the enacting clause is this: "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties-made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." One law of the United States has in our time been openly defied. It stands as a solitary case. May we ask Mr. Froude whether those who openly resisted the Fugitive Slave Law, thwarted its execution and appealed to a higher law, based their action on any decree of the Pope? Were they Catholics at all?

Almost every statement made by Froude in regard to the Constitution is unfounded. "The Constitution of the United States repudiates the idea of an established religion," he says; but it does nothing of the kind. The first amendment says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The power was explicitly denied to Congress, but it existed in the States. Massachusetts had an established church at that time and maintained it far down into the present century; New York, until after the commencement of the century, excluded Catholics from office, as New Hampshire does to this day; North Carolina excluded from office by her constitution those who denied the truths of the Protestant religion; and New Jersey secured civil and political rights to Protestants only.

The whole Protestant opinion leaned strongly to the idea of an established church, as is seen in the petition of a number of clergymen asking Congress to publish a Bible; and at a later date asking that body to place Bible publishing under a legal censorship. (O'Callaghan, *American Bibles*, xxi., xxxix.) They had not outgrown the idea of looking to the state for direction in things spiritual.

But had Mr. Froude known anything of the history of Catholics in the United States he would never have made such a blunder as to call attention to the first article of the amendments to the Constitution. It says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." We admit that Congress has passed no law; but, by authority of the General Government, the Protestant religion is established in the army and navy and in Indian reservations, and Catholics are prohibited from the free exercise of their religion, and a whole

series of cases can be cited where soldiers and sailors have been punished for refusing to attend the services of a church established in defiance of the law. He could learn something of this matter by consulting Lieutenant O'Brien's *Treatise on American Military Law and the Practice of Courts-martial* (Philadelphia, 1846), the author having been himself tried by court-martial for refusing to attend a Protestant church. At this very time (1879) one-fourth of the soldiers in the United States army are Catholics, yet all the chaplains maintained by government, with a single exception, are Protestant; and in the navy, although numbers of sailors and marines are Catholics, there is not a single Catholic chaplain; but, perhaps, Mr. Froude explains all this where he says (p. 530): "If the progress of Romanism creates difficulty, with which the Constitution cannot deal, they will not sacrifice reality to scruples of form." By *they* he means Americans; but, though this theory may be that of a few fanatics, we may assure Mr. Froude that it is not the will of the American people that the Constitution should be trampled on to carry out the prejudices or hates of any set of men.

Thus, though Congress has made no law, and can make no law establishing a religion, the bureaucracy, the departments created without the Constitution, have established a religion.

The Secretaries of War and of the Navy have done so in the army and navy to an extent not known even in England.

The Secretary of the Interior has gone still further. He is not President or Congress, he is not named in the Constitution, but his word is law. The army and navy of the United States are fortunately of very trifling extent in numerical force; but the Secretary of the Interior controls the very soil of free America, and by his authority there are thousands of square miles of American land where there are established religions—established in a form that would shock the moral sense of the world. There is district after district where, under the authority of a foreigner, now occupying the position of Secretary of the Interior, a native-born Catholic priest attempting to preach the Gospel to Catholics who desire his services, and to officiate as a clergyman for them, can be arrested and removed by force. The Catholic Indians on reservations have been allotted to Protestant denominations, and the creed of that denomination has been made the established religion in that district. No other is tolerated, and every remonstrance of the Indians themselves and of the Catholic clergy has been treated with derision. These men have the power; they can call the army to their aid, and they act in defiance of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. What they do in a Territory they may soon attempt in a State, for the principle is the same.

All this subversion of the Constitution sprang from jealousy of the Catholics. In the Commissioner's Report for 1861 the Catholics are represented as having one-fourth of all the missionaries among the Indians. This excited jealousy, and, as soon as the army left the agencies, the old system was broken up, and in 1873-74 a new and specious scheme was devised, by which the different tribes were allotted to different denominations. No regard was paid to the ratio of the denomination to the general population. No regard was paid to what missionaries had actually done. The great mass of the agencies were assigned to Protestant denominations, and the Catholics found only four allotted to them, while they were almost immediately excluded peremptorily from the others and cut off from all intercourse with the Catholic Indians. The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, who had been under Catholic guidance before the settlement of Virginia and Massachusetts, were allotted to a little body called Christians, who had no Indian missions at all! And when that body declined the task the Presbyterians were put in possession of the district. In the few agencies allowed to the Catholics no attempt has ever been made to exclude any Protestant denomination that has missions or members; but from the Yakama Mission, the Mission Indians of California, the Pimo, and other old Catholic ground, Catholics are persistently excluded, often with violence, as in the case of Father Osuna and Rev. Mr. Tomazin, to mention no others. In each agency the Episcopal, the Presbyterian, the Baptist religion, or the doctrines of Fox, is established, not by law, but in open defiance of law, and the free exercise of religion is prohibited, not by Congress, not under or by virtue of any law, but by the sole authority of the President and the Secretaries.

It is one of the cases that show the rapid decline of personal liberty in America and the rapid growth of usurped power. No man of thought can fail to grieve over this decline and the steadily increasing disregard of individual rights. The late war gave rise to many usurpations, justified on the shallow pretext of military necessity; but once begun, the invasion of individual rights has increased in every department, and is the real danger menacing our institutions.

But to leave this question and return to the Established Church in this country, we appeal to Mr. Froude, as he has undertaken to treat of American subjects, to lay aside his narrowness, prejudice, and unfairness, and be for once what he well claims to be, an Englishman, loving fair play and even-handed justice, and to take up the Indian system established under General Grant, compare it with the Constitution of the United States, and tell the world whether religion is not really established here, and the free exercise

of religion is not prohibited, in defiance of that Constitution, and whether Catholics are the wrong-doers or the victims.

That the Constitution guarantees liberty of speech and of the press is a misstatement. Congress cannot abridge it, but it cannot control the action of a State in that regard. The Constitution, we are told, repudiates royal powers. There is not an allusion to them. "The Constitution allows," he tells us, "the free circulation of the Bible, and the right of private judgment in interpreting it." In our school-days we used to learn the Constitution by heart, and have never altogether forgotten our early training, but we are perplexed. Froude, the great Froude, the learned Froude, the accurate, honest Froude, says that the Constitution allows the free circulation of the Bible and private judgment. We do not like to admit that our memory is failing, so we take up the familiar pages and look. Bible! Bible! Bible! Private judgment! Oh, good Mr. Froude, you have been fearfully hoaxed! Had you only in this case used your private judgment and read for self, instead of taking as Bible truths all the outpourings of anti-Catholic rant, you would have known that there is not a syllable in the Constitution about the Bible or the interpretation thereof.

But citing his anonymous authority, Mr. Froude asserts that the Pope censured two propositions which he finds in the Constitution, and which we confess we cannot: 1. A guarantee of liberty of speech and of the press. 2. A clause requiring all the people *and all the churches* to obey the laws of the United States; and in the third place that the Pope declared to be heresy the part of the Constitution of the United States wherein "the Constitution subordinates all churches to the civil power, except in matters of faith and discipline."

Which of the Popes he does not tell us, but Pius VI., VII., VIII., IX., Gregory XVI., Leo XII, and XIII., all the Popes who have occupied the See of Peter since the Constitution, signed by two Catholics, went forth to the world, do not cover so long a period in the annals of the Church but what we may find out which Pope sat in judgment on the Constitution of the United States.

Again we take up this Constitution. We fail to find any such clauses in the whole document as some Pope is said to have condemned. The words *church, faith, discipline* elude our scrutiny. We examine to see what proposition is there laid down that might excite scruples in a Catholic mind, or lead to question between a layman and his clergyman, a priest and his bishop. We find none. The Constitution is a singularly practical, cautious, state paper. It enters into no effusive statements of political doctrines or theories; it lays down no axioms, denounces no form of government. The organization of a new federal government, the powers to be con-

ceded to it by the States, the powers renounced by the States, these alone are treated of by the Constitution of the United States. It was drawn up in a very critical time, when anything except what was absolutely essential would endanger its passage. Much as we venerate it now, we must not forget that it passed by a close vote; that New York accepted it most reluctantly; and that Hamilton's able articles in its favor were met by arguments that showed no inferior ability. No one who knows the history of the formation of the Constitution and has studied under its ablest expositors ever elicited from it any proposition which has caused any difficulty in Catholic minds. And, in fact, there is no trace in the history of any Catholic diocese or bishop, in the annals of any church or order, in Catholic periodical, book, or newspaper, of any question in regard to the Constitution of the United States, which was ever carried to Rome, and became the subject of a Papal decision.

But on page 524 he refers us to the Syllabus. To cite his words: "The Syllabus says that men are not free; that they are not capable of taking care of themselves; that the laity, in the most important matters, must be guided and governed by the clergy; that the press ought to be under a censorship; that the Catholic religion being true all others are false, and therefore ought not to be tolerated."

Now this does not sound a whit like the Syllabus, and Mr. Froude, as usual, gives us no reference. We must, then, take up the Syllabus to see whether it was in this that Pius IX. so strangely condemned things in the Constitution of the United States that really are not there. Popes make bulls, but not bulls of this kind.

The Syllabus is a collection, as it were, of the marginal notes in a book of law reports—brief notes of decisions made by Pope Pius IX. on the various questions brought before him during his long pontificate. Now in this Syllabus there is not the slightest reference to the Constitution of the United States. There is no statement that men are not free; there is no statement that men are not capable of taking care of themselves; there is no such statement as Mr. Froude affirms about laity and clergy; there is no statement in regard to censorship of the press, and if there were, it would not be disputed here, where men are actually in prison for printing and circulating what they deemed right and proper. There is no such proposition as the last, and no general condemnation of religious toleration.

Protestants hold that Catholics are wrong in doctrine and must so hold to justify their leaving it at the Reformation. Catholics hold that the Reformers were guilty of heresy and schism, and that their followers are in the wrong. Three centuries have not sufficed

for either side to convince the other, and no one ever dreamed of seeing a Pope, after the long series of condemnations of Protestant doctrines, recognize them as true. Indeed a Pope would need only to read Mr. Froude to see that it was unnecessary. "Protestantism has failed," says Mr. Froude. "And no Protestant community has ever succeeded in laying down a chart of human life with any definite sailing directions," he proceeds to tell us. This is not exactly what we expect of an institution founded by God, and which He is to direct by his abiding presence.

The Syllabus condemns doctrines put forward by Catholics which were at variance with the recognized teaching of the Church. There is not one that touches even remotely the Constitution of the United States. So far as that is concerned the inference that Mr. Froude leads his readers to draw is unfounded. Neither Pius IX. in the Syllabus, nor any other Pope before or since, ever condemned the Constitution of the United States or a single clause in it.

As directly bearing on this point, I quote the words of Archbishop Spaulding :

"To stretch the words of the Pontiff, evidently intended for the standpoint of European radicals and infidels, so as to make them include the state of things established in this country, by our noble Constitution, in regard to the liberty of conscience, or worship, and of the press, were manifestly unfair and unjust. Divided, as we were in religious sentiment, from the very origin of our government, our fathers acted most prudently and wisely in adopting as an amendment to the Constitution, the organic law that 'Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' (Amend. i.) In fact, under the circumstances, they could have adopted no other course consistently with the principles, and even with the existence of our newly-established government.

"In adopting this amendment they certainly did not intend, like the European radicals, disciples of Tom Paine and the French Revolution, to pronounce all religions, whether true or false, equal before God, but only to declare them equal before the law; or rather simply to lay down the sound and equitable principle that the civil government, adhering strictly to its own appropriate sphere of political duty, pledged itself not to interfere with religious matters, which it rightly viewed as entirely without the bounds of its competency. The founders of our government were, thank God, neither latitudinarians nor infidels. They were earnest, honest men, and however much some of them may have been personally lukewarm in the matter of religion, or may have differed in religious opinions, they still professed to believe in Christ and His revelation, and exhibited a commendable respect for religious observances. Therefore their action could not have been condemned, or even contemplated by the Pontiff in his recent solemn censure, pronounced on an altogether different set of men, with a totally different set of principles—on men and on principles so very clearly and emphatically portrayed in the document itself, which every sound canon of interpretation requires to be strictly construed." (Pastoral Letter, February 8th, 1865, pp. 10, 11.)

Certainly no Catholic writer in America was abler, or more thoroughly informed of what had been decided by the Church on important questions, than Dr. Brownson; and, near the close of his life,

he wrote thus in *The American Republic, its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny*.

"The system is no invention of man, is no creation of the Convention, but is given us by Providence in the living Constitution of the American people. The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that they did not destroy or deface the work of Providence, but accepted it, and organized the government in harmony with the real order, the real elements given them. They suffered themselves, in all their positive substantial work, to be governed by vality, not by theories and speculations. In this they proved themselves statesmen." (P. 271.)

"In all human governments there will be defects and abuses, and he is no wise man who expects perfection from imperfection. But the American Constitution, taken as a whole and in all its parts, is the least imperfect that has ever existed, and under it individual rights, personal freedom and independence, as well as public authority or society, are better protected than under any other; and as the few barbaric elements retained from the feudal ages are eliminated, the standard of education elevated, and the whole population Americanized, moulded by and to the American system, it will be found to effect all the good, with as little of the evil, as can reasonably be expected from any possible civil government or political constitution of society." (P. 276.)

These two great American Catholics, a great archbishop, a prominent figure in the Vatican Council, and a great philosopher and reviewer, knew of no condemnation of the Constitution of the United States, and of nothing in it that was at variance with the doctrines of the Church, or that could excite scruple in the mind of a Catholic. Each, from his own standpoint, gives it his hearty praise.

And the voice of American Catholics has been uniformly the same. Mr. Froude and his anonyme give no authorities, but as they cite no article of the Constitution condemned, no Pope who condemned, and as our search fails to lead us to one or the other, we will leave the field of constitutional law and its theological recognition to return to Mr. Froude in his favorite field, history.

The condition of Catholics and Catholicity from 1785, when, as he supposes, they were all French and Spanish, down to 1847, the time of the potato famine in Ireland, is to Mr. Froude a terra incognita. Who constituted the Catholic body he does not seem to know; his mythical French and Spaniards seem to have vanished. Who took their places according to his theory it would be hard to say, for he tells us suavely and serenely: "The Irish who were in America before the potato famine were chiefly Presbyterians from the North, part of the Protestant colony which had been planted by Cromwell." It is a puzzle to determine whom this gentleman's judgment constituted the Catholic body in the United States prior to the Irish famine. If the Irish were all Presbyterians, and all other nationalities are ignored, of what will he make the Catholic population in 1844, estimated loosely, indeed, at a million, but in all probably twice that number. There was a great attack on the Catholic Irish of Philadelphia in 1844; mobs burned Cath-

olic churches, and asylums, and a library, and houses of Catholics. There was a general movement of hostility to Irish Catholics. A party called Native Americans was violent and active, and carried elections in various parts. It was the period of the second great anti-Catholic outbreak; the first dating about 1835, the period of coarse indecent fictions like *Maria Monk* and *Six Months in a Convent* as well as of works by abler hands against Catholicity, like Beecher's *Plea for the West*, and the *Brutus, or a Foreign Conspiracy against the Liberties of the United States*, by S. F. B. Morse, who saw, in the gift of a few paintings from the Queen of the French to the Cathedral in St. Louis, the utter overthrow of American liberty and institutions. But Mr. Morse had not reached his great fame then, and was not painted with royal decorations on his breast, and even one from his Holiness, the Pope, so that if Mr. Froude pursuing his studies reads *Brutus*, he ought by all means insert a portrait of the author with his foreign decorations.

Of any element but the Irish constituting the Catholic body Mr. Froude knows nothing. Of the large, intelligent, well-united, and organized German element, with its numbers of priests, religious of both sexes, schools, newspapers, and readers, he knows nothing; although it has given the Church several bishops not only of the first but of the second generation. Of the American element gained by conversions during two centuries he knows nothing, and his idea of the mental process, by which a man aided by God can come to see that when Christ instituted a church with power to teach there arose the duty of accepting that teaching, is very extraordinary. He says: "That an educated American Protestant should, at this time of day, run his head into the sand, and call himself a Catholic, is very absurd," and we agree with him; but though we have known numbers of educated American Protestants who have become Catholics, we never before heard of this curious way of entering the Church. The ritual for receiving a convert into the Church does not prescribe any such comical act as is here indicated. Many we have known who forfeited position, friends, wealth, business by the act of becoming Catholics, who knew that they must take their share of misrepresentation, obloquy, petty persecution, and insult, and who gallantly faced it all, but of these Mr. Froude knows nothing. Of the French Canadian element, numbering at least half a million, he knows nothing; of the Flemish, both Holland and Belgian; of the Polish, of the Portuguese and Italian, he knows nothing. And yet in his supreme ignorance of American history and our Constitution, of the Catholic body, its constituent parts and its history, he gives us nearly twenty pages of what can really deserve no name but twaddle and threatens to inflict another article. Is it anything but twaddle to tell us (p. 524): "The Catholic says

it (the spiritual part of man) resides in the Church?" We presume he means to state that Catholics maintain that the power to teach and define revealed truth resides in the Church. "The question is, where the spiritual part of man resides. The Protestant answers that it is in the individual conscience and reason." From this he infers that the Catholics can be loyal to such a constitution as the American only as long as they are a small minority. Is this logical? The Protestant recognizes no authority out of or beyond himself, therefore he is always and under all circumstances a loyal subject. He may be a loyal subject, but it is just for the contrary reason that he does recognize an authority beyond himself to which God requires his obedience.

Is it anything but twaddle, and anachronistic twaddle, to give a long list of things that a Catholic majority will do, and among the rest tell us "it will put the press under surveillance." Then he proceeds: "That it will try to do all this . . . is as certain as mathematics. It tried before in the Dark Ages." He certainly ought to give us a chapter on the "Press in the Dark Ages." It will be like the chapter often cited "On the Snakes in Ireland." The chapter was very brief, but to the point: "There are no snakes in Ireland."

Of course Mr. Froude must touch on the school question. "If there is one thing which *they* are prouder of than another, it is their national schools. The Roman Catholics do not like these schools. They insist on educating their own children." *They* evidently mean the Americans, not merely New Yorkers; but there is no system of national schools, nor can there be under the present Constitution of the United States, although the utterly useless Bureau of Education at Washington would lead a stranger to suppose that Congress had some power to establish schools. The States have, within a generation, adopted systems of public schools. They are not uniform, and at best are only experimental. But a portion of the people favor the exclusion of all religious teaching from the schools, while others believe that the best interests of the community are advanced by imbuing the young with religious principles during the whole course of their education. Here are two distinct theories of education. Each party has the right to establish schools at its own expense, and carry out its views in them. Have the advocates of either theory the right to assume that they are the people, and to establish schools at the public expense to carry out their views? Certainly not. Yet it is done. Those who claim that education should be simply secular, insist that schools for which all are taxed shall be managed according to their theory. They assume that they are the whole people and ignore completely the advocates of the opposite theory, driving

them by bigotry and intolerance from schools which they are taxed to support.

The theory of a completely secular education is, however, never really carried out. A fanatical, but active portion, by the indifference of the masses, make the schools really Protestant. The school bodies are almost exclusively made up of Protestants; laws will be cunningly altered to effect this; the whole tone of the school-books is Protestant, and they abound with assertions and statements and insinuations which no Catholic will admit to be true, and which no teacher should have power to compel a Catholic child to learn and repeat. The Protestant canon of the Bible, a Protestant translation, Protestant hymns and prayers are used in schools; so that though the schools are nominally secular they are really Protestant, and it must be so as long as the control is entirely in the hands of the active advocates of one faith, for such men cannot entirely lay aside their religious convictions and bear constantly in mind that they are not individuals regulating their own private or church concerns, but State officers managing a department in which all creeds are interested.

It has frequently been boasted that these schools are the great engine against Roman Catholic progress. That in the free school the Catholic was sure to learn to throw off the authority of priest and church. And a belief in this power is one of the reasons of the great interest violent anti-Catholics entertain for the schools. Mr. Froude recognizes this: "It (the Church) kept its hold on the children, and furnished them with antidotes to correct the poison of the secular schools. The lapses from the faith, once relatively large, have now wholly ceased" (p. 522). Then the question comes: Should a State which recognizes all creeds as equal maintain a system of schools which one set of people can employ to proselytize from another set? Is there not something intrinsically wrong in a system which can be put to such a use?

But the system of secular schools, leaving religion to the Sunday-school and excluding it from the school, has never been tested. Most of our criminals have received this slight religious training, and the result shows that it is not enough to counteract vice. Are we to go on bringing up unreligious and depraved generations, trusting that if they see that men in our day blundered, they will try to remedy the evil by returning to religious training?

The same false reasoning is seen in other things. Throughout this article Froude contrasts Americans with Catholics, thus making American synonymous with Protestant, and denying us Catholics our American nationality. Our separated brethren cannot easily divest themselves of the idea that they are the people, and that they allow us to live here, and if we behave ourselves, they

may do something for us one of these days. Hence in many States this intolerant majority, intolerant, because they do not recognize us as being as much as themselves part of the people, cut off Catholics in all eleemosynary and penal institutions from all means of practicing their religion or enjoying the ordinances of their faith. New Jersey rejected a law which aimed at giving the members of each church a right to the ministration of its own clergy. Ohio passed such a law, but under a storm of public odium hastily repealed it. Yet Mr. Froude tells us: "The theory of the republic is that all men are free, that each citizen is capable of taking care of his own interests, temporal and eternal; that so long as he does no practical wrong to others, he has a right to go his own way, *to worship under his own forms*," etc. This theory is certainly not carried out in Massachusetts or New Jersey or in Ohio, not to name other States.

"But the figures in the census startle them;" that is, Protestant Americans. The last census is ten years old now, and it is rather late in the day to begin to be startled by its figures. But it is a comical fact that this strong anti-Catholic feeling which is so active and which has contrived to get hold of so many departments of the public service, has manipulated the census for its own ends, and that statistical work is made to show the Catholic body as small as possible, and on the other hand the property possessed by it as great as possible.

The same farce will be enacted by the census bureau in 1880, and Mr. Froude will be taken to task for drawing attention to it. The plan is this: No effort is made to ascertain the faith of the inhabitants in taking the census, but the seating capacity of the churches is given; and ignoring the fact that in Catholic churches, especially in towns and cities, several masses are said every Sunday, each attended by a different set of worshippers, the Catholics are estimated for each church as being only as many as it will seat, when that is often not one-fourth of those who attend it, and a Protestant church, where an unpopular clergyman preaches to empty benches, is credited with as many as the church will hold. The figures of actual church attendance, obtained by count for a Philadelphia paper last year, show how completely fallacious the census figures are.

The matter of property is similarly exaggerated. Every asylum, school, institution, under the control of Catholics, is put down as property belonging to the Catholic Church in that ward, village, or district, although there is no legal or real connection between them. In this way the amount of property is swelled to a figure to alarm old women. But, in classifying similar Protestant institutions, they are not put down to any particular church unless directly connected

with them; nor where denominational are they added to the sum-total of that denomination's property; nor where Protestant at large, like the Bible Society and Tract Society, or Foreign Missionary Society, is such property added to the sum-total of Protestant church property.

The whole matter of Catholic population is in a very unsatisfactory state. Men like Mr. Froude, who know nothing of the subject, are very ready to settle it in a moment; but, among Catholics, we have only the guesses made from year to year in the Catholic almanac. Where the estimates there given are based on the yearly baptisms considered as live births, and on the yearly marriages, a fairly accurate estimate can be reached by adopting the rates of live births to population in that State; but, where the estimate is made without any definite data, it is, of course, not of similar authority, and such estimates vary greatly when made by different well-informed persons in the same diocese. The present estimates are, perhaps, somewhat over the mark, while ten, fifteen, and twenty years ago they were certainly far below the real number.

So far as the growth of the Catholic body in the United States, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution to our time, its rapid organization of congregations, building of churches, and at once working out its own life, in its religious, educational, and charitable institutions, as naturally as a plant throwing out its branches, blossoms, and fruit, he shows no knowledge whatever. He attempts no outline of its history, no account of its struggles, of its members as valuable citizens in peace and war, of the services of its clergy and religious in the cause of morality, or in times of peril from epidemics. Yet there is matter here for philosophical study and examination. So far as the history of the Church here in the last century is concerned, Mr. Froude tells us nothing, and shows us unmistakably that he cannot possibly tell us anything.

The actual position of the Catholic body in the United States is a peculiar one. The great effort is to prevent it from exerting any influence, from obtaining any adequate representation in the executive department of government, the legislative or the judicial, and above all in the educational system controlled by the state. Both political parties agree in this though they do not avow it. One, whether called Republican now, or Whig a few years ago, has been uniformly hostile to Catholics, and occasionally falls into the background to let a directly anti-Catholic party, Native American or Know-Nothing, take its place. The other party professes some liberality, goes so far as to accept Catholic votes, will give an occasional minor office to a Catholic where the votes of citizens of that faith are numerous enough to require it; but if a Catholic is put up for any prominent office he is certain to be

scratched, and to run far behind the rest of the ticket, often sufficiently so to insure defeat. If a Catholic is proposed in a nominating convention this experience will be adduced, and it will be argued that it is useless to put up a Catholic only to insure defeat, and perhaps imperil the whole ticket. Cases can be cited in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, not to name other States, proving this state of things.

The school law of New York was altered so as to take the election of Commissioners of Education in the city of New York from the people, and confer the appointment on the Mayor. The danger was that as the Catholic population is large, several Catholics might be elected. The Mayor made his appointments; out of some fifteen, one Catholic was selected and at least seven Presbyterians, yet no one will pretend that this is at all in ratio to the numbers of the two denominations in the city. It was simply a piece of special legislation to deprive the Catholics of any influence in a city where they form half the population.

What Catholics should do under the circumstances is a question for wise and prudent statesmen to decide. Some, where a Catholic is scratched for any office, always scratch that office in subsequent elections unless a Jew is nominated. They adopt the lesson in courtesy inculcated by their fellow-citizens. Of course as numbers scratch in this way, the result must be seen. Carried to its full extent Catholics will finally not vote at all, or will nominate a ticket of their own, not necessarily of Catholics, but of fair equitable men. For not only do Catholics find that those who expect them to vote for the regular candidate turn against them on the score of religion, but no sooner does a distinctively anti-Catholic party come up than they see among its leaders men who have for various offices depended on their votes, and who, when the new party has lived its short life, will be as prominent as before, obsequiously asking Catholic votes, and expecting that their late conduct shall be overlooked in the interests of party.

That seven millions of the population should be content to remain in their present helpless political state is not to be expected. They are accused of no crime except that of wishing to educate their own children. Everything else is a forced conclusion from prejudiced premises. The Germans and some of the other foreign elements are well-organized bodies, acting together under recognized leaders, and with a press of influence; among the Irish Catholics there is little organization or concert; among American Catholics none. The continuance of an active anti-Catholic party in the country for ten years would unite all these elements into one organized whole, alive to its wants and its interests; and under this point of view it is, perhaps, the best thing that could possibly

occur for the Catholic cause, as any long hold of power will, by its fanaticism and excesses, make such a party forever after impossible.

The evanescent character of these anti-Catholic parties is one of our difficulties. When they start they profit by the latent prejudice against Catholics, the result of old training and of current literature; but as soon as these fanatics show their inherent obscenity, coarseness, violence, disregard of civil rights, and taste for arson and murder, the sensible and respectable men who were led away for a moment, withdraw from the party in disgust and shame, and the party dissolves. If it could be made to live ten years by the existence of a directly Catholic party, every question would be so thoroughly canvassed that the sound sense of the American people would banish Catholic and anti-Catholic parties forever after from American politics.

Of our present position Mr. Froude speaks vaguely. But as a prophet he is sublime. Historian he may not be; philosophical observer of the present he may not be; but as a prophet he surpasses all we have hitherto read. He foresees the future with unerring eye. What we American Catholics will do under any possible contingency, at any period of time, is as clear to him as noonday. Starting with the absurd theory that we Catholics are opposed to the Constitution, and with the false assertion that our Church had condemned it, he cries, like some tragic ranter on a provincial stage: "Give them the power and the Constitution will be gone. A Catholic majority, under spiritual direction, will forbid liberty of worship, and will try to forbid liberty of conscience. It will control education; it will put the press under surveillance; it will punish opposition with excommunication, and excommunication will be attended with civil disabilities. That it (*i. e.*, a Catholic majority in the possible future) will try to do all this as long as it accepts (? in the living present) the Ultramontane theory which at present passes current (what is it, please?) is as certain as mathematics. It (*i. e.*, this possible American Catholic majority of the future) tried before in the Dark Ages; it will try again in the age of enlightenment."

We cannot comment on such nonsense, especially when backed up by what M. Louis Veuillot said in the Chamber of Deputies, where it happens that M. Veuillot never spoke,—we cannot comment on it better than by citing Mr. Froude's own words: "Language of this kind is permitted in the New World because of its absurdity. Fools are allowed to talk as they please."

Signs betoken a new movement against us Catholics in America, like those of 1835, and 1844, and 1855; but we must beg those who differ from us, or view our progress with jealousy, to meet us

fairly, and to bring to the discussion of the few real questions in debate men possessed of some knowledge of American history and law; men who have read, or are willing before they speak to read, the recognized doctrines of the Catholic Church, and not build up a colossus of prejudice and misinformation. For, from the specimen afforded, we must decline to consider Mr. Froude as an historian, at least where American topics are concerned, and we submit the question, with all deference, to the various historical societies from Maine to California, convinced that they will decide as we have.

INSANITY AS A PLEA FOR CRIMINAL ACTS; INSANITY AS EMOTIONAL OR AFFECTIVE; AND WHETHER INSANITY CAN BE OF THE WILL ALONE.¹

MENTAL insanity is an obscure and difficult subject, and yet the discussion of it, especially as related to crimes against the civil law, has passed from the schools of science and philosophy to popular literature, to the magazine—even to the daily newspaper. This has been brought about mainly by the fact that members of the medical profession and the “scientists,” in their writings addressed to the general public, and also “experts,” in their testimony before the criminal courts, now propose novel and strange theories for explaining diseased mental action, maintaining that “emotional insanity is an ordinary physical cause of moral depravity and crime of unusual atrocity.” Some of these scientists go so far as to hold that their hypotheses for explaining disease of the mind and the physical causes of crime should be authoritatively recognized in the criminal code; and with such success have they done this that some courts in New Hampshire have actually ruled that insanity is a question of fact, not of law, and

¹ The following authors, among others, were consulted in the preparation of this article: Dr. Ray, on Medical Jurisprudence; J. H. Balfour Browne, Esq., on Medical Jurisprudence; Maudsley's works, *Body and Mind*, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, his writings being of standard authority with the medical profession on the subject herein treated, were consulted for the theories generally defended by his school of thought. While Dr. Ray's treatise on Medical Jurisprudence is very elaborate, that of Browne is far more correct in its philosophical principles, and under this respect it is a safer guide, both for the student and the general reader, who are desirous of forming sound notions on the subjects treated by them.

that its definition, and the tests of its presence or absence, are matter for the jury with the experts to decide, without any instruction from the court on responsibility of acts, on the definition, and the legal tests of insane deeds. It is for the legal profession to determine at what value they will estimate the verdict of a petit jury made up without instruction from the court, and entirely on the answers of experts, some of whom maintain that all moral depravity is insanity; that one may be insane at the instant of committing a criminal act, and perfectly sane at the instant next before the act, and next after it, and at all the other instants of his life; that one may be perfectly sane as to his intellect, and yet plan and execute a criminal act by compulsion of an insane will. It remains to be seen whether this strange precedent in New Hampshire will be followed elsewhere, and thus take from the office of judge what was heretofore looked on as one of its most important functions. Is not murder that is charged also a question of fact, and yet must the judge not instruct the jury as to what constitutes the crime of murder?

The questions raised in respect to insanity are living and practical, therefore, and their discussion cannot rightly be left exclusively to those "scientists" who claim to speak for the medical profession, and reduce crime to a purely physiological basis. The problems of insane mental action pertain to civil law, to the medical science, and to psychology or the philosophy of mind. The matter of those questions concerning insane mental action has its ethical and civil aspects which relate it to public authority; and since insane mental action supposes organic lesion in the brain, under this aspect the subject legitimately pertains to the science of medicine; and, finally, it is related to psychology, or the philosophy of mind, whose office it is to discriminate between intellectual or spiritual action and organic action. Before expressing any opinions or drawing any conclusions as to the share which mental disease may have in causing criminal acts, it will be very advantageous to consider, 1st. What rules and axioms are laid down by jurists for the guidance of civil courts; 2d. What the medical science has succeeded in proving; and lastly, what principles the philosophy of mind must claim as demonstrated which bear upon the subject. As regards the sciences of law and medicine the writer cannot pretend to give more than a general statement of results; but such statement will, at the same time, suffice for that view of the subject which is here to be taken. There are questions concerning diseased mental action which are interesting to the Christian, and which he must be prepared to answer with as much clearness and certainty as are attainable. Nothing more is attempted in this

article than to state those questions, and offer a few suggestions pertaining to their solution.

Insanity is an abnormal state of the soul's superior faculties, produced by disease of the brain, which state of the soul's faculties is manifested by disorderly and unsound or abnormal action, thus showing such person to be *non compos mentis*. But, it may be asked, what more precisely and specifically is that abnormal action of the mental powers which conclusively proves one to be of insane mind? Are there certain symptoms or tests which, when known with certainty, infallibly determine that some persons are victims of this disease? Is there some sign or characteristic of insane mental action which surely and in all cases distinguishes it from sane action of the mind? Is the insane person who, in consequence of his disease, violates the law ever justly punishable for the transgression?

The works written for the legal profession, and the instructions given by the courts, at different times, treat these questions more ably and dispassionately than do most works composed by members of the medical profession, since the latter class of authors either theorize concerning all mental action from a purely materialistic standpoint, or else they consider only the pathology of the disease as manifested by its various types in lesions of the brain.

Whenever a murder of startling atrocity is perpetrated, and its author is brought to trial, public sympathy is enlisted in the case, either for the culprit or in favor of the victim; and as the populace are swayed rather by feelings than by any juridical view of the deed, one while the culprit is summarily lynched, another while his crime is condoned under the assumed plea of "emotional insanity." As the courts do not presume insanity *a priori*, merely because the crime is enormous and was committed without reasonable motive, a plea of insanity must be sustained by sufficient proof; and hence great effort and ability have been directed towards establishing some legal tests of mental insanity by which to rule all cases of the kind. "Experts" from the medical profession are summoned to assist the jury, who are duly instructed on these tests, in applying these criteria to the particular case before them, and thus determining as to the fact of mental insanity. As these "experts" have come to impugn all the formerly received legal tests of insanity, and to advance conflicting opinions concerning the distinctive symptoms and the true nature of insanity, less and less authority is accredited to them; and their cross-examination is, in many instances, made an ordeal through which few of them would freely pass a second time. There is usually no great difficulty when the offender is under the control of frenzy, is a raging maniac, or is a confirmed idiot; but the perplexing case is that of the accused who

has "method in his madness;" who deliberately planned, selected the means, and executed a criminal work. Can such a person be really insane, and, if so, by what tests, symptoms, or criteria can it be certainly determined that he is of insane mind, and, therefore, not punishable?

The scope of the question will be more clearly and fully apprehended by here stating some of the rules actually laid down by the courts, at different times, for testing and distinguishing insane action. The tests as first given were quite vague and unprecise, and though more satisfactory results were reached at a later period, there is not even yet any uniform or invariable rule that governs the courts. The law provides justly enough that an act is not punishable when the person, at the time of doing it, was not of free will, owing to mental disease. Lord Coke merely classified persons mentally diseased: "1°. An *ideota*, which from his nativitie by a perpetual infirmity is *non compos mentis*; 2°. He that by sickness, grief, or other accident, wholly loseth his memory and understanding; 3°. A lunatic that hath sometimes his understanding and sometimes not, *aliquando gaudet lucidis intervallis*, and therefore he is called *non compos mentis* so long as he hath not understanding; 4°. He that by his own vicious act for a time depriveth himself of his memory and understanding, as he that is drunken." There is here given no definition of insanity. Lord Hale and others subsequently ruled that there is a partial insanity and a total insanity; that a man may be *non compos mentis quoad hoc*, without being *non compos mentis* altogether; and that "this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter capital;" this rule is still strictly adhered to in England. In 1723, when Arnold was tried for shooting at Lord Onslow, the instruction of the court was that for one to be exempt from punishment in such case, "it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." Mr. Erskine affirmed, at a later period, that "no such madness (*i. e.*, entire privation both of understanding and memory), ever existed in the world." None of these rulings of courts or provisions either furnish any definition of insanity or lay down any determinate test or specific symptom by which an insane reason can be distinguished from reason that is sane or in a normal state. The first attempt made with any degree of genuine success to do this, in explaining the nature of insanity as a plea for criminal violation of law, was made by Erskine in the year 1800, when Hudfield was tried for shooting at the king, a case rendered famous chiefly by Erskine's remarkable speech pronounced at its trial. Erskine affirmed that "delusion" is the test or the distinctive symptom of

that insanity which is the only type of mental disease the courts have to deal with, and that ordinarily admits of any doubt or uncertainty. In the words of Erskine, "Delusion, therefore, where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity;" and we shall see further on that he here assigns a true test of such insanity, understanding insanity in the sense of insane mental action. In the next preceding sentence of his speech he thus expresses more fully the same principle: "These are the cases that frequently mock the wisdom of the wisest in judicial trials; because such persons often reason with a subtlety that puts in the shade the ordinary conceptions of mankind; their conclusions are just, and frequently profound; but the premises from which they reason, when within the range of their malady, are uniformly false; not false from any defect of knowledge or judgment, but because a delusive image, the inseparable companion of real insanity, is thrust upon the subjugated understanding, incapable of resistance because unconscious of attack."

"Delusion," which this sagacious jurist declares to be an unerring test or characteristic of insanity, is variously defined by lawyers and in works on medical jurisprudence. Lord Brougham explained it to be "the belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient." Shelford defines it with less precision to be "the fancying things to exist which can have no existence, and are impossible according to the nature of things, as that trees will walk or statues nod, and which fancy no proof or reasoning will convince." It is plain this last definition does not accurately state the objects of delusion, since they are oftentimes plainly possible things, and even things partly real.

This rule for discerning insane mental action, which was proposed by Erskine, was for many years cited and followed by the courts; and that there is delusion in all insane mental *action* is a truth beyond dispute; there is now no question of mental disease in which reason has *no action* at all. The questions, "What is the general test of mental *disease*?" and "What is the test of insane mental *action*?" regard different matter. The general test of mental disease is the organic lesion in the brain; the test of insane mental action is delusion. But as it is generally conceded to be a fact, proved by experience, that there may be insane delusion which is limited to some particular objects, or class of objects, while the mind has perfectly sane knowledge of all other things, or the mind may be insane on one subject and sane on all others; it was, therefore, argued that one who is under the control of an insane delusion may still be punishable for a criminal violation of law when the matter of his offence does not fall within the range of his delusion. Hereupon a controversy arose among jurists; some main-

taining that "delusion" is not an unerring and adequate test of mental insanity; others asserting that delusion is no test at all of insanity, and this class of minds have now reasoned out their theory to a denial that there is any test of insanity at all, its presence or absence in a given case being merely a question of fact to be decided only by the jury and the experts, which is surely a *reductio ad absurdum*, since no fact can be known, even to experts, except by means of its own specific criteria." That there is no insanity of the species referred to by Erskine without delusion is a certain fact; as to whether a morbid delusion is all that is required for exempting a criminal act from legal punishment is a very different question, about which there are two plausible opinions that are defended.

One school of authorities contend that there is no such thing as monomania, or a delusion that is entirely confined to one object or one class of objects; but the reasons advanced by some of them in defence of this opinion are not genuine, namely, when they affirm as proof that the mind does not consist of compartments or distinct divisions, but it is simple, and therefore when insane at all, the entire mind is insane. Of course the soul is simple; but one who would argue the question raised should first know the elementary truth that insanity is a disease of the brain, and that it is not seated in the soul, which is a spiritual substance; disease is only in a material organ, since matter alone is composed of parts joined to parts, physical agents and reagents acting chemically. It is easy to conceive that the mental action of a person who is under the control of a dominant delusion about one class of things is affected, and more or less impaired in respect to all things, since an ailment in one part of the brain may by sympathy interfere with healthy and normal action throughout that organ; but it is, perhaps, not possible to prove that, as a fact, this invariably happens in monomania.

Those who admit, with Erskine, that delusion is the inseparable companion of mental insanity, but deny that it is an adequate legal test, on the ground that one may have a particular delusion, and yet become guilty of crime that is punishable, labor to discover some one test that will apply to all cases coming before the courts; and some dispose of the difficulty by alleging that the test is "inability to distinguish right and wrong." But this is only shifting the difficulty to another point of view. Ability or inability to distinguish right and wrong is the test of rational knowledge; an infant cannot discern right and wrong, and neither can an insane mind do it. The question must again come back then, What is the test of that insanity which deprives the mind of its power to distinguish right and wrong? We should here keep different mat-

ters in their right relation to each other; *responsibility* comes from power to distinguish right and wrong, and freely choose between them; power thus to distinguish right and wrong, and choose between them, presupposes the mind to be in its healthy normal state, and that the right and wrong are duly presented to it. The question always returns, What is the test of that mental insanity which deprives the mind of its normal state and its normal action? In respect to the type of mental insanity now under consideration, Erskine assigned its specific and uniform symptom; it is delusion, which comes from inability in the mind, caused by disease of the brain, to distinguish mere fancies or images in the morbid imagination from reality.

In order that the courts might, if possible, settle down on some uniform rules and doctrine in respect to this disputed matter, the British Parliament, in 1843, proposed four questions to the judges, with the request that they would agree upon, and report answers. Those questions and their answers were as follows:

"Question I. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusions in respect to one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, when, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?"

Answer of the judges:

"Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the accused did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing the crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand your lordships to mean the law of the land."

They limit this condition to "the law of the land," partly in order to cut off atheistical subterfuges, which, if holding the accused bound by the moral or natural law, might be resorted to by the accused.

"Question II. What are the questions to be submitted to the jury where a person alleged to be affected with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?

"Question III. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?"

Answer to questions II and III:

"As these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we submit our opinion to be, that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man

is to be presumed sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, till the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

"Question IV. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he therefore excused?"

Answer:

"On the assumption that he labors under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation, as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."

According to the doctrine laid down in these answers of the judges, which is still generally adhered to by the courts, both in England and in the United States, in order to judge the moral character of a person's act which is done when such person is under the control of insane delusion on one subject, we must assume that the facts are just what he imagines them to be, and then judge his act by those facts, as if they really existed. If one burns down his neighbor's house, because, as he insanely fancies, God commands him to do so, his act is not criminal; but if he burns the house out of revenge, because his delusion is that his neighbor robbed him of an imaginary fortune, in such case he is guilty, supposing that his mind was sane in all else and he then knew revenge to be unlawful. It is also contended by some authorities that this same rule should be applied in the same manner to the acts of the somnambulist, or of one dreaming and acting under the delusions of his dream; his illusions being regarded as real facts, his acts must be judged accordingly. But this opinion, concerning responsibility for acts done in sleep, does not accord with the facts, as will be seen further on in this article. There is no real consciousness in one dreaming, while there is, as supposed, perfect consciousness in partial insanity, as regards all objects of thought not within the range of the morbid delusion.

What is thus far said concerning the legal and judicial doctrine of insanity and insane action, though not herein developed or analyzed fully, for that would extend this article beyond due limits, will suffice for the object proposed. It is certain that the grave authorities who hold to those principles of medical jurisprudence in adjudging criminal charges against persons pleading insanity as exempting them from punishment, sincerely intend truth and jus-

tice. Many leading members of the medical profession at the present day emphatically condemn the law as applied to partial insanity or monomania, asserting with Maudsley, "when a person is lunatic he is, as Dr. Bucknill has remarked, lunatic to his finger ends." Others of them only deny that delusion is a specific and certain test of such type of mental disease. But in order to determine the value of their theories and criteria of mental insanity, their account of its psychological nature and its relation to sound ethics, we must here consider the results which they profess to have reached and demonstrated. Pinel is credited with first saying that "there are many maniacs who betray no lesion whatever of the understanding, but are under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties alone had sustained injury." Prichard is said to be the first who maintained the theory of moral mania, or that the will, as the "moral sense," may be insane, even when the intellect is perfectly sane, alleging that persons "while laboring under this disorder—of moral insanity—are capable of reasoning or supporting an argument on any subject within their sphere of knowledge that may be presented to them; and they often display great ingenuity in giving reasons for their eccentric conduct, and in accounting for and justifying the state of moral feeling under which they appear to exist." His followers maintain his theory still more explicitly, that moral insanity is a disease of the "moral sense;" that in many instances of it every other faculty of the patient may be in a perfectly healthy condition, and that oftentimes the only symptom which manifests this type of mental disease is depravity of unusual or exceptional species. Hence Maudsley's¹ reflection on the law laid down by the judges in 1843: "How grossly unjust, then, the judicial criterion of responsibility which dooms an insane person of this class to death if he knew what he was doing when he committed a murder!" In such case, this school of teachers hold, the reason is perfectly right, and is completely conscious; it is only the moral sense, the affective faculty, or the will, that is struck with insanity.

But in order to do justice to the doctrine of insanity, as taught in most schools of medicine at this day, it is but fair to let them state for themselves the first principles on which they found their teachings; and then the correctness of their reasoning becomes only a question of valid logic, which is easily disposed of. In-

¹ Body and Mind, lecture ii. In his work on Responsibility in Mental Diseases Maudsley tries to show the falsity of all the tests of insane mental action followed by the civil courts, including that of "delusion." His theory is that the *will* may be insane, even when there is no delusion in the reason, or when the reason is perfectly sane. His doctrine is not likely to be generally followed in practice by the courts, as they must fail to see how a man is not responsible for his acts done deliberately and with perfectly sane judgment as to their moral character.

deed, their first principles are more at fault than their reasoning upon them.

With the results reached by physiologists in accounting for the organic causes of insanity, their description of the lesions in the brain which distinguish the different types of mental disease, there is no question here to be argued; for this being exclusively and specially an object of their science, it may well be conceded, on general principles, that they have made the discoveries which they claim to have made, and that they correctly state the pathology of mental diseases, so far as they affect the brain and the nervous system. It also falls within the province of medical science to describe and explain the phenomena of disordered mental action as a distinctive symptom of this peculiar bodily disease; and it may also be granted that their best authorities do enumerate and describe these facts and manifestations of insanity with much thoroughness, as well as that the medical profession of this day greatly excel all their predecessors by their skill and success in treating disease of the mind. But many leading authorities in this profession go much further and attempt to explain the spiritual world, the nature of man's soul, and the moral order; and to account for them from the standpoint of mere living organism, or of mere organic and nerve function. It is with this part of the doctrine now taught that issue is here to be joined.

The majority of the medical profession holding peculiar views concerning body and mind as only different manifestations of one and the same living physical and homogeneous nature would, perhaps, be perfectly willing to allow Maudsley to speak for them, as he represents the "advanced doctrine," and is probably among the very ablest exponents of the new theories of mind, who have treated the subject *ex professo*; however there are others who push the principles defended by him to further consequences than he does, at least as regards some special questions.

After treating of the intellect or rational principle's healthy and normal action, which he explains to be nothing else than action of "nerve-centres," Maudsley thus introduces his views on the subject of diseased mental action:¹ "I pointed out that the higher mental operations were functions of the supreme nerve-centres; but that, though of a higher and more complex nature than the functions of the lower nerve-centres, they obeyed the same physiological laws of evolution, and could best be approached through a knowledge of them. I now propose to show that the phenomena of the derangement of the mind bear out fully this view of its nature; that we have not to deal with disease of a metaphysical entity, which the method of inductive injury cannot reach, nor the re-

¹ Body and Mind, lecture ii.

sources of the medical art touch, but with disease of the nervous system, disclosing itself by physical and mental symptoms. . . . Clearing then the question as completely as possible from all the haze which metaphysics has cast around it, let us ask,—how comes idiocy or insanity? What is the scientific meaning of them? They are mysterious visitations only because we understand not the laws of their production; appear casualties only because we are ignorant of their causality." A cause that will not produce insanity in one person will do so in another, showing that in the latter case, "there has been a certain hereditary neurosis, an unknown and variable quantity in the equation." "Idiocy is indeed a manufactured article; and, although we are not always able to tell how it is manufactured, still its important causes are known and are within control." He then proceeds to describe, and correctly, various causes which lead to idiocy, as drunkenness in parents, marriage of blood relations, etc. So long as he confines himself to the mere organic lesion, the external symptoms which manifest mental derangement, and the best means of treating the disease with a view to its cure, his language is generally faultless. It is only when Maudsley philosophizes concerning the intrinsic nature of mental action that he is at fault in his conclusions; he is then astray in his reasoning because he starts from wrong first principles.

He thus accounts for the origin of conscience, or, as he more generally styles it, "the moral sense." "But if all mental operations are not in this world equally functions of organization, I know not what warrant we have for declaring any to be so. The solution of the much vexed question concerning the origin of the moral sense seems to lie in the considerations just adduced. Are not, indeed, our moral intuitions results of the operation of the fundamental law of nervous organization by which that which is consciously acquired becomes an unconscious endowment, and is then transmitted as more or less of an instinct to the next generation? . . . There is no greater difficulty in believing that the moral sense may have been so formed, than in believing, what has long been known and is admitted on all hands, that the young fox or young dog inherits as an instinct the special cunning which the foxes and dogs that have gone before it have had to win by hard experience." "A perversion or destruction of the moral sense is often one of the earliest symptoms of mental derangement; as the latest and most exquisite product of mental organization, the highest bloom of culture, it is the first to testify to disorder of the mind-centres." When the "moral sense" alone is insane¹ there is often irresistible

¹ Maudsley regards "punning" and also wit that startles us with the use of an idea in a double sense, as indicating "the insane temperament." Dugald Stuart considers fondness for polemics or religious controversy as a symptom of insanity.

impulse to homicide and other crimes, when the "reason is no further affected than in having lost power to control, or having become the slave of the morbid and convulsive impulse;" and he denounces the injustice of punishing the acts of such a person. He maintains "the essential unity of body and mind;" and regards "the mind as the crowning achievement of organization, and the consummation and outcome of all its energies."

In defending this theory of body and mind philosophically he resorts to Locke's well-known argument: "To those who cannot conceive that any organization of matter, however complex, should be capable of such exalted functions as those which are called mental, is it really more conceivable that any organization of matter can be the mechanical instrument of the complex manifestations of an immaterial mind? Is it not as easy for an omnipotent power to endow matter with mental functions as it is to create an immaterial entity capable of accomplishing them through matter? Is the Creator's arm shortened so that He cannot endow matter with sensation and ideation?" The question may be fairly stated thus: Is it as easy for omnipotent power to make one being with contradictory attributes, or attributes that mutually exclude each other, and are therefore, as expressed by the old authors, not at all compossible, as it is for omnipotent power to make two distinct natures, the attributes of the one excluding the attributes of the other? Is it as easy for omnipotent power to make one figure which is a square circle as it is for omnipotent power to make two figures, one of which is a square and the other a circle? It is possible for body and intellectual spirit to be united into one living compound, as it is possible to inscribe a square in a circle; and, as a fact, man is just such a compound of soul and body; but it is not possible for a material organ to elicit intellectual action, nor is it possible for intellect to elicit the act of an organ, for the two species of action exclude each other, or they have no common property, and are not compatible in one and the same principle; they are of necessity two distinct agents.

As there can be no true theory for explaining the mind's healthy and normal action, unless it recognize the spiritual character of the intellect, so there can be no true or satisfactory explanation of insanity or insane action of the human mind which denies or even ignores the essential and fundamental truth of all genuine mental philosophy, that man's intellect is a faculty of his soul alone, not an organ, not a compound faculty, made up of two factors or components, body and spirit.

Some who agree with the above theory which makes all intellectual or rational operation merely a "function of supreme nerve-centres," oppose the legal principle that one acting under the influ-

ence of insane delusion may, notwithstanding, deserve punishment if he knew his act was criminal at the time he committed it; and they base their argument against this judicial decision, on the principle that "such person has only abstract or speculative knowledge¹ of right and wrong in the case supposed; but one who is thus insane upon real things is not capable of rationally or freely applying this abstract or speculative knowledge to particular realities in a true and normal manner at all as required for the very idea of responsibility." There is surely plausibility in this reasoning. But the premises contain a truth which proves too much as regards the theory that intellect is only a "function of supreme nerve-centres;" for, "abstract and speculative knowledge" can only be in a faculty that knows the universal or immaterial; that is itself *abstracted* from the material. How could there be "abstract or speculative knowledge of right and wrong" in the intellect, which is ideally true, or true as in the ideal order, while, as Erskine correctly words it, "the morbid imagination which constitutes the disease" obtrudes false or distorted images before the intellect, unless we conceive the intellect to be a spiritual faculty that is not capable of sickness, while the imagination is an organic power that is diseased? And, as correctly argued by those who bring this objection against the justice of punishing any one acting under the influence of insane delusion, it is not the "speculative knowledge" that is wrong; it is the application of that knowledge to particular realities which are falsely represented by the imagination, which is erroneous and against reason.

It will now be comparatively easy to conceive what the materialistic medical authorities mean by "moral insanity" whose symptoms are "depraved impulses," "perverted emotions," "motiveless

¹ See Maudsley, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, chapter iv., where he cites Ray on *Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity*, as using the same argument.

St. Thomas, p. 12, qu. 77, a. 2, in answer to the question, "Whether reason can be overcome by passion against reason's knowledge," after distinguishing different manners in which passion may either wholly or partially take from reason its ability to apply abstract universal knowledge to particular things, says, in conclusion, "Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc, quod aliquando cum passiones multum intenduntur homo amittit totaliter usum rationis; multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et iræ sunt in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad iudicium in particulari, contra scientiam, quam habet in universali."

"And that such a thing may happen in the passions is plain from this, that sometimes, when the passions are much intensified, a man entirely loses the use of reason; for many, through excess of love and anger, turn to lunacy. And in this manner passion draws reason to a judgment in a particular matter, which is contrary to the knowledge which it has as universal."

It does not follow, however, from this truth that, as implied by Maudsley's and Ray's argument, a man who is insane or under delusion only on one subject, may not be able to judge truly of other subjects which he knows correctly, and apply a general principle to them rightly.

character of the deeds done," "defective volition," "annihilation of the will-power;" for, in this form of mental disease or mental insanity, their theory is that the principal lesion is in "the volitional nerve-centres," or in those supreme nerve-centres of which all volition is a function. Hence, their instruction to the courts is, in every judicial charge to the jury, the question of fact to be determined is as to whether or not the criminal pleading insanity, while knowing the difference between right and wrong, was able or unable to control his action.

Emotional insanity, pathetic insanity, affective insanity, are expressions used by these authors as synonymous, and they signify with them insanity of the will; for this school of "scientists," like the Stoics of old, confound feelings, or the excitement of mere animal passion, with action of the spiritual part of man, his soul; or rather, the materialist recognizes no spiritual nature at all in man, and, therefore, he regards all his actions as purely that of a living material organism. In accordance with such conception of man's nature, this school of thinking now generally hold that a person's will, which in their theory is only a nerve-centre, may be insane at the same time that the reason of such patient is completely sane, so that one who has this form of insanity may deliberately plan, select the means, and execute a murder, impelled to do so by force of an insane will, though the reason is at the same time perfectly sane, knows the action to be wrong, and reprobates the deed. But, in order to quiet all scruples in religious minds, they gravely assert the superfluous thesis, that "moral insanity is never moral depravity;" yet they do not say anything about the converse of that proposition, they do not assert that "moral depravity is never moral insanity," much as such view of the subject merits their serious attention.

The question is, then, can man's intellect be perfectly sane while his will is, at the same time, truly insane? In other words, can the will alone be insane, or does mental insanity necessarily suppose disorderly, deranged, and abnormal action of the reason, coming from disease of the brain or "nerve-centres?" It is perfectly certain that no one can give any consistent or satisfactory explanation either of the sane action or the insane action of man's superior faculties, the intellect and the will, who confounds intellectual and voluntary action or spiritual action with organic or material operation in man. One who regards the act of the intellect by which it knows the universal truth, the morally good, and the act of the will by which it desires such object, as purely the action of "nerve-centres" in the brain, is not at all provided with the essential first principles for philosophizing on this subject; and

his theorizing could justly apply only to the "brute mind," which includes no spiritual faculty, but only "nerve-centres."

It may be justly affirmed, then, that it is not physically possible for the will to be truly insane while the same person's intellect is really sane or in its perfectly normal state.

To know the nature of an end, correctly judge its moral character, rightly to judge and select means, and then accomplish that end as the work or object intended, precisely constitute that operation over which man's reason has empire or free voluntary control. The choice which the will may exercise between delusory objects presented to it by the insane reason is not that rational free choice which is required for responsible action; for, when the reason is insane, the will's ability to choose is not that of genuine rational liberty; the will inclines to, or averts itself from, the objects, just as those objects are apprehended and presented by the intellect. The will is sane or insane according as the intellect is sane or insane. The will is really a faculty of the reason itself, for it is one and the same reason that judges and chooses an end and the means to that end; and it is not correct to conceive the will either as a mere organic function, or as being a something really separated or distinct from the reason. Hence, the will is very appropriately styled by the schoolmen the "rational appetite," it being the reason's faculty of appetite, or power of desiring and choosing. It follows, therefore, that insanity of the will would be insanity of the reason itself; and that abnormal action of the will necessarily presupposes abnormal action of the reason, which must present to the will its objects in order for the will to act at all; in other words, the act of reason is included in an act of the will, and is inseparable from it.

Emotional insanity, affective insanity, pathetic insanity, cannot be more nor less than abnormal action of the animal passions or sensible appetites in man, which are so sudden and violent in their disordered movement as to dethrone the reason and take away its mastery or control over the person's action. This sudden, violent, and overpowering movement of passion or bodily feelings is also styled impulsive insanity, for the obvious reason that it strongly and suddenly impels to action, its violence or force coming from the passion or affection that is abnormally excited. Such emotion or impulse in the human organism anticipates all deliberation or rational choice, or it precedes all comparison and judgment in the reason; for the superior faculties of the soul then have not their usual healthy action, as we must suppose, owing to a diseased state of the "nerve-centres" in the brain, which interrupts the right presentation of objects to the intellect.

While we must grant the possibility of reason and its appetite, the will, being either suddenly and momentarily overcome by in-

tense feelings, and even more or less permanently deprived of their normal sway, by unhealthy violence of emotion or passion in the bodily organism, the reason and the will, which are not faculties of the body or of nerve-centres in the brain, but faculties of the soul alone, are intrinsically united in the soul, and they are not, in themselves, capable of sickness. The soul itself, being a spiritual substance, is not diseased, though the natural and normal action of its faculties, the reason and the will, is disturbed, disordered, and it may be either partially or completely deranged in their action, through disease in the brain organs or "supreme nerve-centres" which minister to the intellect the objects of its thought. No well-attested fact either of the mind's sane action or of its insane action furnishes any proof whatever that, the intellect and the will are "purely functions of supreme nerve-centres in the brain;" man's superior or spiritual faculties, the intellect and will, manifest their specific spiritual character, whether the organs that extrinsically serve the intellect with its objects be in a healthy and normal state, or in an unhealthy and abnormal state; just as in the analogous case of the eye, whose action of seeing objects reflected from the smooth mirror does not lose its specific character as the eye's action when it sees objects as misshapen and distorted by a mirror whose surface is ruffled with undulations and angles. It is not at all necessary, in order to explain the facts adduced to prove the existence of what is styled "impulsive insanity," or what is by some miscalled "moral insanity," either to assume that man has "a moral sense," or that the will is susceptible of insanity which is not shared by the intellect.¹ How can there be "a moral sense?" How is it possible that there should be a sense whose object is that which is not sensible, or transcends all sense power? The sense can know a sensible object; but no such faculty can apprehend that object's relation to an abstract universal law, and this is required for knowing the moral character of objects. Conscience is not "a moral sense," or any sense-power, for, if it were, then there is no reason why a brute should not have conscience. The sensible feelings of remorse, self-reproach, or self-approval are effects produced in the bodily organism by conscience; but conscience itself is an act of the reason by which it applies the moral law here and now to a deliberate choice of the will; an organ of the body is wholly incapable of such act, since it cannot apprehend the moral law, which is expressed in an abstract universal

¹ Doubtless Maudsley and his school state correctly the symptomatic facts manifesting the character of different mental diseases; but the materialistic theory which they follow in accounting for them philosophically envelops their speculations in much confusion and inconsistency.

idea and is in itself considered something purely of the intelligible order.

To suppose that a man of perfectly sane reason can plan an evil work, and deliberately execute it by chosen means, and though knowing it at the same time to be evil, is compelled to do it by an insane will, is surely to make a supposition that destroys itself.

Not a few medical authorities urge upon the courts to recognize as an established principle that "repeated crimes, being symptoms of morbid perversion of moral sentiments, should in all cases be treated as disease." In truth, repeated crimes in one who gives no other sign of mental disease is proof only of moral depravity. A man of sane reason is always responsible for the government of his passions and evil inclinations, and they cannot deprive his will of its liberty, except by deposing reason from its normal rule; for the will cannot be forced to elicit its acts by any degree of passion while reason is in its normal state. Properly speaking, the will cannot be *forced* to act by any object or power.

One who has the "St. Vitus's dance" may have so little control over the movements of his body as against his will, and in spite of his reason, to run over the precipice or into the ditch. In such case there is nervous and muscular action of which he has no voluntary government, though his reason is perfectly sane; but it is sickly and disorderly action of his body, and is done only mechanically. It is also easy to conceive certain bodily passions or emotions, acting with sickly and abnormal violence, to override the reason and cause acts of "impulsive insanity;" but the reason and will could have no share in the deed, since it would not be a deliberate action, as we suppose. Admitting the facts as usually related in this connection concerning kleptomania and other forms of monomania coming from insane passion, they can be explained only by assuming that the reason is bereft of its normal sway when the acts are done; for if the reason have sane action and there be deliberate choice by the will, such acts would be fully responsible. The deeds of one under the control of insane passion or impulse are not imputable, in the supposition that the action of his members and faculties is, by consequence of the disease, taken from under the empire of his reason and will.

It is not exclusively the office of the physician or of the physiologist, as already affirmed, to account for insane mental action; it strictly belongs only in part to him, in so far, namely, as the insanity is an organic ailment, a nervous disorder, a lesion of the body, and has certain manifestations in the mind as symptoms of the disease. It is for that profession to give the pathology of insanity and define rules for its diagnosis; the essential distinction between spiritual or intellectual action and organic bodily action

belongs to the domain of psychology or the philosophy of mind. It follows, then, that the physician who attempts to philosophize concerning the intrinsic nature of spiritual or intellectual action, without having duly informed himself as to what principles are demonstratively proved in the philosophy of mind, cannot possibly furnish any but a crude and more or less inconsistent explanation of the facts observable either in healthy or unhealthy mental operations. One who is unable to discriminate between intellectual or volitional action and organic or nerve action, is also unable to refer correctly and rightfully the actions of an insane mind to their true and proper causes. He could be persuaded that man has "a moral sense," which is capable of insanity, and that, when thus afflicted, his will may become wholly insane, even when his reason or intellect remains perfectly sane; and that, although a person of sane reason who contrives and executes a criminal work is responsible if ever man is responsible for his deliberate acts, since thus doing a work includes all the conditions for responsible action, yet, even in that case, the person may be truly irresponsible because of only obeying the irresistible impulse of an insane will. This kind of theorizing misrepresents both the medical science and the teachings of genuine philosophy; and it appears to have for its chief final aim to bring about the identification of moral depravity with mental insanity, or to defend the hypothesis that great moral depravity is mental insanity, and is one of its distinctive symptoms.

It is possible for one whose mind is really insane to contrive a work, select the means, and execute his plan, his reason being under the control of a fixed dominant idea or image of the fancy that deludes him, producing in his mind abnormal action, deception, false judgments concerning the moral character of the deed on which he is intent. When reason, which must present to the will objects of choice, is insane, the will, as wholly dependent on it, must be insane also, and in a corresponding degree, for the will must follow the reason; its freedom is not then rational freedom. This form of mental disease is technically styled monomania, and it is the species of madness which presents the subject of insanity under an aspect the most interesting, the most difficult, and at the same time the most important, whether as regards medical jurisprudence or the philosophy of mind. We shall here consider the condition of the intellect when under such thralldom, and the nature of its action in such case, from the standpoint of psychology or the philosophy of mind. Excluding from the consideration, then, all questions as to idiocy and frenzy or raging mania, in which the specific action of intellect and will is scarcely discernible at all, and confining the argument entirely to "delusional insanity," *i. e.*, insane mental action, it seems to me that the symptom, the distinc-

tive characteristic, the specific sign or mark of that form of mental disease is correctly said by Erskine to be delusion, understanding delusion as Lord Brougham defines it: "The belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient." Just as one who is fully under the influence of a dream does not doubt, and even cannot doubt, the truth and reality of the images then obtruded by the imagination before his intellect, no matter how absurdly it may combine impossible elements, so neither can one who is fully under the control of insane delusion doubt the truth and reality of the sickly phantasms before his intellect. His only medium of knowing realities as they are, and therefore as truly presented to his intellect, is the imagination; and, at the same time, the imagination being diseased, cannot fulfil its normal function, cannot be the witness against itself, but forms images of them that are false, and even impossible, and objects them before the intellect as being things actual, the intellect being entirely unable to know any objects except as thus presented to it.

The delusory image, then, is invincibly mistaken for reality; it is not truly judged, it cannot be truly or rightly judged. Whether that delusion be in the mind of one dreaming or in a mind insane from brain disease, its illusory character remains the same. It will be interesting here to give St. Thomas's explanation of the manner in which the false and delusory images in the fancy of one dreaming cut off the intellect's communication with realities. He maintains that what is done under the influence of a dream is, in itself, never imputable to the person, a doctrine which is followed by theologians and casuists in general to this day.

In his *Summa*, p. 1, qu. 84, a. 8, he lays down the principle, "It is impossible that there should be a perfect judgment of the intellect in us while the sense is bound through which we know sensible things." He gives as reason, "the object proportioned to our intellect in our present state of existence is the nature of sensible things. But there can be no perfect judgment of anything unless all is known that belongs to it, and especially if one should be ignorant of that which is the term and end of the judgment. All things now understood by us are known only by a comparison of them to sensible things. Although intellect is superior to sense, yet it in some manner receives from sense, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. Therefore, it follows necessarily that the intellect's judgment is impeded by a bondage of the sense."¹

¹ Impossibile est quòd sit in nobis iudiciu intellectûs perfectu cum ligamento sensus per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. Propriu objectu intellectui nostro proportionatu est natura rei sensibilis. Iudiciu autem perfectu de re aliqua dari non

He goes on to observe: "A man sometimes judges while dreaming that what he then sees is a dream, in some manner distinguishing between real things and unreal likenesses of things. But, nevertheless, the *sensus communis* (sensorium, sensory) is, to some extent, bound; and although it may discriminate certain mere appearances from the real things, nevertheless it is always deceived in some things. Hence, those who argue (syllogizant) in sleep, always find when they awake that they were deceived in something." On this account he decides p. 22, qu. 154, a. 5, that one is not responsible for what he does in sleep. "There is no one who, when dreaming, is not actuated by certain likenesses of phantasmata, just as if they were the things themselves; and therefore what a dreaming man does who has not a free judgment of reason is not imputed to him in blame, just as what one does who is mad or out of his mind is not imputed to him as culpable." He affirms that a man's character, personal habits, virtues, or vices, when awake, may sometimes be indicated by the turn which his dreams take, as St. Augustine has observed (12, 15, *Super. Gen. ad Lit.*), "on account of the soul's good disposition some of its merit may shine out even in sleep."¹ Again, "the use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, but, nevertheless, it is always impeded as to something, so that it cannot have free judgment; and therefore, what one then does is not imputed to him as culpable." In reply to an objection, he adds: "The reason's apprehension is not hindered in sleep to the same extent as its judgment; the judgment is perfected by conversion to sensible things which are first principles of human thought."

The theory for explaining sleep once generally taught was that, in such state, the "*sensus communis*" or the sensorium in the brain of one sleeping suspends its action, causing the external senses also to suspend their action. But the imagination and the organic memory do not cease all action unless in deep sleep. As the "*sensus communis*" or sensory of the brain, which is the organ in which and by which all the sensations or impressions received by the external senses are reduced to the unity of consciousness, may be only partly in action; and when this happens one may actually know that he is dreaming, just as in partial insanity one may know that his delusory image is unreal. This "*sensus communis*" is,

potest nisi ea omnia quæ ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et præcipue si ignoraretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Omnia autem quæ in præsentī statu intelligimus cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles. Ad. 2: quam vis intellectus sit superior sensu accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu et ejus objecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quòd impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.

¹ Propter bonam animæ affectionem quædam ejus merita etiam in somnis clarent.

1st, the principle of the external senses; 2d, it is the terminus of external sensations where they are reduced to unity, as sensations of one and the same living animal nature. This sensory informs the waking sane fancy with images coming from real things, which are then seen as real things and known as real things; but in the dream the fancy or imagination can form images not then furnished to it by the sensory, and not coming, therefore, from real things, but only originated by the imagination out of its own resources. The fact is well known that the fancy can preserve and reproduce its images once received, a faculty not possessed by the retina of the eye in respect to its images; and also the fancy can variously combine images once formed in it, so as to compose the likenesses of other objects. When one is awake the imagination may be made to form these combinations under the direction of reason; in dreaming the imagination is not subject to the direction of reason. As the intellect of one dreaming, or of one under the control of insane delusion, cannot compare these fallacious images to real things, since it is cut off from communication through the imagination and the external senses with real things, it is unable to find out or even suspect the unreality of such images. In such case it is the imagination that presents false images, and at the same time it is the imagination which must furnish the true images of real things, by means of which the intellect is to discover its deception, if it does so at all; two offices which the imagination cannot perform at one and the same time; for it cannot act both as sane and as insane in presenting the same images.

Speaking of the insane, he says:¹ "The mad or those out of their minds are wanting in the use of reason, *per accidens*; namely, on account of some impediment in the bodily organ, but not from a defect of the rational soul, as it is with brute animals, and hence, in regard to them, it is a different question." Again: "Insanity" is taken for this, that the human mind falls away from the due condition which man's nature requires; and this happens either by his losing the use of reason, and it may be also in respect to the power of appetite, as when one loses human affection."

In regard to affective or emotional insanity, he thus speaks, explaining its cause: "From the very fact that appetite is vehemently affected toward a certain thing, it can happen that the man from

¹ "Furiosi vel amentes carent usu rationis per accidens, scilicet propter aliquod impedimentum organi corporalis; non autem propter defectum animæ rationalis; unde de his non est similis ratio." P. 3, qu. 68, a. 12, ad 2.

² "Insania animæ accipitur per hoc quod anima humana recedit a debita dispositione humanæ speciei. Quod quidem contingit et secundum rationem, puta cum aliquis amittit usum rationis; et quantum ad vim appetitivam, puta cum aliquis amittit affectum humanum." P. 22. qu. 157, a. 3, ad 3.

violence of the affection is taken away from all other things.¹ There is in man a double appetite, namely, the intellective, which is called will, and the sensitive, which is styled sensuality. Therefore a man may get beside himself (either above or below his normal state), through appetite, in two manners. In one manner when the intellective appetite (or will), leaving aside all those things towards which sensitive appetite inclines, wholly tends towards divine things. In a second manner is the appetite rapt away when, superior appetite being put aside, a man is borne entirely towards things that pertain to inferior appetite. This has not the nature of rapture (involuntary and total alienation of the superior faculties and of self-control), unless perchance the passion be so vehement that it wholly takes away the use of reason, as happens in those who become insane through violence of anger or love. Each one of these excesses coming through the appetite can cause excess in the knowing faculty, either because the mind being taken away from the senses is rapt to certain intelligible things (things of the intelligible or spiritual order), or because the mind is rapt to some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition." It is plain that if this image in the fancy, which thus subjugates the reason, is fixed, such a one is of insane mind, and the violent and ruling affection will not be merely transitory.

Some conclusions furnished by psychology or the philosophy of mind, which must guide our investigations of insane mental action as indispensably as mathematics must direct us in solving the problems of mechanics, despite Maudsley's unreasonable and repeated sneer at "metaphysics," may now be stated and applied to the present subject-matter:

1st. The specific note or mark of insane *mental action* is delusion, as affirmed by Erskine. There may be delusion that regards only some particular class or classes of objects, and this is partial insanity, the reason then knowing correctly other objects presented to it by the external and internal senses, and those objects are also

¹ "Ex hoc enim ipso quòd appetitus ad aliquid vehementer afficitur, potest contingere quòd ex violentia affectûs homo ab omnibus aliis alienetur." P. 22, qu. 175, a. 2 ad 2: "In homine est duplex appetitus, scilicet intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas et sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas. Dupliciter ergo homo secundum appetitum potest fieri extra seipsum. Uno modo quando intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, prætermisiss his in quæ inclinat appetitus sensitivus. Alio modo quando prætermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quæ pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem. . . . Deficit a ratione raptûs, nisi fortè tam vehemens passio sit, quòd usum rationis totaliter tollat; sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam iræ vel amoris insaniunt. Uterque excessus secundum appetitum existens, potest causare excessum cognoscitivæ virtutis, vel quia mens ad quædam intelligibilia rapiatur alienatur a sensibus, vel quia rapiatur ad aliquam imaginariam visionem seu phantasticam apparitionem."

presented as they are really and truly. But if the imagination offers none except delusory images, the condition of the reason is then like to its state in dreaming, when by suspended action of the "sensus communis," or common sensory in the brain, it is entirely cut off from all communication with the order of real things, the impressions made on the external senses not reaching it in a normal manner at all. In madness of this type the patient cannot know rightly any real object that is brought before him, since, in his state, the diseased imagination cannot present an actual and truthful image of any objects to his intellect. It may be inferred, perhaps, that in such form of mental disease, in which the imagination has none but delusory images, the disease is not wholly confined to the imagination; but there may also sometimes be lesion of the "sensus communis" or sensory, whose office is to reduce the external sensations to the unity of internal consciousness, understanding "consciousness" in a wide sense, so as to include even that power by which a brute may be said to know that it sees, to know that it hears; know that it feels, etc., and a brute has sensible knowledge of these impressions received.

2d. Affective insanity, emotional insanity, pathetic insanity, impulsive insanity, which, as before observed, are different names employed to present one and the same thing under different respects, all arise from abnormal action of the animal passions, feelings, and appetites caused by organic lesion or disease. When the impulse of such passion or feelings is so violent or abnormal as to take away the use of right reason, then the consequent action of such patient will be insane and, by consequence, irresponsible. Should the impulse of such feelings and passions or appetites not be so violent as to overpower and take away the use of right reason, then the deliberate yielding to such impulse and doing criminal or unlawful actions would not be insanity, but it would be in its degree moral depravity. This impulsive or emotional insanity,¹ which takes away the use of right reason, may perhaps be only occasional and transitory, as seems to happen in kleptomania; or it may produce more or less permanent dethronement of the reason, accompanied by delusions which, of one kind or another, are as inseparable from all insane mental action as they are from all real dreaming.

3d. It will be more easily understood how all mental insanity is proximately caused by diseased or abnormal action of the imagination, if we rightly conceive the true function of that brain-power

¹ "An interesting circumstance in connection with this morbid impulse is that its convulsive activity is sometimes preceded by a feeling very like the *aura epileptica*—a strange morbid sensation, beginning in some part of the body, and rising gradually to the brain."—Body and Mind, lecture ii., Maudsley.

when its action is healthy and normal. The office of the imagination is to present the images of objects primarily derived by it from impressions on the external senses before the intellect; and the intellect itself forms all its ideas, no matter how abstract they may be, only by directing its action towards these images, or as turned towards them. In no other manner can the intellect even think its own thoughts, think of them, or reproduce any of its own ideas, than by converting itself towards their objects as somehow mirrored before it in the imagination. One who reflects attentively on what takes place in his own mind when thinking, will observe this fact for himself; and he will notice that the intellect, as it were, looks outward from itself, to what is extrinsic to itself, and that the representations before it and extrinsic to it are always clothed in some or other sensible properties, among which are certain relations of place and extension. Whenever we think, then, we look towards the images in the imagination as at something which is extrinsic to our intellects, and we cannot even think of our own intellectual ideas as objects, or, in other words, make them the objects of our thoughts, except by embodying them or imagining them under some form in the imagination. If the intellect was not thus entirely dependent, in thinking, on this extrinsic ministry of the imagination, disease or lesion of this organ in the brain would not then deprive it of its ability to know and think of real things by means of true ideas of those things. But the intellect's actual condition is like that the eye would be in, if it were so situated that it could see no object whatever, whether above, below, to one side or to the other, unless that object were presented to it as reflected from a mirror placed before it. If this mirror were perfect it would truly image the objects; but if it were furrowed, indented, irregular, or filled with various flaws, it could give only distorted, fragmentary, and false images of the objects reflected by it, and, hence, the eye's vision would be false in a corresponding manner. Such dependence of the eye on the mirror would be very analogous to that which the intellect has, in all its acts, on the imagination; and disorder or defect in this mirror before the intellect also disturbs or falsifies its perceptions and ideas, in a degree corresponding to the injury which is in the organ.

It may be easily perceived, by reflecting on our own thoughts, that these images in the imagination are of a material nature, or are made out of what is part of matter, since they so plainly possess the qualities of matter, as size, or some property of extension, some respect of color, or other qualities of material things that are derived by the imagination from impressions on the external senses. Indeed, who can say that some Kepler may not yet make the physical discovery of the material phantasmata at a nerve-centre in

the brain, as the philosopher by that name actually physically discovered and verified the fact that, in ocular vision, perfect images of objects when seen are projected on the retina of the eye? It had long before been demonstrated by the philosophy of mind that the eye must acquire images of the objects seen by it. Kepler actually discovered the now well-known physical fact that the eye forms these images.

4th. There is no such faculty in man as "a moral sense," nor could there exist such faculty in the nature of things. There is a popular use of such expressions as "good sense" for correctness in apprehending and judging practical things, and less commonly "moral sense" applied to a conscience that is exact and steadfast in dictating what is right and condemning what is wrong; and these forms of language may be justified. But what is herein denied is that the will of man can be only an organ in the brain or a mere nerve-centre. *Sense* is an organ of the living body, and therefore it is body, bodily; but, being itself matter, it cannot transcend the sphere of material action. Matter can never have action which is wholly immaterial, for this is a contradiction in terms. Now, the moral character of an action or an object arises from the relation of that action or object to the norma of right reason; but this norma of right reason totally and absolutely transcends all matter and all the physical predicates of matter; it follows, then, that it cannot be apprehended by a bodily organ, whose object must always be physically extended and material. Hence, to say that "the moral sense may become perverted or insane," is unmeaning language, since there is no such sense in man at all. Perversion of the will's affections in one who has lost the use of reason gives no proof whatever that the will is a sense or an organ in the brain; such perversion is from disorder in the reason's action, caused by a diseased imagination, through which the reason has lost its control over the feelings and passions, since it has lost its ability to judge rightly.

5th. A man's will cannot be insane while at the same time his reason is really and truly sane. Man as a rational being has but one superior mental power, strictly and radically, and that power is reason, which possesses, as its virtues or faculties, intellect, will, and memory. Reason and will are not really separated from each other, but they intrinsically constitute one principle, which is capable of both knowing or judging and choosing. Will, as distinguished by us from reason, is blind, and is incapable of any action till reason proposes its objects. Error or falsity is only in a faculty which is capable of knowledge, and therefore there can be no disorderly, insane, or deluded action of the will which does not come from insane or deluded action of the reason in presenting to the will its

objects. The will, then, is of itself incapable of being deceived or deluded, because it is incapable of knowledge; it is a mere appetite of the reason, or the reason's power of inclining towards objects which that reason apprehends as good. There can be no insane mental or bodily action in man, therefore, which does not spring from that lost use of right reason which is caused by a diseased state of the imagination.

6th. In accordance with the foregoing doctrine, concerning the nature and connection of man's superior faculties, it is a generally received principle in ethics that no violence of passion or force of impulse can carry away the will, or compel its act of choosing, except by previously obscuring and overturning sane reason.¹ It is an undeniable fact that violent passions or emotions may take away the use of right reason by injuring the brain. The will intrinsically elicits or puts forth its own acts, and it is the complete principle that determines its own choice in all those things that fall under the empire of reason, whereas force is extrinsic violence, which cannot reach the will's own immanent act, or share in the act as intrinsically elicited by the will. Man's animal appetites, and all the appetites and inclinations of the brute animal, promptly obey the "predominant motive;" but man's rational appetite, the will, can choose either the stronger or the weaker motive, or it can freely refuse to choose at all either the one or the other.

7th. No one is really and truly *non compos mentis*, or of insane mind, unless he has lost the free use of right reason through a diseased state of the imagination, either in regard to some objects only, or in regard to many objects. It may happen, it doubtless does happen, that, owing to special nervous lesions, a man may suffer sudden and violent impulses of feeling, emotion, or passion, which cause in him a transitory and sometimes a permanent privation of right reason, and for this he may be in nowise responsible. But to say that a man whose reason is perfectly sane and right may, by impulse of insane emotion or passion, determine on perpetrating an unlawful and criminal deed, select the means for its

¹ "Unde si sit talis passio, quæ totaliter involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, alioquin non totaliter. . . . Si verò causa non fuerit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex ægitudine vel aliqua hujusmodi causa incidit in talem passionem, quæ totaliter aufert usum rationis, actus omnino redditur involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter excusatur a peccato."—St. Thomas, Summa, p. 12, qu. 77, a. 7.

"Hence if the passion be such as to render the act following from it wholly involuntary it wholly excuses from sin; otherwise it does not wholly excuse. . . . If, indeed, the cause was not voluntary, but natural, as when one from disease or any cause of the kind falls into such a passion as entirely takes away from him the use of reason, the act is rendered altogether involuntary, and by consequence it is wholly excused from sin."

accomplishment, and actually carry out the work, while at the same time his right reason reprobates the action, which, however, he is compelled by an insane will to do, is to state a case whose conditions destroy themselves. It is surely nonsense to say that when a man of sane reason deliberately resolves to do a future action, selects the means, and then deliberately fulfils his purpose, he is not therein a free agent, since such action would include all the conditions, and that without any exception, for an act that is completely and perfectly free. There may be involuntary impulses, feelings, and diseased nervous action of various kinds in a person who, though diseased, is of right reason, but the action of such a one is merely physical and mechanical; there is then no object resolved on, no means deliberately selected, for his action is not designed, it is not at all voluntary. It follows, therefore, that there can be no such thing as "annihilation of the will power," except as consequent upon a previous "annihilation" of the reason itself.

The imagination, as heretofore said, may be so injured by its lesions as to object before the intellect few genuine and true images of real things, as happens with idiots and with some maniacs; or it may offer some defective and delusory images, but yet present true, real, and healthy representations to the intellect, of all other things. Were the imagination to offer no images at all but delusory ones, the condition of the intellect would then be perfectly analogous to its state in a dream; were the imagination to offer before the intellect no images of any kind, true or false, the condition of the intellect would be as it is when a person is in a deep sleep, or, rather, as it is when the person is in a comatose state.¹

We may conclude, then, that the subject or the seat of the disease called mental insanity, which takes away the free use of right reason, is the imagination, not the reason itself, though it impedes or wholly mars the reason's action. A living bodily organ is susceptible of disease, because it can be decomposed, can have part violently torn from part, and be dissolved into its constituents; but the reason, being a perfectly simple faculty, and not composed of tissues, or material parts joined to parts, cannot be acted on by chemical forces, cannot be decomposed or dissolved, and, therefore, it cannot be diseased. From the fact that, as we are now constituted or as we are existing in this life, the intellect is wholly dependent on the imagination in all its thought, it can never think

¹ The scientific weekly, *Nature*, of August 7th, 1879, says: Delusion, really, in its widest sense, may be said to constitute the essence of insanity.

It is certainly true that there can be no insane mental *action* without delusion. When the reason can have no action at all, it is because the imagination is incapable of presenting any images, whether true or false; and the mind's condition then is that of complete inanition.

of anything or form any idea at all unless the imagination represent before it the extrinsic object of its thought or idea under the form of some or other image or likeness. The seat of the disease is, therefore, the imagination, which is an organ in the brain; and this is confirmed by the positive discoveries of science, as Dr. Hammond with others bears witness: "Even in the most striking instances of what is called transitory mania, or morbid impulse, the evidences of pre-existent and subsequent disease of the brain will be found, if they are looked for with skill and diligence and intelligence."¹ Were this lesion in the brain distinctly and specifically known, it would constitute a general physiological criterion of mental disease. But, as yet, the "nerve-centre" whose function is imagination, is not ascertained. While delusion is the criterion of insane mental *action*, the general criterion of mental *disease* cannot be deranged mental action, since the mind has no discernible action in some types of mental disease; it must, therefore, be some different symptom from disordered action of the reason.

8th. In order to conceive insane mental action correctly and truly it is necessary first to understand rightly the manner in which the healthy human mind naturally forms its ideas of objects, and to know clearly the dependence of the intellect on the imagination for presentation of all the objects of its thoughts and ideas. It is not less necessary also to conceive the imagination to be a sense or an organ in the brain, and that the intellect is of a simple and spiritual nature, and not a sense or a "nerve-centre" in the brain, as Maudsley falsely affirms. One who is in possession of these preliminary truths will be greatly helped towards understanding the manner in which the reason is controlled by those insane delusions in all types of diseased mental action, by reflecting attentively on the action of his own reason in dreams which he distinctly remembers to have had. He will thus prepare himself to study the action of the human reason when it is under the control of a morbid imagination, which is the proximate cause or reason of mental insanity.

Finally, there are learned members of the medical profession who merit great praise for the invaluable service to the philosophy of mind which they are rendering by their discoveries in the physiology of the nervous system, and for the advancement made by them in the successful treatment of mental insanity, and also, what is pertinent to the subject of this article, for the proof which they furnish that there is actually some lesion of the brain in all forms

¹ *Insanity in Relation to Crime*. New York, 1873, p. 75. Maudsley, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, ch. i.

of mental disease. But when some of them, with Maudsley, proceed farther and try to interweave their science with a materialistic philosophy of mind, they surely go beyond their own premises ; they lay down principles and assert conclusions which are not only false in physiology because false in philosophy, but which are false in philosophy because false in physiology. They certainly cannot claim to have demonstrated by means of forceps and microscope that the act of knowing universal and abstract truth, and the act of freely choosing moral good are functions of "supreme nerve-centres." No one can give any consistent explanation either of the human reason's sane action or of its insane action, on the hypothesis that man's reason is a material organ, a mere nerve-centre. Man's reason retains and manifests its spiritual character, both in its sane operation and in its action when under the control of insane delusion in the morbid imagination. The sane action of human reason cannot be explained satisfactorily without admitting reason to be an immaterial and spiritual faculty, which forms its ideas of objects with the extrinsic aid of the imagination mirroring before it the representations of those objects under some or other images or species of likeness. Nor can the insane action of man's reason be accounted for scientifically except by admitting it to be an immaterial and spiritual power, yet totally dependent for its objects, in forming ideas and thinking, on the ministration of the imagination, which must somehow mirror those objects under sensible forms before it, but which being deranged by disease of the brain, is incapable of imaging or representing those objects in a normal manner, and as they are really and truly ; on which account the insane reason's ideas and judgments are rendered in a corresponding degree abnormal and false. The "scientists" are evidently correct in denying that "delusion" is the test of all mental disease, since there can be no delusion when the disease of the brain is such that the mind has no action ; but delusion is the true test of insane mental action, the only type of insanity in regard to which "either a case of conscience" can arise for the casuist or the civil courts require any special definition, test, or rule, on which to instruct the jury. But the theory maintained by these "scientists" that the human will may be really insane and thereby entirely lose its freedom, even when the same person's reason is perfectly sane and is not under the influence of any morbid delusion, is surely false, and it must prove mischievous in practical life if generally admitted by society as true.

To sum up the main theses concerning mental insanity proposed in this article: 1st. The general physiological test or criterion of mental disease is lesion of the brain ; but the exact seat of that lesion in the brain is not yet certainly determined by physiologists.

2d. The test or criterion of insane mental action is morbid delusion. 3d. There is affective or emotional insanity, which may be either transitory or permanent, and it is caused by disordered passions, feelings, nervous excitement, so violent as to take away the use of right reason. 4th. Affective, emotional, or impulsive insanity can be styled "moral insanity," in the sense that this affective insanity may be accompanied with perverse action of the will, caused by abnormal force of passion or feeling that has deprived the person of sane reason. But it would be wholly incorrect, however, to use the expression "moral insanity" to signify insanity that is limited to the will alone, as if the will could be truly insane when the reason is really and entirely sane.

THE STACK-O'HARA CASE.

Report of R. P. Allen, Esq., Master in Chancery. Submitted January 8th, 1875.

Opinion of the Court and Decree. James Gamble, President Judge, November 13th, 1877.

Opinion of the Supreme Court. Delivered by Justice Mercur, October 8th, 1879.

THERE was a time in our history when the mere fact of a citizen's being intrusted with judicial functions was of itself *prima facie* evidence of his possessing a high sense of honor and rectitude, and a guarantee of his incorruptibility and unswerving devotion to all that truth and justice demanded of him in that elevated position. In the settled conviction that he knew his duty and would conscientiously discharge it, there was a feeling of tranquil security for all, whether voluntary suitors in court, or drawn thither against their inclination. And he who was worsted in the encounter either gracefully yielded, or had only the doubtful satisfaction of setting up his own opinion against that of the judge, without daring to impugn his motives.

The rising generation came into being since that day, but there are those yet living who saw it, and who deeply regret that they will never see it again. It was when judges were not chosen by the people because they happened to be members of this or that party, but appointed by the constituted authorities because they were known to be skilled in the law, honest and impartial men. The good old practice yet prevails in one of the oldest and noblest

of our commonwealths, and the consequence is that she can point to the record of her judges as one of the brightest pages in her domestic annals. The sovereign people, as the Demos is flatteringly called, may be competent to decide on the qualifications of a legislator or member of Assembly. It is not, and cannot be, competent to pronounce on the merits of him who is to preside in a court of justice. The claims of party and all the other interests (sordid and degrading at times) that are connected with politics contribute to his election, and it is greatly to be feared may sway his course upon the bench, as it does that of others in the halls of legislation. Even where there is no room for suspecting any gross outrage upon law and justice for party ends, yet too often the public opinion that prevails in the party that elected him, with its subtle influence, will creep in imperceptibly, warp his judgment, and deaden that delicate sense of right and wrong which he may naturally feel, and which he would most probably follow were he wholly untrammelled in his decisions. The evil, or its danger, is inseparable from the system; and where one rises superior to all temptation, a dozen others succumb to this fatal influence. It is not pleasant for an honest man to know that snares and pitfalls may await him, even within the sacred precincts of the Temple of Justice. What will his consciousness of right avail him, or, in the language of the old dramatist,

“What has innocence to hope for,
When those who sit her judges are corrupted?”

or are liable to be so? Not corrupted by bribes, or intimidation, or reckless partisanship,—the writer thinks it neither necessary nor becoming to suppose this,—but by the taint of what is called public opinion. For this may be, and often is, unjust and wicked; and its baneful influence, however refined and impalpable, deserves the name of corruption, since it poisons and corrupts the administration of justice in its very sources.

All this will be looked on, and possibly denounced, as old foggyism—as the language of a man who is behind the age. At all events it is no treason; and the writer sees no harm in expressing an opinion which, apart from common-sense, long experience and observation have forced on the mind of one who, with more honest intent than far-travelled Ulysses,

“*Mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes.*”

He has no wish to bring back the old state of things, for no one desires the impossible. The absurd notion that the people is the proper judge at the polls to decide who is best fitted to sit as a judge upon the bench, is now as deeply rooted in the popular mind as the other no less extravagant belief, that the knowledge

of what are vulgarly called "the three R's" is of itself sufficient to develop any school-boy into a good member of society and law-abiding citizen. The American people, or most of them, have become so wedded to these idols (not of domestic but of foreign make) that their removal is not to be thought of. Yet one may be allowed to hold, and even modestly to state, a different opinion, unterrified by the great crowd that thinks otherwise. For in matters of this kind, as the old saying has it, great numbers rather tell unfavorably. *Argumentum pessimi turba est.*

Such were the thoughts that passed rapidly through the writer's mind on first reading the late decision in the Stack-O'Hara case. Here is, on the one hand, he said to himself, a case that would be decided in the Bishop's favor in five minutes by any five impartial men who had no qualification beyond common-sense; on the other hand, we have six or seven judges, who after shrouding and obscuring the matter with legal verbiage, decide adversely to the Catholic side.¹ What could have prompted such decision but that insidious breath of anti-Catholic prejudice which permeates the party that rules the State and that gave them judicial office, and which perhaps imperceptibly and in spite of their better knowledge has wrought upon their judgments. They decided, it is true, in favor of a Catholic priest; but was it because he was under censure of the Church, and stood upon anti-Catholic ground? One cannot ward off the suspicion that, had the relative position of plaintiff and defendant by any possibility been reversed, had the priest been the representative of Catholic law and discipline against his Prelate, they would *not* have decided in the priest's favor. The writer, being a stranger to the State, knows nothing of these judges individually, nothing of their special creeds, not even their names, unless that of the Justice who is set down in the newspapers as delivering the opinion of the court. And of him, as of all the rest, he knows absolutely nothing, good or evil. They may be very learned in the law; they may be most exemplary and above reproach in private life; they may be most righteous in their ordinary decisions. But they must be very unlike the judges elected by the people in other States, if they are not liable, in spite of all this, to be overborne by the pressure of anti-Catholic prejudice with which the atmosphere in which they live and whence they derive their official being is laden. To assign any other motive would be folly and would do them little honor. It would be an attempt to compliment their impartiality at the expense of their understanding.

But though prejudice may explain, it can never excuse a decision which reflects so little credit on Pennsylvania justice and its highest

¹ The writer has been misinformed. To the credit of the Bench it must be said that some of the Judges dissented from the Opinion of their colleagues.—NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

exponents. Still it need excite no surprise. It is only an additional instance, out of the many that have occurred and are daily occurring everywhere, and which go to prove that the profession of Christendom's earliest faith, and still more the holding of ecclesiastical office or dignity in the Church, are circumstances that weigh heavily to a Catholic's injury in the scales of what is technically called "Justice" throughout the land.

The decision in question, viewing it only theoretically and apart from its consequences, is manifestly wrong. It is not law, but a straining of the law. The reasoning on which it rests, and which accompanied the delivery of sentence by the court, is hollow and flimsy, based upon alleged facts that are not facts, and suppositions that are not real but pretended. It would have been better and more becoming to leave so arbitrary a judgment without any attempt to back it up by reasoning. But usage required some show of argument, and since nothing solid could be adduced, a few pitiful paltry reasons were strung together to supply its place.

As to the injustice done by this decision, it might be borne patiently if it were an isolated case, the effects of which would pass away with the execution of the sentence. But the injury is permanent; for this decision will serve, and no doubt was intended to serve, as a precedent for future cases of like kind. What action our bishops and clergy will take in this matter does not appear so far. Perhaps knowing that "patience hath a perfect work," they will bear the wrong patiently and meekly with the many other wrongs and insults they have daily to endure. But it seems to be the unmistakable duty of the Catholic laity to enter their cordial and outspoken protest, if they can do no more, against this flagrant judicial outrage upon the laws and discipline of their Church. Though the blow is nominally aimed at our bishops, it seems only right to let the world know that we consider ourselves attacked, and unjustly dealt with in every wrong that is done to our bishops and clergy in their discharge of official duty.

It needs not much knowledge of the law, but only a little plain common-sense and common honesty to discover the iniquity of such decision. But before saying a few words on this subject it may be well to state, as briefly as possible, the facts of the case, and the successive stages of its legal history. Luckily, but, perhaps, not very wisely, the principal facts and documents have found a place in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Rev. M. P. Stack received from Bishop Wood originally, and after the erection of Scranton into an Episcopal See, continued to hold from Bishop O'Hara, the pastoral charge of a church in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Something went wrong. The temporals of the Church were not properly administered. The sacred edifice at last fell into

the hands of the sheriff, so that it was liable to be sold at any moment. The Bishop, who had to come hurriedly to the rescue of the bankrupt church, and pay off its debt of \$600 or more, was naturally displeased with the mismanagement of the pastor which had brought about such a state of things. From the documents on record it does not appear whether he regarded him as guilty of gross negligence or of utter incompetency in financial matters. But on the same day, November 5th, 1871, that he paid the money to prevent the church from being sold, he removed Rev. Mr. Stack, as he had a perfect right to do and as prudence dictated, from his pastoral office at Williamsport. And fearing, it would seem, that possibly Rev. Mr. Stack might be disposed to loiter in the neighborhood of his former charge, he forbade him "to exercise any priestly functions in Williamsport," adding that this prohibition was binding *sub gravi*. Which text one cannot but laugh to see thus glossed or paraphrased rather by the judicial Solons of the Pennsylvania bench: "his administration was of so *grave* a character that any disobedience to the order of prohibition would be a *grievous* sin." It is hard to imagine how they kept their own *gravity* whilst writing this deliberate nonsense. On the 9th of November, 1871, Rev. Mr. Stack wrote to a friend, Rev. Mr. Kœper, a letter (produced in the evidence) stating that he had seen the Bishop, by whom he had been kindly received, and promised another place where he should have no financial troubles. Before this, in compliance with the Bishop's order, he had surrendered the property, books, etc., of his church to Rev. Mr. Kœper, pastor of the German congregation of Williamsburg. But soon after he changed his mind, whether of his own accord or prompted by others outside of the Church who proffered their aid, it does not appear. On the 26th of the same month, with a set of keys he had contrived to retain, he entered the church, and having summoned the congregation, announced to them that he would apply to the civil courts to test the legality of the Bishop's action. Accordingly, on December 1st of the same year, he filed a bill in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, praying the court to decree that his removal from the church in Williamsport, and the prohibition to exercise priestly functions in that town, were unlawful and void; further, that the Bishop be restrained by injunction from removing him, and from forbidding him the exercise of priestly functions in Williamsport; and, finally, that the aforesaid M. P. Stack be restored to his rights and emoluments as pastor of the church in Williamsport.

The unfortunate priest, who, by thus appealing to the civil courts in a matter of strictly ecclesiastical jurisdiction, had forfeited all communion with the Catholic Church, according to the very Canon

Law he and his patrons were invoking, was received and welcomed with open arms by all the enemies of the Church. Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, especially their ministers, vied with each other in showing favor to the new-comer who, though he did not join any of the sects in particular, had won the confidence and goodwill of them all by trampling on his priestly conscience and despising the authority of the Church to which he owed his priesthood. At a session in Chancery the recreant priest obtained all he asked for from Judge Gamble, a thorough bigot, as is clear from his judicial harangues, and far better suited to preside in one of John Knox's conventicles than on a bench of justice where any Catholic interest was at stake. As far as his decree could do it he annulled the Bishop's acts by declaring them unlawful and void; as far as his order could effect it he gave back to the rebellious priest his former position, rights, emoluments, etc., in the pastorate of Williamsport. But a little common-sense and sober reflection might have taught him that his furious anti-Catholic zeal had betrayed him into promising more than he could perform. It takes something more than the bare word of an angry judge to give to Father Stack a right to the use and actual possession of real estate, the sole title to which is invested in Bishop O'Hara by the law of the land, where no bargain, contract, or agreement between them relative to the property has intervened. And even, what is impossible to suppose, had he succeeded in terrifying the Bishop by threats and penalties into surrendering the Williamsport church edifice into the hands of Mr. Stack, he could never succeed in compelling him to grant spiritual jurisdiction, without which material occupation would be worthless, and over which no court in the country has or pretends to have control. Besides, if by any means this misguided priest got possession of the church building, he would have to deal with more dangerous opponents, viz., with the congregation, who, after all, are the true owners of the church property, the Bishop only holding it in trust for their benefit. There is very little doubt that, instead of respecting the new pastor commissioned by Judge Gamble, they would summarily eject the excommunicated priest from their premises without troubling their heads with writs or any other routine process of ousting. The Judge, if he had any knowledge of law and precedent, must have known that it was out of his power to grant an injunction which, from its nature, must be worthless to the party in whose favor it is granted. "An injunction will not be granted if it will not carry with it a substantial benefit" (Jones v. City of Newark, 3 New Jersey Eq. Rep. 357). But anything good or worthless, idle swagger or sound law, was equally expedient, if it could only impress the people, even for a few days, with

the notion that Pennsylvania lay courts have a right to intermeddle with Episcopal jurisdiction.

From this absurd and illegal sentence the Bishop appealed to the Supreme Court of the State. This body being at the time, as charity would suggest, more equitably disposed than of late, sent the case back to be tried once more in Lycoming County Court. A Master in Chancery was appointed by the judge to examine more fully the facts, evidence, etc., and report upon the same. The Report, filed in January, 1875, was clear, logical, and comprehensive. It showed that Mr. Stack had no case, and that the Bishop had in no way made himself amenable to the civil law by his conduct, having only exercised a spiritual jurisdiction which the priest had voluntarily bound himself at the time of his ordination to obey. But this did not suit the purpose of those who were bent on harassing the Bishop in the exercise of his spiritual authority, and promoting rebellion and disaffection amongst worldly-minded priests. The Report, instead of being received, was, after nearly three years' delay, set aside by Judge Gamble, who further took it upon himself to qualify this able paper as "hasty and superficial." The Judge reaffirmed his former decision, viz., that the removal of Mr. Stack, and the prohibition of his exercise of priestly functions in Williamsport were unlawful, that it was inexpedient to reinstate Mr. Stack, and, finally, that the Bishop be condemned to pay "the costs accruing from the cause, including the examiner's and master's charges, with expense of printing." Against this sentence, so manifestly unjust to both parties, both appealed. Whether the appeal on the part of the refractory priest was withdrawn or not is unknown to the writer. The name of the Bishop, as sole appellant, appears in the heading of the final decision of the Supreme Court, which was rendered October 14th, 1879. The appeal was dismissed, and the Bishop, besides former costs and charges, was condemned to pay the additional expenses of the appeal.

It has been said that the sentence of November 13th, 1877, now indorsed by the Supreme Court, was unjust to both sides; and it may be well to examine how far this is true with respect to the plaintiff, who has been for the last eight or nine years not only a mere suitor for justice at the hands of the County Court, but manifestly its theological guide. Judge Gamble and the judges of the highest State court all agree that the priest has been wronged. Then why do they not redress the wrong? If his "rights of property" (this is their favorite expression) have been wrested from him by fraud or violence, why are they not restored? For what other end than this were courts of justice instituted? Their very name implies as much. Justice, even for Pagan sages and lawyers, meant that every man should have his own, *suum*

enique tribuere, as it has been defined by Ulpian. A "court of justice" means a tribunal organized by and representing civilized society, and which by the strong arm of the law upholds the citizen in the possession of what is his own, or restores it to him after due investigation, when he has been unjustly deprived of the same. But Pennsylvania justice, as expounded by its Supreme Bench, means neither of these things. Her judges cry out against wrong, but refuse to right the citizen who has been wronged. They sympathize with him and shed tears, figuratively speaking, over his misfortune. But it was not for this empty purpose that courts and judges were created by society. Any citizen can give his share of pity to the victim of misfortune or wrong, and it will be accepted at its just value. But when I see my neighbor wronged and refuse to right him, though it is my duty and I have the power to do it, should I, instead of help, tender him my sympathy, he will spurn it as hollow and unmeaning, or resent it as an insult. Well, at least they investigate wrong, discover and denounce it. Even if they do, what is that worth if they lack the will or the power to redress it? The editor of a newspaper can do as much, and often more effectually. A court that has no remedy for injustice has no right to investigate; for since the cure of the evil does not lie in its hands, neither does the investigation lie within its province.

They cannot plead ignorance of the proper remedy. The plaintiff, whose words they seem to look upon as oracles, has often and plainly enough told them not only wherein lies his grievance, but wherein consists the proper mode of redress. He has been unjustly deprived of the revenue of the Williamsport church, and he demands to be reinstated as pastor. Why is the injustice of the deprivation admitted and decreed, and the remedy, the reinstatement, refused? Oh, no! exclaims Judge Gamble. I have not refused exactly; I tried to reinstate the plaintiff seven years ago, and would have done it had I been allowed, but the Supreme Court dissolved the injunction. In 1877 I again boldly reaffirmed that foul injustice had been committed, but on reflection decided that to remedy such injustice would be "inexpedient," "unwise, and injudicious." (Opinion and Decree, p. 49.) Oh, yes! cries out the Supreme Bench, in chorus; he ought to have prevented or remedied this violation of the rights of property, which is "contrary to the supreme law of the land," but he "thought it unwise" to do so. (Opinion of Supreme Court, delivered by Judge Mercur.) Expediency, then, and wisdom, worldly wisdom, are sufficient reasons for a judge to sanction the peaceful, unmolested triumph of fraud, robbery, and injustice over the rights of property and injured innocence, though a word of his might prevent it! It is expediency, not the eternal law of justice, that determines what is

right and what is wrong! There may be among the occupants of that bench those who, for aught the writer knows, are in the habit of taunting the Catholic Church with this very doctrine. Whether Catholics so believe or not, this is no place to examine. There must be something in the doctrine to recommend it, since Pennsylvania judges hold it and follow it in practice. But the character and grounds of this expediency deserve a little closer scrutiny. Let us hear the explanation from the judges themselves.

"A decree of restoration as asked for . . . is deemed inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the Church of the Annunciation (Williamsport), its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff six years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. The wise and prudent course of their present pastor has secured to him their confidence and regard, which it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb." (Opinion, p. 49.)

All this reads very prettily, but, casting aside its verbiage, what is its substance? The plaintiff was unjustly deprived of his rights of property. Not content with this, the Bishop, who deprived him, sent another to enjoy these usurped rights and property. The plaintiff goes into court to recover his lost possession. The judge warmly espouses his cause and decrees his restoration; but an appeal causes loss of time, and when the judge is again ready to give sentence he once more denounces the injustice, but will do nothing to remedy the wrong which he officially recognizes. And why? The usurper who now holds the place by unlawful seizure, is well liked by the congregation, and gets on very well with them; so well, indeed, that it would be a pity to disturb him in the possession of his stolen goods! This is the plain English of the paragraph when stripped of its rhetoric. To illustrate still more Judge Gamble's theory of law and justice being made subservient to expediency, let me propose a case, which is quite in point, as he must admit. A landlord, by lease or other mode of legal tenure, grants, for twenty or thirty years (say a lifetime), a large tract of land to A. The latter makes the best use of his newly acquired possession, with its "rights and emoluments," improving the land, dividing it into small farms, and subletting to a numerous tenantry. In a year or two the capricious landlord gets tired of his bargain with A. In defiance of justice, and in spite of the lease, which holds good in law, he summarily evicts A and gives his place to B. A applies to the court for protection of his rights of property; the judge promises he shall have it, and, as a preliminary step, grants an injunction. This is followed by an appeal and counter litigation of some years. When the judge is at last free to pronounce sentence, he begins by denouncing the unlawful outrage that had been committed on A's rights of property, and assures him that his heart bleeds for the cruel injustice he has suffered and is yet suf-

fering, for his wrong is "serious, irreparable, and continuing" (Opinion of Judge Gamble, p. 47). He then goes on to say: "It would give me great pleasure to restore the plaintiff to the possession of his legitimate rights, and I would do so did I not deem it inexpedient under existing circumstances. Whatever may have been the condition of the tenantry, its attachments and relations towards the plaintiff years ago, it is now apparently harmonious and content. Mr. B is such a nice man, and has acted so wisely and prudently, that the neighbors and tenants have become quite fond of him. It would be a pity, it would be unwise and injudicious to disturb the kindly relations existing between them." What would Judge Gamble and his brother judges of the higher court think of this decision? Let them not condemn it, for it is their own. It is the very way in which they have dealt with Mr. Stack. If he has not a good case to-day he never had one. If expediency now can warrant the leaving him without redress, it is plain that he never was the victim of injustice. Winning ways with tenantry or with a congregation can never legitimate usurpation of rights of property; and it was on the rights of property that Mr. Stack based his claim for redress, not on the good will and attachment of his parishioners.

It is hard to believe that men whose position compels them daily to scrutinize narrowly what is adduced as evidence, to pursue and detect error lurking under cover of specious argument, could have been so misled by their own sophistry as to really take for granted that there was a time at any stage of the case when it was *wise* or *expedient*, or at all possible, for them to restore Mr. Stack to his pastoral office. Not all the law courts of the State, nor Congress, with its legitimate, or even its lately assumed, powers could do it, without first rooting out of existence the American Constitution, and the principles on which it rests. It is a pity they did not try to do as well as talk, and make the attempt to quash the Bishop's spiritual jurisdiction and force a pastor bearing their commission on a reluctant congregation! They did not attempt it because they knew it was impossible, and because failure, which they knew to be inevitable, would cover them with shame and ridicule. This, perhaps, furnishes the true key to explain the words, *inexpedient* and *unwise*. They may be only mild expressions to avoid the use of that unpleasant word *impossible*, and to smooth the descent from their own lofty promises and the great expectations they had encouraged in the plaintiff. So that all the fine talk about restoration to rights of property, reinstatement in the pastorate due to plaintiff, but unfortunately hindered by the agreeable relations now existing between the congregation and the present occupant, had no meaning, was in fact mere Buncombe! The old-fashioned, unprogressive

judges of a former generation, to their credit, knew as little of this language as of its name.

In their Opinion the Pennsylvania judges are never tired of repeating that the plaintiff had rights of property in the Williamsport church. This church has no revenues, but depends on the voluntary contributions of the members, which are of their nature fluctuating and uncertain. Granting, however, that it was fixed, certain revenue or property, and that plaintiff had a right to it, of what nature was that right? Was it absolute, indefeasible right, derived from inheritance, free gift, lawful purchase, or any other way known to the law by which ownership comes? Evidently not. The right to the property or its use, for he could have no more, was purely conditional. As long as he was the pastor he was entitled to its use; as soon as he ceased to be pastor, *ipso facto* his right and title were forfeited. How does a priest cease to be pastor? According to the discipline hitherto prevalent in these United States, by death, resignation, or removal. The bishop, who has the removing power, removes sometimes for cause assigned; at others without giving any reason. But in either case the removal holds equally good. The system occasionally works harm and suffering. But for this the civil court has no remedy; and the priest has bound himself at his ordination to abide by it "for better, for worse."

It is scarcely worth while to notice the ludicrous way in which the judges set about proving that the Williamsport church revenues, though derived from voluntary sources, are constant and certain. Instead of consulting the Church treasurer's book they have consulted the Catechism, and found there that Catholics are bound by precept of the Church to support their pastors. Therefore Rev. Mr. Stack, as pastor, had a certain support. In the first place it is too kind of them to take for granted that Catholics never fail in this as in other duties. But admitting that a congregation never fails to support its "pastor," would Mr. Stack be such if, after having been removed by his bishop, he were imposed on the congregation by a court of lay judges? And if not considering him their lawful pastor they should use their own discretion in interpreting the Catechism and refuse to support him, would their refusal have to be remedied by pains and penalties at the hands of the same lay court? It is to be feared that these wise judges were nodding, not to see the mass of absurdities to which their arguments open the door.

But, they add, "a priest's profession is his property." As long as he has spiritual jurisdiction from proper authority, no doubt. But a lay court can neither give nor take away that jurisdiction. Let them look at their own profession. The name of an attorney, who has by the study of a lifetime qualified himself for the law and for nothing else, may be stricken from the rolls at any moment by

competent authority. In which case where is he to find his property in his profession?

If the writer of these lines belonged to a State whose judges could deliberately give to the world such a wretched, absurd opinion as that delivered by Judge Mercur, he would feel ashamed of them for her sake. Nothing short of intense bigotry, either innate or reflected from public opinion, could have so perverted their powers of reasoning, blinded them into contempt of the fundamental law of the land, and what is worse, of the first principles of common-sense. Omitting what they said but did not mean, and supplying what they meant but did not say, the whole opinion might be condensed into the following words:

We have undertaken to protect a priest who holds himself independent of his bishop's authority. He appears to be an enlightened priest; for he denounces hierarchical pretensions, and though he promised obedience at his ordination he has reconsidered that promise, and will henceforth keep only as much of it as his private judgment may deem compatible with his rights as a man and citizen. Had we only amongst us some of those wise provisions, which the illustrious Bismarck has lately introduced into German legislation, we would gladly reinstate him as sole legal pastor in Williamsport church. But, unfortunately, this is not a Christian government, and will not allow us to compel the Williamsport congregation to acknowledge or receive him, or submit to his jurisdiction. Meanwhile, until better days bring more stringent legislation, we can only sympathize with this noble victim of episcopal tyranny. If we cannot protect the priest, however, we can punish the bishop, and mulct him heavily in costs for the suit which the priest brought and failed to gain. If we can do no more, we will pinch his pocket,

Which, if not victory, is yet revenge.

Though the writer does not know the religious creed of any of these judges, there may, perchance, be a Presbyterian amongst the number; in which case I respectfully recommend to his perusal the following extract from the most influential Presbyterian journal of the country, that he may learn from it what is thought of his decision by those who reflect and guide public opinion in his own denomination. The other judges, too, may read it with profit. It is from an article on the case in question, written soon after the opinion was delivered:

"The opinion thus rendered is NOT consistent with religious liberty, nor in harmony with the fundamental idea of American relations between the Church and the State. . . . When the civil power steps in and says that, because a priest draws a salary, therefore the civil power has the right to determine whether or not he has been properly inducted or extruded, it is an invasion of the religious freedom of the Church, which ought to be intelligently, but firmly, resisted."—*New York Observer*, October 23d, 1879.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE FAITH OF OUR FOREFATHERS: AN EXAMINATION OF ARCHBISHOP GIBBONS'S "FAITH OF OUR FATHERS." By Rev. *Edward J. Stearns*, D.D., Examining Chaplain of the Diocese of Easton, author of "The Afterpiece to the Comedy of Convocation," "Birth and New Birth," etc. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1879. 12mo.; pp. 380.

THE admirable little controversial manual, or familiar exposition rather, of Catholic doctrine, to which the present volume professes to be a reply, has been now nearly three years before the public. During that time it has not only received the hearty applause of the Catholic press, but has also won kind words and respectful homage from reviewers outside of the Church. It has made its way into many a household, where no Catholic book had ever before penetrated. It has been instrumental, under heaven, in diffusing the light of Truth and dissipating wicked or ignorant prejudice to an extent that its author could scarcely have anticipated. Edition after edition has been exhausted with a rapidity unprecedented in our Catholic publishers' experience, whether of books written at home or reprinted from abroad.

All this must have been very consoling to the author, and to all who share his wish that "the marvellous light" of God's Kingdom should shine upon as many as possible of those who sit in darkness, waiting for the kindly hand that is to guide their steps in the way of Divine Truth. But it was gall and bitterness to many whose prejudices and interests are opposed to the dissemination of truth. They are the professional teachers of error, of what the Church calls "doctrines of men," as opposed to the truths revealed by God and intrusted to her keeping. If you listen to the professions of these men you would imagine that they are fond of encouraging investigation, ardent advocates of free discussion, who insist on a hearing of both sides of the question, and who welcome with pleasure everything that may help the candid inquirer in his search after truth. But their deeds belie their professions. They are unwilling that any of their disciples should look into a Catholic book, or even know of its existence. They forbid the reading of it where their authority extends so far, and if any one presumes to read it without their knowledge or in disregard of their injunctions, their indignation knows no bounds. Though this intolerable tyranny has its ludicrous side, one cannot well afford to laugh at it, in view of the deplorable results of such clerical domineering on one side, and too often on the other the blindest obedience in those who have been taught to boast of their Gospel liberty. But what vexes and alarms those self-constituted teachers most of all, when their authority fails to secure obedience, is this: they have been in the habit for years of misrepresenting and caricaturing, in the most shameful way the doctrines and discipline of the Catholic Church. If now one of their disciples by any chance get hold of a Catholic book, they know full well that he must learn how grossly and wickedly he has been deceived hitherto. And to have his eyes thus opened, they know, will prove, in his case at least, a death-blow to their teaching authority. They have deceived him with regard to the doctrines of the Catholic Church with which they were well acquainted, having read them in her standards. How can he ever again trust them for guides in those doctrines which they pretend to have found in the Bible, and about which, nevertheless, they are perpetually wrangling with their fellow-teachers of the other sects?

Hence, whenever they had the power, as they had for more than two hundred years in Great Britain, they caused all Catholic books to be confiscated and burnt—even the Douay Bible, as Bishop Newcome confesses. The sword of persecution having been wrested from their grasp, they fall back on moral coercion wherever it is possible. And when it is possible no longer, with reluctance, with a hearty sigh for the good old days of gibbet and rack that have departed forever, they sit down to the less congenial task of writing, or pretending to write, refutations of those Catholic books that expose and correct their misrepresentations. "Fire and sword," they seem to say, "are, unfortunately, no longer at our command in settling religious controversy. The milk-and-water spirit of a degenerate age has banished these speedy and unfailing arbiters of theological strife. But there still remain for our use other ugly weapons, which the spirit of the age has not yet succeeded in consigning to oblivion. If they cannot slay, they can pierce and wound, and though they find little warrant in God's Law or the Gospel, they are welcome, and we will make the most of them, in default of those stronger ones that, alas! we are now forbidden to wield."

From a careful perusal of his volume, such we judge to have been the spirit of the writer who has undertaken to confute, or to "examine" Archbishop Gibbons's book, as the title-page professes. An "examination" from such a source could scarcely be adequate, or fair and honest, either in execution or design. And any candid reader, no matter what his religion, after an impartial reading, however cursory, of the book, must be fully convinced that it was not the author's intention from the beginning to deal with his opponent according to the established laws of controversy amongst gentlemen, leaving the clerical profession and Christianity out of the question altogether.

Who or what the Rev. Dr. Stearns is we can only partly tell and partly guess from what appears of him in his book, or what may be inferred from its pages. He is the "Examining Chaplain of the Bishop of Easton," and not satisfied with the drudgery of examining candidates for Orders, aspires to catechize an Archbishop. *Altius egit iter* may be said of him, as of Icarus; but *magnis excidit ausis* will yet have to be added to complete his epitaph.

"Chaplain of the Bishop of Easton!" This must be a novelty in Episcopalian language. Their style, heretofore, has been to designate their bishops not by towns or cities, but by the Diocese of such and such a State. A departure from this custom looks like aping "Romanism." It is only a few days since that all the Evangelical sects of New York were thrown into a flutter by an inscription on a vase publicly presented to Bishop Potter, in which he was called "Bishop of New York." The more outspoken said it was a deliberate insult to the Protestant community of that city. What do the non-Episcopalian Protestants of Easton think? Pride goeth before a fall, and the sect that of all others is doomed to speediest destruction is the one that is daily enlarging its pretensions and putting on most airs. They now want "territorial titles," like their own bishops in Great Britain, and like those of Rome who are around them on every side. There are others among them who would like to have *archbishops*, in imitation of the American Catholic Church, which is for them an object of as much genuine envy as it is of dislike; but though some of the bishops and clergy are dying for the possession of this title, Low Church and laity are strong enough to put a veto on this silly ambition. Shams must not aspire to be treated as realities, and there is enough of hard sense in our people to distinguish one from the other. "Roman" bishops derive from a power that is

acknowledged and respected even by its enemies. British bishops are the creation of a powerful government, which, if it cannot impart the fulness of true priesthood, can at least back up its titles of dignity with secular pomp, solid influence, and munificent revenues. But our non-descripts, who have to be called Episcopalian bishops that they may be supposed to have something of the bishop in them—who “sent” or authorized *them*? They derive neither from Church nor State. There are those yet living who will see the downfall of the Episcopal Church. The day, and it is near at hand, when she shall be disestablished in Great Britain as she has lately been in Ireland, will witness her disintegration as a body, and the same effect is sure to follow on this side of the Atlantic, some being added to the Church of Ages, the rest falling away amongst the various sects.

Rev. Dr. Stearns is also the author of two books which are named, and of others—who knows how many?—that lie hid under the enigmatic “*etc.*” of his title-page. What their names may be we cannot inform the reader. They are as unknown to us as were the two others until we read them for the first time as a pendant to his name on the title-page of his volume. They seem to have met with a very unappreciative reading public, for they have not succeeded in conferring any reputation on their author. But he, who rates them at their proper value and knows that they are too high for vulgar appreciation, is determined that they shall not perish through popular neglect. Accordingly he snatches them from oblivion and consigns them to immortality by freely using them as authorities (pp. 162, 184, 213, 282) in a book which he fondly imagines is to go down to posterity bearing with it the glory of having crushed an archbishop, and with him the foolish attempt to make “Romanism” appear rational in Protestant eyes.

In religion, Dr. Stearns is what is commonly known as an Episcopalian, though this vague term does not by any means define his position or his belief. For in that comprehensive Church there is room for everything from Puseyism to refined Deism. He is neither a Low nor a High churchman, or rather both in one. He believes that the Holy Ghost and the Apostolical succession were faithfully transmitted through Barlow and Parker to the present Anglican Church (p. 34). He would have us think that he and his Church are “Catholic;” and so great is his reverence for the name that he never allows Archbishop Gibbons to designate by it the Roman Church, without adding his parenthetical protest “Roman, not Catholic.” Yet when the Jansenist Dupin gives her that name repeatedly, he allows the quotations to pass without protest or correction, which can only be explained by that subtle sympathy which makes error of every kind recognize and love its like, Dupin having been a nominal Catholic and real heretic. He admits that Protestantism has no unity, but thinks its dissensions and splits are a sign of life (p. 114)! He talks as gravely of the bishops and “priests” of his sect, as if he were a curate of St. Albans. But his bishops and priests amount to very little. They have for him no teaching authority, for “private judgment is the right and duty of every man—a duty that he owes to the manhood God has given him” (p. 71). They have no ministerial power, for they have no sacramental grace to impart. What the Catholic Church calls sacraments are for him only symbolic rites, that may have meaning but have no efficacy. Rightly understood, he admits that there is “a Real Presence of Christ’s Body and Blood in the Sacrament” (p. 286); but the right understanding, as we are soon informed, is that the Presence is only nominal, not real, for it must be understood figuratively (p. 291). The Eucharist, therefore, spite of his high-

sounding words, is for him nothing more than what it was once for Zwingli and Calvin, nothing more than what it is now for his Protestant fellow-ministers, Dr. Talmage and Henry Ward Beecher. As for Baptism (p. 481) he follows heartily the decision of the lay judges in the Gorham case, who decided that Baptismal Regeneration is no doctrine of the Anglican Church. Nor is Baptism necessary for salvation (p. 280). Of the Fathers and the Primitive Church he talks now and again with reverence; but when it suits him, he can toss the Fathers aside as contemptuously as any Socinian (p. 141).

To leave now his own confessions, and come to what may be inferred or guessed from his book, one is strongly tempted to class Dr. Stearns amongst the members of the Masonic fraternity. He speaks of it more than once (pp. 9, 32, 113, 143), and always favorably. He is fond of comparing it with the "Church of Christ," and contrasting it with the Church of Rome. "The Masonic fraternity is as visible and as Catholic a body as the Christian Church" (p. 113). Again, "the Church of the (Apostles') Creed and of the Bible is Catholic, as the Masonic fraternity is Catholic; that is to say, it is not for one nation, but for all nations. A Mason anywhere is a Mason everywhere, and is received as such. A Catholic anywhere is a Catholic everywhere. Time was when he was received as such" (no doubt of it, but it was when all Christendom was Catholic); "if he is not so now it is the fault of the Bishop of Rome" (p. 32). *Fault* indeed! he should rather thank God that there is an authority left in the world to distinguish genuine Catholics from spurious. Hear him once more:

"The Church is one, as the Masonic fraternity is one. Now the unity of this latter is a visible unity 'known and read of all men;' and yet it has no ecumenical head, but only a national head to each national organization. Plainly then a visible earthly head is not necessary to the visible unity of the Visible Church. Perhaps it is on this account that the Roman Church is so *especially* hostile to Freemasonry. She can have no liking for a society whose very existence is a standing proof of the possibility of visible ecumenical unity without a visible ecumenical head" (p. 9).

Pity he did not throw in the two other marks of "holiness" and "apostolicity," and thus prove out and out that Freemasonry is the true Church of Christ!

Dr. Stearns is very anxious that it should be known to all men, that "in his veins flows the blood of Governor Dudley," of Massachusetts. So anxious is he to put this on record, that he drags it in more than once where nothing called for its mention (pp. 241, 302). Be it so, though the poet says:

Genus et proavos et quæ non fecimus ipsi,
Vix ea nostra voco.

It happens that amongst our friends and acquaintances North and South, there are not a few, men and women, Catholic and Protestant, in whose veins runs the same blood of which Dr. S. boasts. Those we know are gentle folks, not only in their manners, but in all the daily walks of life. Dr. Stearns may be such, we shall not deny it. But no reader would ever discover this, or even suspect it, from his book. The true gentleman is such always and everywhere. He never considers himself free to despise the laws of good breeding. He feels himself bound by them in preaching a sermon or in writing a book, no less than in social intercourse. And this is the test which Republican common-sense

applies to all amongst us who claim gentle blood. What admits of no doubt is the ferocious spirit of religious intolerance which Dr. Stearns has inherited from his Puritan progenitor.

Dr. Stearns is a Know-Nothing of the ultra type. He seems to think that this is a Protestant Episcopal country, and, therefore, would have the Archbishop of Baltimore and the Cardinal of New York know that they are "ecclesiastical intruders" and "have no mission to preach" here (p. 30). He makes an exception in favor of the Russian clergy. They are "welcome guests" (ib.). In spite of their Mariolatry, their idolatrous bowing down to stocks and stones and worshipping the bones of dead men, they have an Episcopal Church, and, therefore, "they are welcome." We leave him in the hands of his Presbyterian and Methodist brethren, who will be likely to resent this extravagant development of Know-Nothing madness. Another feature of his Know-Nothingism is his ill-will to everything "Irish." He seems to think that by calling anything "Irish" he has proved it to be silly and discreditable (pp. 60, 322, 323). This leads him at times into ridiculous blunders; as when he brands with the name of "*Irish*" St. Augustine's grand apostrophe to divine truth, "O Beauty, ever ancient and ever new!" etc., because he thinks Archbishop Gibbons the author, who only adopted it from the Saint for his purpose!

And now having learned something of Dr. Stearns individually, let us see what he is as a controvertist. In his style and manner of polemical discussion he is rather below than on a level with the average No-Popery pamphleteer or writer of Know-Nothing harangues. His language is too often low, vulgar, and interspersed with slang. He seems to think that colloquial English is the highest form of good English, and, therefore, treats us on nearly every page to such words as *couldn't*, *wouldn't*, *didn't*, *doesn't*, *haven't*, etc. But this is a matter of taste, and if there were nothing else we should not feel called on to blame him. But there is more, and far worse. The man of the world, who has ordinary prudence, is careful in writing for the public not to betray his temper in such way as to let the world see that from excess of passion he is not able to control his pen. Respect either for his adversary or for his readers, or at least self-respect, will make him cautious. But none of these considerations have any weight with our headlong divine. His soul is so possessed with the spirit of ill-will, spite, and bitter hate that there is no checking it. It bursts all barriers of politeness and even common decency, and pours itself out in a stream of angry, harsh words, of railing, invective, and insinuations of the most shameful kind. His mouth becomes really what St. Paul (Rom. iii. 14), quoting from the Psalmist, calls "*os maledictione et amaritudine plenum*." He accuses the Archbishop, almost on every page and in the plainest terms, of dishonesty in concealing or falsely representing Catholic doctrine; he charges him with "ignorance of logic, claptrap, rigmarole, slandering the Fathers and the Anglican Church, impudence, effrontery, and again with either shameless effrontery or discreditable ignorance" (see pages 47, 30, 67, 236, 354, 225, 76). Passages conceived in the spirit of the following are of constant occurrence: "The Archbishop's argument . . . is ineffably silly. Of course *he* sees through it, but he thinks his readers won't; else he wouldn't use it" (p. 31).

But enough of this. Let us turn to his favorite authorities. One would suppose that in discussing Catholic doctrine the Councils and Fathers would be quoted, and none but grave and impartial writers appealed to. But our "Examining Chaplain" is little acquainted with these sources. His choicest witnesses, besides his own productions, are

Janus, Dupin, Bishop Hopkins, the apostate Bower, Irenæus Prime, Tristram Shandy, the *Genius of Popery*, *Pope or President*, *Father Tom and the Pope*, the *New York Church Journal*, and the *Southern Churchman*! His ideas of standard authorities are somewhat peculiar. He says that "Gieseler is recognized by scholars as a standard authority." He had better have told us by *what scholars*. Quoting another book printed by "John Murray, of London," he adds, "the name of the publisher is a guarantee of the standing of the writer" (p. 274). Why then does he not quote from *Maria Monk*, whose standing was guaranteed by the highly respectable house of Harper & Co., New York? She would have furnished an abundance of edifying extracts as new and as true as many in his book. He tries further to illustrate his topics by anecdotes and allusions, which are not always happy nor drawn from very elevated sources. We may instance Barnum's Happy Family (in illustration of Catholic Unity), Bridget and the Protestant Bishop (a story as old as the hills, but here fastened on Bishop Wilberforce), some of *Father Tom's* gibberish, some low wit from one of Dr. S.'s own books on Peter's Patrimony and Matrimony, and other stuff lower and viler still, which we dismiss with the contempt it deserves.

It is an old saying that still water runs deep, while the shallow stream is noisy and pretentious in proportion to its shallowness. And so with writers and bookmakers. Noise, pompous pretence, and bluster on the surface are generally proportionate to the emptiness or ignorance that lies below. Never is this more signally verified than in those boastful writers who wield what Scripture calls the *linguam magniloquam*, "the tongue that speaketh great things" against the Catholic Church. There is some fatality impelling such men to lay bare their own shame. And Dr. Stearns is no exception. He makes a quotation from Virgil, on p. 309, and had he done no more he might have passed for one conversant with the great Latin poet. But having made the quotation, instead of wisely dropping it, he lingers at it and toys with it till he betrays himself. The passage is the description of Fame in the Fourth Book of the *Æneid*, to which Dr. S. calls his reader's attention, and then partly translates. But the last lines seemed to convey a peculiar sting, and he determines to give them entire, or nearly so. But in doing this, he has the presumption to alter the words, and even to put Gothic or Choctaw Latin into the mouth of the "diviné poet." Virgil had said:

Multiplici populos sermōns neplebat
Gaudens, et pariter facta atque infecta canebat.

This, Dr. Stearns quotes as follows:

Centum multiloquacibus ORIS (!)
Gaudentem et pariter facta atque infecta canentem.

We have no fault to find with the slight change in the second line; but in what grammar did he learn that *os*, *oris* (a mouth) makes *oris* in the ablative plural? Time was, and not quite so far back as the days of Orbilius, when the boy, who after three weeks' study of Latin could be guilty of such a shameful blunder, would have received a thorough trouncing. But we live in an age of progress when independence of Rome must be shown, not only by spurning her creed, but by shaking off the fetters of her venerable language. We should have passed over this blunder in silence had not Dr. Stearns so boldly accused the Archbishop of "discreditable ignorance of what he is writing about, discreditable in an Archbishop and Metropolitan, particularly discreditable

in a volunteer controvertist" (p. 137); and adding that "he may take his choice between the two horns of the dilemma (shameless effrontery or discreditable ignorance), as either of them will gore him badly" (ibid.). How would he like to have his dilemma retorted on himself? His own discourteous language would be enough to provoke it. Whenever in future he shall be tempted to hurl these charges of "discreditable ignorance" at his betters, let him remember *gaudentem* ORIS and wisely restrain himself.

Sometimes he allows himself to be blindly led by blind guides, and thus falls into silly mistakes which could have been avoided with very little trouble. Thus trusting to Sweete (*England v. Rome*), he denounces a certain prayer as forming a portion of the Litany of Loretto. The prayer which begins "O Glorious Virgin Mary, I commend to thee," etc., is rather a long one, and if each of the "petitions" (so-called) were equally long, the Litany would exhaust the patience of pious Christians who recite or sing it, and tax the ability of those who set it to music. It is a very good prayer, but forms no part of the Litany. The latter is a public prayer, and must not be confounded with the outpourings of private devotion.

On p. 216 he makes a mistake of a similar kind by following the same author, who disingenuously quotes from the Roman Ritual the little prayer *Maria Mater Gratia*. The Ritual, from its very nature, contains no prayers but the public prayers of the Church, or those which the priest says in his official capacity and acting in her name. And no priest acting as her minister, and on her behalf, would ever presume to intermingle private prayers with her sacred functions. How then does the prayer occur in the Ritual, for it is to be found somewhere in that Book? Yes, somewhere, but not amongst *her* Ritual prayers. It occurs in a Rubric or instruction, where the priest, in the discharge of his extra-official duty, is directed how he may comfort the sick and dying, and keep their minds fixed on the mercy of God, the Passion and Cross of our Lord, on Heaven and other thoughts that may best soothe their last hours. He is told to help them by suggesting, according to their needs and his own prudence, some ejaculations or short prayers which may cheer and elevate without fatiguing their minds. Of these prayers a list is added from which he may choose at his discretion. They are ten in number, all beautiful and most appropriate. Among them is the *Maria Mater Gratia*, an old quatrain in rhymed Iambics, that had been for centuries familiar to the lips of all Christians old and young, and is a good deal older than the Ritual itself in its present form. But it is an invocation of the Virgin at the solemn hour of death, and as such recommended, at least, by the Ritual! Certainly; though the soul that has for years daily in the Angelical salutation called on Mary for the help of her prayers "now or at the hour of death," will scarcely need the promptings of a priest to invoke the same aid when that hour has come. But, exclaims Dr. S., "how different the prayer of the dying Stephen, 'Lord Jesus receive my soul.'" Now if he had only looked into the Ritual he would have found this very prayer set down immediately before the *Maria Mater Gratia*. It is no excuse for him that he has been led into these blunders by Sweete. The Litany of Loretto and the Roman Ritual are easily accessible to all, and to Dr. Stearns in particular, for they have been printed by thousands in Maryland since he was born. It was his duty, therefore, even though the matter be not of much consequence, to consult the originals and verify the quotations, instead of treading blindly in the footsteps of Sweete, whose authority

is not a whit beyond that of his other guides, Tristram Shandy, Irenæus Prime, and the *Southern Churchman*.

On p. 306 Dr. Stearns gives a list of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the first six centuries, his object being to prove that the latter are few compared with the former. He can find only sixteen Latin by the side of twenty-six Greek Fathers, and warns the reader that he has "omitted none of any repute whose works have come down to us." Notwithstanding this flourish of trumpets, the reverend gentleman's erudition is not his own, but taken at second-hand from some Sweete or Brogden or other disingenuous Anglican scribe. He has not omitted the Augustines, Jeromes, and Cyprians, because decency forbade it; but he has omitted many others of high repute, and some of them most important as dogmatical witnesses of Catholic truth. He very wisely omits the great St. Optatus, of Milevis, whose works alone (had none of the other Fathers survived) would be sufficient to prove that Anglicanism, even if it held all our doctrine, can never be Catholic, but must be forever a paltry schism. He has omitted St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Zeno of Verona, St. Maximus of Turin, St. Fulgentius, Sts. Phæbadius, of Agen, and Philastrius. He has omitted our great poets, St. Damasus, Prudentius, St. Paulinus, of Nola, Sedulius, Venantius, Fortunatus, and others who are none the less "witnesses," because they have pressed Helicon and the Muses into the service of Christian truth. He has omitted our historians, Orosius, the friend of St. Augustine, Victor Vitensis, the elegant, almost classical Sulpicius Severus, who were as worthy of mention as Socrates (a Novatian heretic), Sozomen and Evagrius on the Greek side. But above all he has omitted those Popes who have issued doctrinal letters and decretals from St. Siricius down to St. Gregory the Great. They are twenty-four in number, excluding Sts. Leo and Gelasius, who are in Dr. Stearns's list. This makes over fifty, to whom others might be added,—Cassiodorus, Salvian, Cassian, Sidonius, and many others.

If the reader would see specimens of the reasoning by which this "examiner" thinks he has demolished the arguments brought forward in the "Faith of our Fathers," let him turn to p. 31. The Archbishop had alleged that the true ownership of the name "*Catholic*" is so well known to both friend and foe, that a Catholic entering a strange town and asking any one he met where is the Catholic Church, would be instinctively conducted to the right place, no matter what the creed of his guide, supposing him even to be a heretic, who considered his own Church to be the true Church of Christ. This is the very argument used with crushing effect against the Donatists of fifteen hundred years ago by St. Augustine. Hear how Dr. Stearns answers the Holy Doctor, for it is from him that Archbishop Gibbons has borrowed his argument:

"Well, and if the same stranger, going into a New England village, were to ask the first person he met to direct him to the Orthodox Church, he would infallibly if not instinctively point out to him the Trinitarian Congregational Church. Is that Church, therefore, Orthodox, and the only Orthodox Church?" (p. 31.)

By thus pointing to a New England or Puritan village, instead of one of his own sect, Dr. Stearns slyly contrives to make out that there is no difference between Catholic and Orthodox. But there is a great difference which completely nullifies his pretended counter-illustration. St. Augustine is speaking of true Catholics on the one hand, and those on the other who in writing attempt to usurp the name, but are ashamed of it in practice, and dare not use it when from theory it comes to a matter of fact. He is speaking of those who might be called the An-

glicans and Episcopalians of his day, who pretended to the name of Catholic—not of the sects who, like New England Puritans, reject both name and meaning. Hence he and the other Holy Fathers advise members of the Church, when they go into a strange place, never to ask for the true or Orthodox Church, for then they will be conducted to heretical synagogues or meeting-houses, but to ask at once for the Catholic Church; in which case no heretic will dare point out his own conventicle, but will show the way to the Catholic Church. *Catholic* is a real surname which cannot be misunderstood; *true* or *orthodox* is only an appellative of praise, which cannot be interpreted without reference to the opinions of him who bestows it. The difference may be seen in the following practical illustration, which is more to the point than that of Dr. Stearns: A countryman comes into town to purchase goods. He asks one whom he meets on the street where is the store of Smith, Jones & Co. He will be, without fail, directed to the very place he seeks. But if he is so simple and unsophisticated as to ask for the *best* store in town, he will be shown, no doubt, to the store of his guide or to that of some of his friends.

It is lack of space rather than of material that prevents us from exposing more of the errors and illogical reasoning of this worthless book. Dr. Stearns has done more to praise and recommend the Archbishop's *Faith of Our Fathers* than he imagines. His book, in spite of his intentions, is a very high compliment to the book which it pretends to answer; and so it will be regarded by many inside and outside of the Catholic Church. Here is what they will say. The Episcopalian bishops have become alarmed by the wonderful success of the Archbishop's little work. They have discovered that it is a very dangerous book. It is gently but steadily making its way amongst their flocks, rooting out those old prejudices which the clergy have sown amongst them, and which the clergy are chiefly instrumental in fostering and keeping alive. They summon one who ranks high among their theologians, and bid him take pen in hand to withstand the aggressions and confute the pretensions of Rome. He undertakes the task, and after nearly three years of anxious waiting, we have the old story of the mountain and the mouse. The formidable confutation of Roman errors, so long expected, differs in nothing but size from the ordinary No-Popery tracts, and exceeds them, if possible, in rant, bigotry, harsh words, reviling, and insult. It is, in a word, what might have been expected from some Rev. Hezekiah Howler, or other dissenting minister of low degree, and not from a dignified minister or priest, as he calls himself, of the Anglo-American Episcopal Catholic Church!

LECTURES ON THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE SHALLOWNESS OF UNBELIEF. Delivered by the *Most Rev. Roger Bede Vaughan*, Archbishop of Sidney. Baltimore: John B. Piet. 1879.

The design of these lectures is to show that the religion of denial is not only a shallow one, having no real foundation for its assumptions, and self-contradictory in its conclusions, but also that it is utterly unfitted to satisfy the wants of humanity, while the religion of affirmation, in other words, of Christianity, is adapted in a marvellous manner to meet those wants, is supported by such an array of arguments, and is so consonant to reason, that to reject it would be to act not only against the enlightened dictates of conscience, but also in opposition to those universally accepted maxims of prudence which are the guide of all reasonable men in every important secular affair of life.

The learned prelate develops his argument from a fourfold basis: First, from a consideration of the intellectual and moral constitution of MAN, he shows that he was made for "something beyond living as a mere animal on earth; secondly, that from what we know of GOD, from the evidences which lie spread out before the intellectual eye of every thinking, rational creature, His existence is as undeniable a fact as the existence of man himself, and that before the creature can deny the existence of the Creator he must first of all deny the truthfulness of those intellectual and moral faculties which for the very initial steps of reasoning he cannot choose but to trust;" thirdly, that "the religion of denial or unbelief is not merely shallow as a philosophy and empty as a religion, but, moreover, that it is the fruitful parent of intellectual imbecility, moral depravity, and spiritual death;" and fourthly, that Christianity, as no other system has done or can do, "solves difficulties, unravels doubts, gives a meaning to life and an illumination to death," and that though, like all things else, it is charged with mysteries, that is to say, with things which during this life cannot be explained, still its bases are so wide and deep, its proofs are so multitudinous, and, when taken together, so overwhelming, that enlightened reason in the order of thought and common prudence in the practical order compel men, in spite of all its difficulties, which are in themselves rather than in Christianity, to submit to its authority.

Apart from the pre-eminent ability with which the argument is developed and enforced, the lectures are especially valuable from the fact that the lecturer shapes his remarks throughout the whole five discourses with constant and direct reference to present forms of disbelief.

A GRAMMAR OF THE IRISH LANGUAGE FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS. By P. W. Joyce, LL.D., T.C.D., M.R.I.A. New York: Printed by Lynch, Cole & Meehan, at the office of the *Irish American*, No. 12 Warren Street. 1879.

Within the last few years the study of the Irish language has received an impetus which may, with the proper effort, be made to develop into a genuine revival. Its introduction into the national schools of Ireland, less than two years ago, can be made a most important factor in the accomplishment of this praiseworthy end, and the system which was at first intended to destroy not only the language but also the religion of the Irish people, has been made to serve a most laudable object; for the distinctiveness of a people's nationality depends very much on the preservation of the mother tongue. But this is not the only reason why the Irish language should be preserved. It is not only the oldest now spoken by any people, but with few of the faults it has all the beauties of the languages of antiquity, and its literature is yet rich in treasures of rare value, though the greater part of it was lost in the tumult and destruction which accompanied barbarian invasion and internecine strife. Enough of it remains, however, to make the language worth studying by a more numerous class than the few who devote their time to philological and antiquarian research. Besides, the old tongue may again become as much the language of the people as French is that of so large a portion of our neighbors across the northern frontier.

For the study of the Irish language many textbooks have been compiled of late years. The most valuable we consider to be those of Canon Bourke, written while this distinguished scholar was yet a student of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. But both his *Easy Lessons* and his *Irish Grammar* are beyond the reach of the vast majority of the people. A want which was long felt has, however, at last been supplied by the elementary work whose title we have placed at the head of this notice.

Coming from the distinguished author of *Irish Names and Places*, it is unnecessary either to criticise its merits or point them out in detail. It fulfils every promise made in the preface, and more; its rules are clear, concise, and correct. It comprises everything necessary—for a student of modern Irish. We have no hesitation in recommending it to the Irish classes that have already been or may yet be formed in this country. Private students will also find it of great advantage. It is retailed at the moderate price of twenty-five cents.

THE GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, WITH AN ESSAY ON DANIEL WEBSTER AS A MASTER OF ENGLISH STYLE. By *Edwin P. Whipple*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1879.

The object of this volume is not to supersede the standard edition of Daniel Webster's works in six volumes, edited by Edward Everett, and issued by Messrs. Little, Brown & Co.; but rather to revive public interest in them by republishing some of his most prominent orations and speeches.

In the preface it is well remarked, that "among the eminent men who have influenced legislative assemblies in Great Britain and the United States during the past one hundred and twenty years, it is curious that only two, Edmund Burke and Daniel Webster, have established themselves as men of the first class in English and American literature; and that it is only by a study of what they authorized to be published under their names that we can adequately comprehend either their position among the political forces of their time, or their rank among the great masters of English eloquence and style."

The volume before us contains most of the speeches of the great statesman on questions relating to the Constitution of the United States and his historical orations; including also the famous Dartmouth College Case, the Girard Will Case, the Discourse on the First Settlement of New England, the Landing at Plymouth, at the Laying of the Corner Stone and on the Completion of the Bunker Hill Monument, on Adams and Jefferson, on the Character of Washington, the memorable "Reply to Hayne," Exclusion of Slavery from the Territories, and a number of others of Mr. Webster's most renowned speeches and orations.

The appendix contains his papers on the Impressment of Seamen, the Right of Search, Letters to General Cass on the Treaty of Washington, and the memorable Hulseman Letter.

The introductory essay on Daniel Webster as a Master of English Style, by Mr. Whipple, is itself an admirable specimen of good English. It contains a number of very interesting anecdotes and reminiscences of Mr. Webster, and is valuable as a study both of his character and his style.

MAJOLICA AND FAYENCE. ITALIAN, SICILIAN, MAJORCAN, HISPANO-MORESQUE, AND PERSIAN. By *Arthur Beckwith*. With Photo-Engraved Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

By persons interested in the history and progress of the ceramic art, and, indeed, by all lovers of art, this work will be regarded as a valuable addition to their means of knowledge. Though specially devoted to discussions of the productions technically styled Majolica and Fayence, it incidentally, but frequently, touches upon kindred topics, and is full of interesting information to the student of æsthetics.

The author gives the following account of the mode of producing

these wares: "The body of Italian fayence and majolica is a plastic clay, mixed with a limy, sandy clay. It is once baked and coated with an enamel containing lead, tin, quartz sand, salt, and soda. This opaque enamel is then painted upon with hard fire colors, as was the practice in the sixteenth century—a difficult process, but one giving great brilliancy of tone—or it is colored over the fired enamel with softer colors and fired again."

It would require too much space to follow the author in his history of the rise and progress of the ceramic art as it specially entered into the manufacture and ornamentation of these beautiful wares in the different regions of Italy, Persia, and Spain. Suffice it to say that the book is replete with valuable and interesting information, and is enriched with engravings illustrating the different styles of the wares and the ornamentation of its finest specimens.

Towards the close of the work there is a valuable chapter upon art, following which are hints for painting upon pottery and an account of the specimens of modern fayence at the Centennial Exposition, with the names of the exhibitors or manufacturers in France, England, Germany, Brazil, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, and the United States. Those who examined the collection of Signor Alessandro Castellani at the Centennial Exposition will be pleased to know that the work contains representations of the pieces of pottery in his beautiful collection.

FIVE-MINUTE SERMONS FOR LOW MASSES ON ALL SUNDAYS OF THE YEAR. By *Priests of the Congregation of St. Paul*. Vol. I. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1879.

This is the first volume of a series of sermons that were commenced in St. Paul's Church, New York, towards the close of the year 1876. The motive for preaching these short sermons was that the great number of persons who generally attend on a Low Mass on Sundays might have the advantage of hearing the word of God preached without protracting the services. For this reason the sermons were limited to five minutes, and the effort was made to condense, with that brief period, a sufficient amount of instructive and hortatory matter to answer the purpose of plain practical discourses, so that they would be both solid and pungent, and furnish real nutriment to the minds and hearts of the audience.

To accomplish this it was necessary that each sermon should be carefully planned and written out, omitting all rhetorical superfluities, and condensing the matter into pithy, pointed utterances. The merit of devising and first carrying out this plan belongs to the late Algernon A. Brown, C.S.P., and many of the sermons in this volume are from his pen.

The discourses are not fragments of sermons. Each is a whole in itself. They are direct, logical, practical, pungent, and contain in small space a large amount of instructive and edifying matter. They are published now in book form in order to give to the very many persons who would not read longer discourses the advantage they may derive from these, and also with the hope that they may be useful to many priests, who may read them or use them in preparing similar short sermons of their own.

THE GRACCHI, MARIUS AND SULLA. By *A. H. Beesly*. With Maps. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

The half century of the history comprised in this volume may be said

to constitute the climax of the movement which swept the Roman people into an abyss of corruption and degradation, of which, even with the facts before us, we can scarcely form an idea. The forces which carried this movement forward had long been at work. They were inherent in the social and political constitution of the Roman people; every conquest, every addition of territory, but aggravated the evils which culminated in the convulsions that led to the establishment of complete political absolutism under Augustus Cæsar.

A careful study of this period will well repay thoughtful minds in the valuable lessons it contains. On the one side were a few nobles and state officials immensely wealthy, corrupted by luxury, selfish, tyrannical, cruel; on the other a populace debased, degraded, caring for nothing but existence and amusement, the clients or hangers-on of the wealthy; and underneath all this an immense multitude of slaves in a condition of horrible wretchedness. The events that occurred were the natural outcome of this, and culminated, as we have said, after a series of convulsions which only hastened on the final catastrophe, in the people of Rome voluntarily accepting a condition of things which allowed to them nothing of liberty but the name.

The volume before us forms a valuable introduction to the study of the subsequent era,—that of Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Cicero, and Cæsar Augustus. It has evidently been carefully prepared, and explains, as clearly as can well be made out from the confusion and obscurity which characterize that period of Roman history, the real intentions and purposes of Caius and Tiberius Gracchus, and the subsequent horrors which Marius and Sulla inflicted on the Roman people.

SURIUS, HISTORIÆ seu VITÆ SANCTORUM juxta optimam Coloniensem editionem, nunc vero ex recentioribus et probatissimis monumentis numero auctæ, mendis expurgatæ et notis exornatæ: quibus accedit Martyrologium Romanum breviter illustratum, Taurinensi Presbytero e Congregat. Cleric. Regg. S. Pauli curante. Vol. X. October. Augustæ Taurinorum: ex typographia Petri Marietti. 1879, 8vo., pp. 914.

The work of the pious Carthusian, Lawrence Surius, was, before the days of the Bollandists and even since, for many, the great repertory and reading book of hagiology. The writer was not only remarkable for holiness, but also for great learning. He was the friend and pupil of the great Canisius, the modern Catholic Apostle of Germany. Indeed, it was by counsel of this great Saint that Surius entered the Carthusian order to escape the dangers of the world and the contagion of Lutheranism, which was then spreading all over his native land. Though our author did not live in a critical age, and much of what he wrote would have to be corrected by reference to the more enlightened judgment of a Pagi, Papebroke, or Tillemont, yet Surius has not lost favor, and his style, which is devotional and good Latin, still recommends him to many readers. It is objected to him, however, that he took too great liberties with the text of the old chroniclers, not altering the sense but changing their style, which may be agreeable to ordinary readers, but is disliked by students. The present editor, who modestly conceals his name, is a Barnabite of Turin. The volume before us contains the lives of the Saints for the month of October.

HISTORY OF MARYLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY. By J. Thomas Scharf, Esq. Baltimore: John B. Piet. 1880. Two volumes, 8vo.

These two volumes bring the history of the State from its first settlement down to the War of 1812; the third, which is soon to appear, will

continue it down to our own day. Maryland has great and noble materials for history, and it is to be wondered that she has not ere this found a historian. The works of Bozman, McMahon, and McSherry either deal only with portions of her history, or are intended for nothing more than popular reading. Mr. Scharf has given us a history worthy of the grand old commonwealth to which he belongs. He has gone over the whole ground of Maryland toleration, and thoroughly disproves the newfangled notions of Brantz Mayer, Rev. Messrs. Neill and Brown, and others, by whom the historian Bancroft was led into error; though this signifies very little, for no one who has read Mr. Bancroft's silly letters addressed from Berlin to the Washington Government can feel much respect for his opinions on any subject. We regret that the space at our disposal does not allow a more extended notice of Mr. Scharf's splendid work, but we shall return to it in our next number.

The typographical execution of the work is excellent and reflects the highest credit on the publisher, Mr. John B. Piet.

DE RECIDIVIS ET OCCASIONARIIS ET DE PRAXI CONFESSARIORUM. Auctore *Emilio Berardi*, Parocho Faventine diocesis. Editio secunda auctior et ad novam formam redacta. Faventiæ: ex typographia Novelli. 1877. Two volumes, 8vo.

There is nothing more important, and at the same time more arduous, in the administration of the Sacrament of Penance than to determine exactly when Christian prudence allows the boon of absolution to be unhesitatingly granted, or when it requires it to be withheld for a time for the penitent's own good and the honor of the Sacrament itself. Here, as in everything else, there are two extremes,—excessive caution and boundless indulgence. And between these two the wise minister of God's pardoning must steer a middle course. The principles that must guide him are laid down, of course, in all treatises of Moral Theology. But they cannot be given there with such fulness of development and illustration as they have been in this estimable book by the Parish Priest of Faenza. He holds, on the whole, a just mean between rigor and indulgence; and if he ever inclines in one direction it is, perhaps, on the stricter side. The work will be very useful to those priests who are perplexed at times to know how to keep the golden mean with the class of sinners mentioned in the author's title-page.

MEDITATIONS AND CONTEMPLATIONS ON THE SACRED PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, AND ON THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. With Instructions on Prayer. Translated from the Spanish of the Venerable Luis of Grenada, O.P., by a member of the Order of Mercy. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1879.

The Venerable Luis of Grenada has long been regarded as one of the ablest masters of the spiritual life. His published works have always borne the highest reputation. They were warmly commended in a brief by Pope Gregory XIII. St. Charles Borromeo preferred them to all other spiritual writings, and made them the subject of daily meditation. St. Francis de Sales advised every priest to procure them and make them his second breviary.

We welcome, therefore, this translation of one of the venerable author as a very valuable addition to English Catholic devotional literature. It is published with the *imprimatur* of His Eminence, Cardinal McCloskey, and a warmly expressed approbation of the Most Rev. N. J. Perche, Archbishop of New Orleans.

GREETINGS TO THE CHRIST CHILD: a Collection of Christmas Poems for the Young. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1880.

This is a delightful volume for children, and even for those of more advanced years. The illustrations are good, and the poems well chosen. The latter are not strained and elaborate, like so much of the ambitious poetry of the day, which often needs hard study to find out wherein consists its title to the name. They are all selected from Father Faber, Longfellow, F. Abraham Ryan, etc., and will make their way at once to the hearts of all, old and young.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION. A paper read before the University Convocation of the State of New York at Albany, July 11th, 1877. By *Brother Azarias* of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. New York: E. Steiger.

A brief pamphlet of not many pages; but terse, elegant, full of vigor and keen analysis, like everything that comes from the pen of the gifted President of Rock Hill College.

THE STORY OF JESUS. Simply told for the Young. By *Rosa Mulholland*, with a preface by *Rev. Richard Brennan, LL.D.* Benziger Brothers, 1880.

It is not always an easy matter to maintain the dignity of a religious subject when it has to be lowered to the capacity of children. Yet the fair authoress has done this most admirably, giving Our Lord's whole life in beautiful yet simple language, adapted to the intelligence of any child. Both this and the preceding are very appropriate gift-books for the season, as they are very nicely gotten up and well illustrated.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS NOVISSIMI ECCLESIAE DOCTORIS S. ALPHONSI IN COMPENDIUM REDACTA ET USUI VENERABILIS CLERI AMERICANI ACCOMODATA. Auctore *A. Konings, C.S.S.R.* Editio quarta auctor et emendatio. Neo-Eboraci: Benziger Fratres. 1880. Two vols., royal, 8vo.

We have already noticed with commendation in a former number this excellent work of Father Konings. It is a sign of the favor with which it has been received by the clergy and theological students that it has already reached a fourth edition.

PRELUDES. By *Maurice F. Egan*. Philadelphia: P. F. Cunningham. 1880.

We have read this little volume, which contains much more of value than its modest title would suggest. Mr. Egan is no trifling songster, but a genuine poet. If he but continues as he has begun, he will yet carve out for himself a name and reputation amongst the few poets of whom the country can boast.

THE HOLY MASS. A History of the Mass and its Ceremonies in the Eastern and Western Church. By *Rev. John O'Brien, A.M.* Fourth edition. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1880.

This admirable book has been already praised, as it deserved, in the pages of the REVIEW. The author, we understand, had before his death prepared a good deal of additional matter, which it is to be hoped will enrich some future edition.

THE ILLUSTRATED CATHOLIC FAMILY ANNUAL FOR 1880. New York: Catholic Publication Society.

For neatness, elegance, and most interesting and useful information this is one of the best works in the country. And if the Catholic Publication Society were to publish nothing else, it ought to exist for the sake of this Annual alone.

